THE MODERN WORLD

F. S. MARVIN

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THE MODERN WORLD

EUROPE FROM THE FRENCH REVOLUTION TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

BY

F. S. MARVIN

WITH TEN MAPS

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PREFACE

It is hoped that this book will be found to contain as much of the general political history of the nineteenth century as is usually expected in the studies and examinations of scholars at about the age of sixteen. This is the central thread, and as the subject is European history, France, Germany and Italy receive the largest space, in that order, and English history, though not ignored, is only introduced in its necessary place in that connection. But beyond this it has been attempted, to a greater extent than in any other book of the same size and scope, to sketch the changes in thought and the advance in knowledge and in economic and social organisation which have become prominent in the period. The growth of world organisations, of which the League of Nations is the most notable and active, is probably the most important feature of the age, and the author agrees with the late Professor William Bateson that it is mainly by the operations of science that "the earth has for practical purposes so shrunk that a unity of public opinion once created can now be maintained in a way which in the time of our grandfathers would have been impossible."

F. S. MARVIN.

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THE MODERN WORLD

PROLOGUE

If we are to study history in an orderly way and remember anything definite about it, we need to measure and divide up the stream of time by some commonly accepted units, just as we use a yard or a metre for our measure of length and a pound or a kilo for our measure of weight. To gain this definiteness in a uniform way men have gradually come, since the Christian era, to think in centuries, though obviously they did not always do so, nor is the habit yet universally fixed. In Roman times they dated by the consuls, starting from the supposed year of the Foundation of the City. The Greeks had their era of the Olympic games, held regularly every four years, from about the same time as the traditional founding of Rome. The Mahommedan world still dates officially from the Flight of the Prophet, and so on. With modern educated people the best test of familiarity with history is whether a person is in the habit of referring events, almost automatically, to their proper century.

Of course, this is a rough-and-ready way of reckoning historic time, but, using this method of description, we should say that the nineteenth century is the subject of this book, and in particular the history of Europe, as the centre of Western Civilisation, in the nineteenth century.

Now it happens that in this case, if we interpret the

nineteenth century rather generously and add to it a few years both at the beginning and the end, we gain a real period of history in which great events happened which have changed society more deeply and rapidly than it had ever been changed in the same length of time before. Hence the importance of studying it, and it is very convenient that the real period within which these changes have been effected comes so near to the actual limits of the century itself.

If we go back eleven years from the beginning of the century we come to 1789, the date of the assembly of the States-General in France which ushered in the French Revolution. If we go back four years more to 1785, we reach the date when the first cotton mill was worked by a steam-engine ; and this may well be taken as the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. At the other end of the century, if we add on fourteen years we come to 1914, the outbreak of the Great War which shook Europe as a whole more violently than any single event had shaken it since the downfall of the Roman Empire. And another five years will bring in the foundation of the League of Nations which bids fair to become the most important political institution in the world.

Hence our real subject is Europe from the Revolution (political and industrial) to the Great War and the League of Nations, which is, roughly speaking, the history of the nineteenth century, but overlaps it slightly at both ends.

It will help us in following the threads of the story, which is extremely complicated in its details, if we try to think out at starting what the main changes are which have come over society in Europe and its offshoots during this time of rapid change.

We will put down those points in which a clear and marked change has taken place, which no one can dispute,

and leave aside for the moment the other changes about which we cannot be so certain, such as the popular taste in art and literature, ideas of freedom and tolerance in religion, and so on. Important changes have taken place in these things too, and we shall notice them, so far as there is space, as we go along. But they are often rather symptoms of the other changes than things much changed in themselves. We should have to go much further back than the French Revolution for the critical points in men's ideas about art and many other things, but we can see quite distinctly changes that amount to a transformation scene in the way people live together and govern themselves and do their work.

We will take first the two main changes which are connected with the great events from which we date the period —the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution.

1. *Popular Government.*—Before the French Revolution no great state in Europe, with the exception of Great Britain, had a constitutional government through elected representatives of the governed and by ministers responsible to them. Even in Great Britain, which was the example always before the eyes of "liberals" abroad, the system was limited and full of abuses. At the end of our period such government has become the rule, and its extension is eagerly sought in countries, such as India, China, Persia, and Turkey, where the idea was never entertained until the end of the nineteenth century.

On this line we shall find that the influence of France and England, sometimes in conflict but fundamentally co-operating, has been the most decisive.

2. *Science Extending and Organising Industry.*—At the beginning of the period the population of the world was mainly agricultural and industry mostly domestic or carried on in small workshops. At the end of it the factory system predominates, and in England, which was the pioneer in the

change, a quarter of the population is to be found in towns of over two hundred thousand inhabitants and only a tenth in the villages. This change is ultimately due to the extension of physical science, in which all civilised men have taken part, but it has involved also the exercise and growth of organising powers in which Europeans have been foremost. Each town and country has thus been organised in a social way, the whole world within the period been knit up by railways, steamships, telegraphs, wireless, and aeroplanes—all the fruit of science. This "revolution," still rapidly going on, is the greatest that mankind has ever seen.

3. *The Growth of Nations.*—At the beginning of the period, though there was in many countries a strong feeling of nationality, *i.e.* that the people were one, by living in the same land and having had a common history and generally speaking a common tongue, yet this had not connected itself as a rule with the power of governing themselves, and being independent of other rule. The ruling power was in most cases assigned to some person or family who had it by inheritance, and this inherited right was a relic of the old system which came down from the Middle Ages, and is known as "feudalism." At the end of the period the consciousness of nationality had become almost universal, and it had achieved its purpose, of independence and self-government, in most parts of the world. The French Revolution and the subsequent opposition to Napoleon gave the strongest impulse to this in the early century, and the Great War at the end of the period.

4. *Social Reform.*—Connected with all the previous changes—with self-government, the industrial revolution, and the growth of nations—there has come everywhere the attempt to use the wealth and power of the State to raise, educate, and make happier the mass of their populations. This desire has during the period taken the form of a

systematic policy, almost a religion—Socialism, Communism, and so on. But it is also a marked feature of all the national governments of the time who would not accept the creed of the theorists.

5. *Expansion of the West.*—The same period has witnessed an unexampled extension of European or Western influence or control over the greater part of the globe. Colonies, inhabited or governed by white men, have spread everywhere, and in other countries, *e.g.* China, where the West has not established itself in power, Western ideas of science, government, and social life have become more and more dominant.

6. *The League of Nations.*—At the beginning of the period all the dealings between different states were carried on by means of ambassadors or envoys who acted on instructions from their home governments and according to a code of behaviour which we call diplomacy, and which had grown up since the end of the Middle Ages. In case of dispute the friendly services of other parties might be called in, but there was no international court or machinery to bring people together and no international associations except for religion. The war with Napoleon produced the first attempt at a regular international association which was put into operation. This was the "Holy Alliance." The whole period is full of new international leagues and arbitration, and its end is marked by the establishment of a world-wide political organisation—the League of Nations—both to prevent war and to concentrate the efforts of all nations in helping one another.

This world-wide organisation thus sums up and symbolises the history of the period. The League Assembly at Geneva, with its fifty-five states-members from all quarters of the globe, presents a picture of the world, full of rising nations, covered by exploration and colonisation, and gradually

drawn together by organisation of which the peoples and the events treated in this book are the nervous centre.

While the six great topics just mentioned will be found useful in sorting out the tangled threads of the story, it is also convenient to divide the whole period chronologically into five sections :

Book I. The Revolution to 1815. Napoleon.

Book II. 1815 to 1848. Peace ; Reaction. Beginnings of Reform and National Revolts. The origin of Socialism. Revolutions with a socialistic element.

Book III. 1848 to 1871. The unification of Italy and Germany. Social Reform. Science ; the theory of Evolution and of Progress. National Ambitions and the Second Empire in France.

Book IV. 1871 to 1901. Industrial and commercial development. State activity and Social Reform. Germany as a type. Austria and the Balkans. Russia. Colonial expansion and the rivalry of Empires.

Book V. 1901 to 1920. The new grouping of the Powers and the part taken by England. The World War. The Treaty of Versailles and the new nations. The League of Nations. Science still growing.

BOOK I

THE REVOLUTION TO 1815

CHAPTER I

THE END OF THE OLD RÉGIME

We begin at 1789, with the summoning of the States-General in France, because that let loose the most violent and startling series of events which Europe has ever seen. The Great War set larger armies in motion and led to a greater loss of lives and property and greater changes in governments; but the twenty-five years from the outbreak of the Revolution to the final banishment of Napoleon contain a much more exciting and romantic story. They saw the ancient government of France, the leading country of Europe, overthrown, and its king and queen, the daughter of the Holy Roman Emperor, put to death on the scaffold. The men who did this and had for the time the command of all the resources of the country, then proceeded, in face of the general horror of Europe, and the armed opposition of its leading governments, to overrun and conquer all the lands nearest to them, except our own. The man who helped them most to do it, Napoleon, was not himself a Frenchman but a man of the most extraordinary energy, practical ability, and ambition. He rose on the enthusiasm created by the Revolution in France, and, using this as his lever, became

an emperor in France, a dictator in Europe, and the would-be ruler of the world. Again, within five years from his highest power, he had fallen to the depths and had been twice banished, to die at last in strict imprisonment on a distant island. There is no story like this in the world.

But we know in history that nothing happens without adequate causes, and even the most brilliant personalities only act in and through a society which has been prepared and co-operates with them. So it was with Napoleon and the Revolution. The changes which took place in France, and the use which Napoleon made of them to produce further changes in Europe, were the result of much earlier thinking, and were provoked by evils, abuses, and unreasonable things which men had been suffering from and criticising for many years. We cannot, of course, pretend to give in this short book what the leading thinkers had been saying even about the one subject of government. But we must mention a few of them, and above all try and understand the state of society which the men of the Revolution set out to amend.

We shall begin with France, which is certainly in the centre of the picture for all the earlier part of the century, alluding to England by way of comparison as we go along, and bringing in the other countries as they come within the scope of French influence which flowed for a time like a lava stream over Europe from the volcano in Paris.

The evils attacked were all connected in some way with the traditional government of the country, and the new state of things which was desired seemed generally to be obtainable by changing the government. This led to exaggerated ideas of what governments can do, as we can see in many schemes of industry and education later on. It is ultimately the minds of people which count for most, what they think about the world and life and what they desire ; yet, at the time we are speaking of, there were such gross evils directly dependent

on the government that it looked as if violent measures, what is known as a revolution, were necessary in order to give the ordinary quiet means of improvement a chance of making their way.

The king in France, more than anywhere else, had become since the Middle Ages the centre and source of power and privilege and fashion. He had had a hard time in fighting down his feudal rivals in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and now he reigned alone and gathered them all around him in the court at Versailles. There were, of course, various indirect checks on his absolute rule, but no regular Parliament granting supplies and no system of local government as in England, headed by the landed gentry. Under the glittering pinnacle of the court all sorts of anomalies, abuses, hardships, and privileges filled up the social fabric. The nobles who with the Church formed two of the " Three Estates " of the realm, used so to meet in feudal times, but they had not done so for many years. In that ancient form their Assembly would have been ludicrous as a representation of the nation, for the higher nobility were satellites of the king at Versailles, enjoyed all the higher posts in the army, and drew their revenues from rents and feudal dues paid by their farmers and peasants, to whom they rendered no service in return.

In a similar way the higher and better-paid dignities in the Church were filled by courtiers, while the hard work was done by the lower clergy who lived in obscurity with hardly enough to live on. The Church and the nobles together—two of the Three Estates—made up about a quarter of a million, and all the rest of the population, unprivileged and mostly poor and tillers of the soil, were twenty-five million.

Such were the main social anomalies, but those of law and taxation were equally flagrant.

Though the king was, in theory at least, an autocrat, he did not rule over a compact and uniform kingdom. The various provinces of France had come under the king's rule at various times and had never been brought into a common system. There were nearly three hundred different legal codes in force in different parts, and the country was divided up internally by the custom-boundaries, similar to those which give us so much trouble at the present day between different states.

Two taxes in particular were grossly unfair, though in different ways : the tax on salt and the *taille* or personal tax, or tax on land. The former might vary as much as twenty or thirty times the amount between neighbouring towns or districts. The latter was levied only on the non-noble class, and was a relic, like many others, of feudal dues, once paid to the overlord as part of the labour that was owing to him in return for the defence that he provided. But now he was no defence at all, while his pigeons were always devouring the crops and he alone had the right to hunt or shoot.

There was thus ample reason in the government of France for extreme irritation among the governed, and it had been plain for some time to far-sighted observers that great changes were bound to come. Some predicted a general upheaval ; some hoped for gradual and peaceful reform. In the end the conflict came about, like the English Civil War in the seventeenth century, through financial causes. But in France the discontent and the discord went far deeper than they did with us.

The deeper criticism of the existing order, which had been going on for some time, was sharpened and provoked to action by the far more serious and scandalous state of misgovernment. A few words are necessary on each side of this preparation, before we enter on the events themselves.

Four writers of a large number—often called collectively the "philosophes"—must be mentioned specially for their influence on the minds of the men who were to make the Revolution; some knowledge of their writings is essential if we are really to understand what happened. The best known was Voltaire, who had died a popular hero in 1778, eleven years before the Revolution began. He had prepared for it by a long life of incessant criticism of what he saw in Church and State, and by the passionate defence of certain victims of injustice in his old age. He had also introduced to the French many ideas gained from his visit to England in early life, and especially an admiration for Sir Isaac Newton and the philosophy of science. Voltaire was not a revolutionary or even a radical, and we might compare his position at this time with that of Erasmus on the eve of the Reformation. The revolutionary thinker was Rousseau, who helped to form the minds and suggest the policy of many actors in the drama, including men so widely different as Robespierre and Napoleon. He also was dead, but his ideas of starting society afresh by sweeping away existing institutions and building on the foundation of men's original good dispositions were very much alive. To him, too, may be traced the revolutionary governing principle of the sovereignty of the people. Inspired by this, the men, or even the man, who gained command for the time of the national resources, thought it right and possible to use this power despotically for the ends which seemed good to them. But this is to anticipate the story.

On the quieter and more solid side, we must add to the two leading names those of Diderot and Montesquieu, the former for his work in popularising scientific knowledge in the famous *Encyclopædia*, the latter for pointing out the natural laws that prevail in fitting men's government to their conditions, and, like Voltaire, for directing attention to the example of England.

All the critics were keen on the economic evils, and these abuses, which touched all men's pockets, were perhaps, as they are so often, the strongest incitement to revolt. While every one, except the favoured few, suffered from unjust taxes, wastefully collected, they could all see the king and court revelling in luxury and splendour ; and in the case of Louis XV the king and court were disgraceful as well as extravagant. The splendour and the luxury, even the abuses, had been tolerated in the great days of Louis XIV, but Louis XV had died in 1774, after a reign of fifty years during which his personal degradation had kept pace with public disasters and inefficiency. France had lost to England nearly all her possessions in India and America, and she was practically bankrupt. In spite of the grinding taxes there was an annual deficit, and there had been a partial repudiation of debt. Yet courtiers and mistresses continued to batten on the public funds, and every evil in the system was aggravated and more patent than before.

Louis XVI, who was to be a victim for the misdeeds of others rather than his own, came to the throne at the age of twenty. Though personally well-meaning and entirely free from the vices of his grandfather, he had none of the qualities which might have enabled him to ride the storm and steer the ship of state into the calmer waters of constitutional monarchy. With good intentions and an honourable and affectionate disposition, he had no energy, no judgment, no power over others. And his wife, Marie Antoinette, who had been brought from Austria in 1770 and married to him on political grounds, was the worst possible consort to help him in the crisis.

The king's first effort to meet the situation was intelligent, but, like all his subsequent efforts, not followed up with energy and determination. He appointed as controller-general, *i.e.* the government official in charge of the

revenue, Turgot, one of the "philosophes" with special interest in economics. Turgot was much influenced by the ideas of Adam Smith, the great apostle of freedom in economics, who frequented Paris in the 'sixties and 'seventies of the eighteenth century and brought out his book on the *Wealth of Nations* in 1776. Turgot had good ideas and energy in abundance, but he was entirely dependent on the backing of his master, and Louis soon yielded to the pressure of those whom the reforms affected and especially of the court circle which always had the king's ear and actually ruled him in all the backward and fatal steps of his reign. Four great reforms which Turgot at once put in motion, aroused the storm which swept him away after two years of office. Economy at court, freedom in the grain trade, abolition of the restrictive guilds in industry, and, most serious in provoking opposition, the abolition of the "corvée" or compulsory work on roads. The public roads had always been made and repaired by the forced labour of the peasants who were bound to bring horses and carts for so long every year and work without any pay. Turgot's idea was that this work should be paid for out of taxes, and both nobility and clergy opposed it on the ground of privilege. They had never been required to do the work; why should they now have to pay for it?

The king bowed to the storm, and Turgot went, though he left behind him a great example and explained to the public in the preambles to his decrees the chief abuses which had to be removed and suggested various means, including local assemblies, by which the work might be carried out. Necker, a famous financier, who succeeded him, though he also knew the right road to follow, actually added to the financial confusion by borrowing large sums to meet the war which France was now waging with England on behalf of the United States. Then came Calonne, who began by spending

money profusely, but called a halt in 1787 with a report which declared that the State was on the verge of bankruptcy, and that nothing could save it but a radical reform of the "whole public order."

This was the last cry of the old régime and ushered in the Revolution.

CHAPTER II

THE REVOLUTION

The need of money was to lead to the summoning of the States-General of the realm, which had never met since 1614. The remaining stages followed quickly when Calonne had discovered and proclaimed impending bankruptcy in 1787. Although there was no Parliament, like that in England, there were bodies of lawyers all over France called Parlements, who had to register new laws in their districts before they could be put in force. Of these, naturally, that in Paris was the most important. It fell to this body to make the first open resistance to the king's decrees which led to the calling the States-General. The Parlement of Paris in 1787 refused to register new laws which involved taxation, and Calonne then persuaded the king to summon an assembly of the notables—princes, bishops, presidents of parliaments, and so on—and these too refused to accept the decrees. By the autumn of 1787 the king had pledged himself to call the States-General within five years. These first protesting bodies were, of course, largely interested themselves, but the Parlement of Paris expressed the growing determination of the whole nation when it said that, "Only the nation assembled in the States-General can give the consent necessary to the establishment of a permanent tax. Only the nation, after it has learned the true state of the finances, can destroy the great abuses and open up important resources."

Here we see the self-governing motive which is at the root of this side of the Revolution, first put forth clearly by a public and legal authority in France.

The king's promise of five years was cut much shorter by the necessities of the case, and by the popular clamour which became urgent all over the country, in support of the Parlements and in calling for the speedy assembly of the States-General. Grenoble in Dauphiné was the most outspoken. There the Three Estates met of their own accord and repeated the claims of the Parlement of Paris, adding a demand for freedom from arbitrary imprisonment and punishment which the king and court were in the habit of dealing out to those who opposed them. This was in 1788. At last the popular step was decided on. Necker was recalled and the States-General promised for the following spring.

When the Assembly was once granted the whole country awoke to discuss the event. What were these Estates? What ought they to do? What were they likely to do? The king invited these inquiries and the printing presses rained pamphlets. The most famous was that by an abbé called Siéyès, who was to play a considerable part all through the Revolution. It was entitled *What is the Third Estate?* and his answer was given in the opening sentence: "What is the Tiers-État?—Everything. What has it been in the political order up to the present?—Nothing. What does it ask?—To become something." More than that, he attacked the privileged orders, who were claiming two-thirds of the voting power, as a malignant ulcer which only torments and weakens the body. Its "place in the constitution" was to be cut out. His view, as we shall see, prevailed almost from the first moment of the opening of the Estates. But the general tenor of these pamphlets, and of the "*cahiers*" or lists of grievances which the communes and towns were

asked to submit, was not violent or revolutionary. They practically all agreed that constitutional reform was the one thing needed. They wanted to change the absolute monarchy into a limited one, with an instrument declaring what were the rights of all men, and with laws passed to secure them.

The Estates met on the 5th of May, 1789, in Versailles, and by the middle of June the Third Estate had established themselves as the National Assembly calling on the representatives of the other orders to join them. From the first moment they had decided that voting must be by heads and not by orders.

There were two great scenes before the king accepted this initial step ; the first, when the assembly, excluded by the court from their proper meeting place, took refuge in the neighbouring tennis-court and swore to continue their sittings ; the second, and decisive one, on the 23rd of June, when the king held a Royal Sitting, with the hall surrounded by troops. He made them a speech in which reforms of the most flagrant abuses were promised, but concluded by warning them from any tampering with the constitution, and bidding them return, each order to its own place. He withdrew himself with the nobles and most of the clergy ; but the commons sat on. " Did you hear the king's orders ? " asked the Master of the Ceremonies. " I think the nation in assembly cannot receive an order," replied Bailly, the astronomer, who was in the chair. And then Mirabeau, the hero of this first phase of the Revolution, rose and shouted, " Go and tell those who send you that we are here by the will of the people, and that we will only go if we are driven out by bayonets." The bayonets were not used, the king yielded and wrote to the clergy and nobles to join the commons. The initial revolutionary step had been dared and won.

The story which follows, the most often told in modern history, is punctuated in the ordinary account by the days of thrilling incident so dear to the French narrator, July 14, August 10, Vendémiaire and the ninth of Brumaire. For the summary view, which is all that can be attempted here, it is more important to distinguish the main natural phases through which the struggle passed. For about two years the king kept his place, torn to and fro by conflicting counsels. During this time he was nominally working under the new constitution which was speedily drawn up. In the next phase the king put himself in the hands of the anti-revolutionary party who did their best to arm Europe against France and reinstate the king in his previous position. The effect of this on the mass of Frenchmen was to create a wild enthusiasm for the Revolution and put power in the hands of the group of men in Paris who showed themselves most capable of wielding it. The war was declared by France on Austria in 1792, and the king executed in January, 1793. After his execution the various factions in the new Convention fell on one another, and by the end of 1794, in comparative calm, the stage was cleared for the appearance of the first soldier who was willing and able to use his military success for political ends. In this way Napoleon, before the end of the century, became supreme.

The National Assembly, after asserting its rights and its unity against the court party in June, 1789, proceeded at once to draw up the constitution which the nation had demanded. But its enemies were equally ready to get to work. The king was induced to dismiss Necker and to mass his Swiss and German troops in Paris "to keep order" as he would say, "to slaughter patriots" as the friends of the Revolution were quick to retort. At any rate, by the 14th of July the populace of Paris were so much

excited, so determined, and so well led, that they were able to force the surrender of the Bastille, the old royal stronghold in the city corresponding to the Tower in London, and put its governor and his small garrison to death. This was the prison to which men were being sent, up to the time of its destruction, by *lettres de cachet*, arbitrary orders issued by the king and often obtained by favour against political opponents or even private persons obnoxious to a powerful man. Hence the capture and destruction of the Bastille on the 14th of July was hailed as the decisive triumph of the Revolution, and by the 1st of August châteaux were burning all over France, and the people who burnt them refused to pay either taxes or rent or feudal dues.

On the night of the 4th–5th of August the nobles and higher clergy in the Assembly, moved by these events, made a voluntary surrender of their ancient privileges. Tithe was to be done away with and the peasant permitted to shoot the game on his land. Exemption from taxes was abolished for ever and a common law for all Frenchmen acclaimed as the ideal. Before August was out, these aspirations had taken form in the " Declaration of Rights " which, borrowing a good deal from the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, yet has a wider and more philosophic sweep and became a sacred model to the liberal reformers of Europe. Rousseau had said in the opening words of his *Social Contract*, " Man is born free ; yet everywhere he is in chains." The Declaration of Rights echoed in reply : " Men are born and remain equal in rights, and social distinction can only be founded in the general good."

It now remained to work out these glowing generalities in the facts of law and administration.

The Assembly took up this work with as much zeal as the passing of resolutions, but the king again began to hold

back and try the other course. He delayed to ratify the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and by the beginning of October troops were again being summoned to support the court in its conflict with the people. This time, on the 5th of October, the first outbreak of popular violence against the royal family itself took place, which was repeated so often until the death of the queen four years after. In 1789 the harvest had been bad and the poor in Paris were short of bread. A great crowd of women clamouring for food were led out to Versailles, escorted by armed men, and, forcing their way into the royal apartments, they compelled both king and queen to return to Paris with them. Their acquiescence gave temporary satisfaction but sealed their doom. They were practically prisoners henceforth in the Tuileries, and the Assembly which was installed soon after in the riding-school near by fell more and more under the influence of the Parisian mob.

But for a time, so long in fact as Mirabeau lived, there seemed to be a chance that a peaceful revolution would be carried through and a constitutional monarchy established. This was Mirabeau's plan : the king should retire from Paris before it was too late and summon the Assembly to him at some safe place such as Rouen. Instead of this, while the king kept up a show of accepting the Revolution, he was in constant correspondence with the emigrant nobles and the king of Prussia and the Emperor to bring force to undo what the Assembly was hurriedly building up.

The Assembly worked quickly and on the lines of a constitutional monarchy, modelled partly on that of England, partly on that of the United States. But there were two important provisions not borrowed from either. One related to the representative body to be set up, the other to the position of the Church. The laws were to be made and taxes granted by a single chamber on which the only check

was the veto of the king, as head of the executive ; his veto was to hold good until three successive assemblies had passed a measure over it. The other provision, which caused more division in the country than any other revolutionary act, was the civil constitution of the clergy, who were placed in future entirely at the mercy of the temporal power. All church property was confiscated, and the clergy of every rank were to be popularly appointed and paid out of the taxes. Their income was to be better, but their soul not their own.

Only four of the eighty-three bishops to be appointed, and only a third of the lower clergy, consented to take the new oath to the constitution which was imposed. The Pope condemned the Civil Constitution and forbade the oath, and thus an unbridgeable gulf was created which lasted till the Concordat of Napoleon and left its traces in France till nearly our own day. The eighty-three bishops corresponded to the eighty-three new departments into which the Assembly divided France. Such sweeping measures of reform bespeak the depth of the early revolutionary enthusiasm and the zeal of the first Assembly in translating it into facts.

A year after the fall of the Bastille, France was celebrating the acceptance of the new constitution, and half a million people assembled on the Champ de Mars to see the king swear to observe it. It was the festival which Wordsworth describes with so much rapture in the *Prelude*. Another year, and Mirabeau was dead and the king attempting to escape from Paris, not, as Mirabeau advised, into the heart of his own country, but towards the eastern frontiers, to be received by the emigrant nobles and brought back with the support of the queen's brother, Leopold, who had in 1790 become emperor and ruler of the Austrian dominions.

Mirabeau died in April, and the royal family made their flight to Varennes in June of 1791. After their capture

and return, the republican party raised its head, and the king, though nominally on the throne for another year, never reigned again. But the decisive movement which was to weld France together and put the Jacobins, or extreme party, in power, came from abroad. Ever since the beginning of the Revolution a stream of nobles had been leaving the country and working up an armed intervention of which, naturally, the queen's brother and friends in Austria would be at the head. The flight to Varennes, and the king's capture and imprisonment which followed, put the match to the train. In August the Emperor Leopold II issued a Declaration at Pillnitz in which he called upon all the other rulers of Europe to join him in placing the king of France in a position "which shall be once more in harmony with the rights of sovereigns and shall promote the welfare of the French nation." It was the same spirit which, as we shall see, was the fatal flaw in the Holy Alliance; it was the one thing needed to make the French people act as one man.

The intervening year, before the king was finally sent for trial, was filled by the summoning of the first Legislative Assembly provided for by the new constitution, and by the declaration of war against the assembled emigrants and Austria and Prussia on the north-eastern frontier.

The stages of the growing crisis are sharply marked and easy to remember. After the flight to Varennes the republican party became increasingly active, and Marat, its most violent member, was for a time the strongest influence in Paris. A petition drawn up by these men and taken for signature to the Champ de Mars on the 17th of July, 1791, led to a fatal encounter with the national guard under Lafayette. The petitioners had asked for the abdication of the king and a new convention, and the "Massacre" added fuel to the flames. In October the first Legislative Assemby

under the new constitution came together This Assembly confiscated the property of the *émigrés ;* they were to be treated as traitors if they had not returned to France by the 1st of January, 1792. The non-constitutional clergy also came under condemnation. In May they were ordered to be deported if they still refused to submit. On this last act, and on the proposal to establish a camp of twenty thousand volunteers round the walls of Paris, the king at last summoned up his courage to impose a veto. But it was now too late. He had lost all influence by his incessant vacillations, and " Monsieur " and " Madame Veto " became the mocking title for him and his wife, when the mob in June invaded the Tuileries and compelled the king to don a red liberty cap and drink to the nation.

It was on the 20th of April, 1792, that the Assembly broke with Austria and Prussia. The war which then began was destined, with one short break, to last for twenty-three years and not end until Napoleon, the greatest child of the Revolution, was exiled to St. Helena after Waterloo. The Girondists, or more moderate section of the revolutionary party, were responsible for the declaration of war, but it was left for the more thorough-going revolutionaries, especially to Danton and Carnot, to carry it forward to the amazing success which had occurred even before Napoleon came on the field. A war for the defence of the Revolution passed gradually into a war for the conquest of Europe and was not ended until the maker of the disturbance was confined again within her original borders.

The allied armies of Austria and Prussia were soon approaching the frontier. The Duke of Brunswick, who was in command of the Prussians, issued in July a proclamation in which he declared that the allies intended to restore the king and put an end to anarchy in France ; any one who resisted would be punished according to the laws of

war and their houses burnt. If any more violence was offered to the king or queen, Paris itself would be handed over to military execution.

The answer came in the "Marseillaise." Five hundred men, singing this song, marched up from the south to strengthen the republican forces in Paris, and on the 10th of August the Tuileries was stormed and the king and queen shut up in the Temple prison. The Assembly refused to take the final step. They continued to pass resolutions of friendship for mankind, and illustrated their spirit by conferring French citizenship on distinguished foreigners. Priestley, Wilberforce, Schiller, and Washington were thus honoured. But at the same time a new ministry, with Danton as Minister of Justice, was formed and a decree passed summoning the new Convention which the petitioners of the Champ de Mars had demanded.

This Convention, which met in September, marks the climax of the Revolution, as the States-General marked its commencement. It lasted until the reaction began, and Napoleon was ready to leap into the saddle. Its temper was shown by the fact that the Jacobins, or "Mountain," who had been the opposition in the Legislative Assembly, where the Girondists were supreme, became now the dominant force. Its claim to respect from France and the world rests on three or four great achievements. First among these must be placed the welding of France together in face of the enemy and the victorious advance of the republican armies against the best organised military monarchies of Europe. Next we must count their grappling with two of the greatest questions of internal reform—law and the education of the people. Besides these, a number of reforms, some tentative and some of permanent success, must be placed to their credit—a new calendar, the metric system of weights and measures, and last, but not least, the temporary freeing of

the slaves. Danton and Robespierre soon became its most prominent leaders, and their ultimate rivalry led to its collapse. And among the warring, active, and tempestuous spirits, the figure of Condorcet, calm, noble, and philosophic, rises supreme.

The more sensational events of the period have, as usual, largely monopolised the memory of mankind. By the end of August the Prussians had crossed the frontier, and on the 2nd of September captured Verdun. The same day was darkened in the annals of Paris by the massacres in the prisons which became a by-word in France and Europe and stamped those who took part in them as the "Septembriseurs." For these the Paris commune, and not either Assembly or Convention, was responsible. Those murdered comprised many nobles, women, and priests, and to the murderers the motive was partly the slaking of hatred, partly the fear of anti-revolutionary risings as the citizen armies left Paris for the front, and perhaps, most of all, the desire to intimidate all foes and waverers when the fate of the country was at stake. It was the first act in a policy of "Terror," which found its imitators on both sides in the revolutionary struggle, and it has not wanted apologists before and after.

Just as the crime was being committed in Paris, the troops at the front were learning to hold their own. They had the strongest backing from home, where Danton was making stirring speeches in support of the war. But the first successes were due to Dumouriez, a cheery and daring general who afterwards deserted the republican side, but showed them how to stay the Prussian advance at Valmy. The commandant at Verdun had blown out his brains after signing the capitulation on the 2nd of September, and all France was now ready to die rather than submit to further surrender. Dumouriez held the passes of the Argonne for some days and then gathered his forces on the hill of Valmy.

Here for half a day, the 20th of September, the French stood firm against a deadly Prussian cannonade. Goethe, the greatest of poets or of Germans then alive, was with the Prussian forces on that day. He tells us in his *Campaign in France* what he thought about it. "The day had passed away and the French stood immovable. It was exactly as if nothing had taken place. The greatest consternation was diffused among the army who that very morning had thought of nothing short of spitting the whole of the French and devouring them. As night came on we formed ourselves into a circle and I was called upon to say what I thought of it. For I had been in the habit of enlivening and amusing the troops with short sayings. This time I said: 'From this place and from this day forth commences a new era in the world's history, and you can all say that you were present at its birth.'"

As soon as the tide had thus turned, the French went forward, and before the end of the year they had invaded Germany, occupied several towns in the Rhineland and overrun the Austrian Netherlands. The Austrian troops had been slow to appear; and both Austria and Prussia were really more concerned at the time with cutting up Poland than in fighting the French.

At once the Convention followed up the success of its armies by calling on the people of the countries they were invading to join them in driving out their "tyrants" and abolishing all feudal burdens and inequalities as the French had done. This was in December. By the 21st of January the king had been tried and condemned to death. A week later Pitt declared in Parliament the opposition of England to the French Republic; they must join the allies. The execution of the king was not the formal reason, but the occupation of the Netherlands, the opening of the Scheldt and the threat to Holland. But the king's death had really

provoked the rupture, and the paradox of the country which had put Charles I and Mary Queen of Scots to death for reasons of state, now taking up arms against another country which had followed her example, struck the imagination of the world and especially of France. It is a question on which men will always dispute ; but one clear difference between the two cases goes far to explain the result. In England both executions had been carried out purely in the supposed interests of England herself ; in France they " threw down the head of their monarch as a challenge to the ' despots ' of Europe."

In that spirit the armies of the republic followed up their task, and it grew much more difficult for them in 1793. The three Eastern monarchies arranged their differences after a second partition of Poland, and when in March Spain and the Holy Roman Empire also joined the coalition, France found herself at war with all her neighbours. At the same moment two serious blows fell upon her within. Dumouriez, disgusted by the execution of the king and by the tyrannical actions of the agents of the Convention, went over to the enemy, and in France itself grave rebellions broke out. The Girondists, who had ruled the Legislative Assembly and begun the war, were in deadly opposition to the populace of Paris and the strong centralising activity of the Convention. To meet the crisis which threatened the very existence of France as a united state, the famous Committee of Public Safety was appointed in April. On this the Jacobin leaders Danton and Robespierre were supreme, and before them all local opposition was compelled by the most ruthless measures to bow its head. And so the Girondists went down in June, and after them the revolting cities of Lyons, Bordeaux, and Marseilles. The peasants of Brittany alone made a lingering and stubborn fight.

Abroad the energy of the Committee and the genius of

Carnot rolled back the tide of invasion. Very soon three-quarters of a million soldiers in thirteen armies were on the march, and before the year was over the frontier was cleared. The last event in the year's operations was the freeing of Toulon, the principal naval station in the south, from the English fleet and the revolting royalist garrison. For this success a young artillery officer from Corsica, called Napoleon Bonaparte, was to be thanked.

In 1794 events in Paris moved steadily on towards the advent of the military chief. The Terror which had begun in the September massacres, was systematised by the Revolutionary Tribunal. The guillotine worked more and more rapidly, first mowing down all suspected enemies of the Republic, and then by an inevitable transition one republican leader after another who became " suspect " to those who had the power for the moment of putting him out of the way. The queen and a number of distinguished Girondists thus fell in the autumn of 1793, and in the spring of 1793 Danton and his friends as " moderates," and many others obnoxious for various reasons, followed the same path to death. Robespierre remained to be the last conspicuous victim of the terrorist system. He had been himself the least extravagant in his language, the least violent in his temperament. In the summer of 1794 he enjoyed a brief dictatorship and proclaimed a régime of complete equality, perfect morality, with a new religion borrowed from Rousseau, including a Supreme Being and an immortal soul, with himself as a sort of high priest. As the guillotine was working all the faster meanwhile, opposition was not extinguished but only extended ; every one felt that his turn might come next, unless the representative of the Supreme Being were himself removed. A day came, the 27th of July, when the shout of " Down with the Tyrant " was raised in the Convention, and, in spite of his appeal to the commune of Paris, his

enemies had succeeded before twenty-four hours were out in dragging him, outlawed and wounded, to the guillotine.

It was practically the end of the Terror, and there seemed less need for a terror as time went on, and it was seen that the republican armies were able to keep the enemy at bay and even extend their conquests. The great coalition of Powers, with England at their back, which had been facing France in 1793, had done so little by the end of 1794 that the French had actually succeeded in conquering the Spanish Netherlands, Savoy, and Nice ; had occupied western Germany as far as the Rhine, and established an allied republic in Holland. Other, more selfish, interests had again diverted the attention of Austria and Prussia, the leading military members of the coalition ; for the third and last time they were dividing Poland. The Convention was therefore able in April, 1795, to conclude its first treaties of peace. By the Treaty of Basel with Prussia, France secured all the left bank of the Rhine, on the secret condition that Prussia was to be allowed compensation elsewhere. And Spain soon after also made peace. This left Austria as the only considerable continental enemy to be reckoned with, and in that reckoning Napoleon made his first resounding success.

It was a new government in France which sent him on this, his first Italian campaign. In the reaction which followed the fall of Robespierre the Convention had drawn up a new constitution, intended to conciliate more moderate opinion. There were five Directors to form the Executive which superseded the Committee of Public Safety, and two chambers of which the upper house, or Council of Ancients, was to have a suspensory veto on the legislation of the lower. A rising took place in Paris before this new constitution was accepted, for it provided that two-thirds of the new assemblies should have been members of the Convention. All parties objected to this, and it might never have been carried had not

the young Bonaparte, marked out by his success at Toulon, been charged with the military protection of the Convention. He did this with his accustomed ability and decision, and by the end of October, 1795, the new constitution was in force. Early in the following year the Directors entrusted General Bonaparte with the command of the army which was to attack Austria through her possessions in north Italy.

Italy thus comes for the first time into our story, and it is an Italy politically very unlike that which the revolutions of the nineteenth century have produced. It was divided up into a number of separate states of which the greater part either belonged to or were under the influence of Austria and Spain, who had inherited them from Hapsburgs and Bourbons of generations before. Lombardy, with its capital at Milan, was actually ruled from Vienna, while a feeble Bourbon, Ferdinand IV, who was married to a sister of Marie Antoinette, ruled in Naples over what was called the "Kingdom of the Two Sicilies." Between the two, and stretching right across the peninsula, lay the Papal States, the temporal domain of the Pope. Venice and Genoa were independent republics, but had little of their former power, while the state which was ultimately to bring Italy together, the kingdom of Sardinia or Piedmont, had at that time no other Italian soil save Nice and Savoy.

This was the Italy into which Napoleon Bonaparte advanced through the Maritime Alps in March, 1796.

Emery Walker Ltd. sc.

CHAPTER III

NAPOLEON

THE man whom this Italian campaign was to make master of France was born at Ajaccio in Corsica in 1769. He was of Italian patrician blood, and in early life resented the domination which the French had just established in Corsica over the patriot Paoli. But, always determined to be a soldier, he found his career through a military academy in France, and added to this training a democratic passion derived from Rousseau and a hero-worship from the study of history. By the end of 1789 he had decided to support the Revolution, both in Corsica and in France, and we have seen how first at Toulon and afterwards in Paris he had displayed his powers and earned the gratitude of the government. The Austrian campaign set his feet on the highroad to power.

Austrians and Sardinians were combined to resist him, but Napoleon forced the passes and entered Milan little more than a month after the campaign began. His triumphant conduct of the operations, above all the stirring words which he knew so well how to address to his men, made him at once and for ever the idol of the common soldier. The rest of the year was occupied with the capture of Mantua and the defeat of all the armies which the Austrians sent down to relieve their strongest post. By April, 1797, he might have entered Vienna had he wished,

but the Austrian commander requested a truce, and, with the other two French armies in retreat, Napoleon thought best to conclude the Treaty of Campo Formio.

The process of spoliation had already begun, nor can Napoleon himself be solely saddled with the blame. The Directors had instructed him to carry off from Italy "everything which the political situation will permit you to remove," and he had obeyed their injunctions in Milan to the extent of twenty million francs and some of the finest masterpieces of painting in the churches and galleries. At Campo Formio he extended the process by handing over to Austria the defenceless republic of Venice in return for the Austrian Netherlands and the best part of the left bank of the Rhine. A new state was formed in the north of Italy, including Lombardy, Modena, and some parts of the papal dominions; this Cisalpine Republic was to be under the "protection" of France.

Meanwhile the rising general set up a court in a villa near Milan to which nobles and distinguished men of Italy came crowding to gain the favour of a word. On his return to Paris he decided to hold back a little longer from assuming complete control, and devised a scheme for crowning his triumph by the humiliation of England. He persuaded the Directory that England could best be ruined by occupying Egypt and thus cutting her off from commerce in the Mediterranean and her possessions in the East. The plan had the additional attraction of enlisting in Napoleon's forces some of the best officers in France and thus leaving the Directors less well prepared to resist his ultimate supremacy. It must be added that in the expedition, when it set out in May, 1798, there were included a corps of a hundred and twenty men of science and engineers who, among other achievements, dug up the Rosetta Stone at the mouth of the Nile from which Champollion was able later

on to decipher the Egyptian hieroglyphics which had remained a closed book for three thousand years, even to the Greeks.

The campaign itself illustrated the way in which the sea-power of England and the genius of Nelson were in the end to determine the issue of the struggle. Napoleon occupied Egypt, though he was repulsed from Syria by the assistance given to the Turks by the British fleet. Then at the battle of the Nile, on the 1st of August, the French fleet was destroyed and their army, though still unbeaten, was cut off from home. Napoleon escaped himself in the following autumn, and was ready by the 9th of November, 1799, to carry out what is the first political change known commonly in French history as a "coup d'état." This "Coup d'État of Brumaire" put an end to the Directory and installed Napoleon, with the very efficient help of his brother Lucien, as First Consul in a new constitution. The Abbé Siéyès, who had been devising constitutions ever since the Revolution began, had a hand also in this, though Napoleon largely overruled him in the interests of his own autocratic rule. The First Consul, with the help of two others, was practically supreme in a cumbrous and unworkable system of four assemblies. The details need not concern us now; they were at the time intended only to veil the absolute power of the new man who had thus, by the force of the Revolution, skilfully directed by his ingenious and unflagging mind, come to sit on the throne of the ancient monarchs of France. And it is remarkable, and often noted by later historians of the period, how in spite of all the changes—the clearance of abuses, the upheaval of classes and the passing of individuals, the old forms persisted, and the "prefects" of Napoleon are the "intendants" of Louis XIV, re-written smaller, more numerous and more uniform. France tended to centralisation, and the various "plébiscites" of the century, first

introduced by Napoleon, always gave an overwhelming vote in favour of the man in power.

The war in Europe was the first concern of the First Consul, and he found, when he had established himself in France, that the combination against him was more extensive than when he had gone off to Egypt eighteen months before. Pitt and England had continued their efforts, and this time with some effect. Russia had been induced to join the alliance, and Austria had taken up arms again, while the Directors had justly made the name of France odious by violence and robbery in the Vatican, and by unscrupulous intervention and spoliation in Switzerland. In Naples, too, in spite of Nelson's opposition, the French had succeeded in establishing another republic and carrying off more millions and more works of art. But by October, 1799, the Austrians had driven the French out of northern Italy, and, though the Russians withdrew from the war, the prospects of a peace favourable to France were poor. However, the time for united reaction had not yet come, and Napoleon had still to rise to his greatest heights.

In May, 1800, he set out on his boldest and most successful campaign, for after crossing the Alps by the Great St. Bernard, and, after the battles of Marengo and Hohenlinden, really won for him by Desaix and Moreau, the Austrians again admitted defeat and made the Peace of Lunéville. This re-affirmed the terms of Campo Formio, but—what was more important for Napoleon—it led the way to peace with England and the remodelling of Germany.

The peace with England, signed at Amiens in March, 1802, was but a truce. It gave time, however, for some constructive work, and the remodelling of Germany, which now began, was to be one of the great tasks of the nineteenth century.

We must remember always that although the Revolution

broke out in France, France was by no means the most backward part of Europe at the time of the Revolution. It was, indeed, rather its forwardness in civilisation which made it the scene of those stirring events which we have described, and which had so great an effect on other countries. In France there was an active and intelligent middle class. In France the peasants, though often poor and always suffering from gross injustice and civic inequalities, were all free men. In France there was a strong framework of central government built up by centuries of able and enlightened men. In Germany it was very different. Feudal conditions were still in force in a form which made it far more difficult to take the necessary forward step without a violent shaking from abroad. There were still a multitude of serfs, men bound legally to the soil. The middle class was less developed, and had not the intellectual leadership which, as we have seen, was wielded by the writers and lawyers of France. Above all, the country was broken up into a mass of little states, held as hereditary or episcopal fiefs, without any effective overlordship such as the Bourbons had acquired since the fifteenth century. The Holy Roman Emperor, to whom they allowed nominal allegiance, had never made good his claim, and by the eighteenth century he was ready to be displaced, first by Napoleon and then by the power of Prussia which grew in the national reaction against Napoleon.

The first step in this process took place as the result of the Treaty of Lunéville. It was then agreed that the French Republic should hold the territories of the Empire which lay on the left bank of the Rhine, and that the Rhine should form the boundary of France from the point where it left Switzerland—now the Helvetic Republic—to Holland, now become the Batavian Republic. This involved the dispossession of about a hundred rulers and towns with small territories, who by the treaty were to receive an "indemnity

within the Empire." The ecclesiastical rulers—bishops and abbots—who had no legal heirs—were therefor compensated by the payment of pensions, and their territories on the right bank, being sacrificed as well, were used to indemnify the hereditary princes who had lost their lands on the left bank by the treaty. In this way Bavaria, Baden, Prussia, and the Emperor himself received accessions of territory at the expense of church holders, and of the forty-eight "imperial free cities" only six remained. The amalgamation which was thus begun, was carried further in 1803 when altogether over two hundred little independent states were extinguished, about a hundred on the east and another hundred on the left or west bank of the river. The accessions were mainly to the advantage of the southern states—Bavaria, Würtemberg, Hesse, and Baden—whom Napoleon, like his successor Napoleon III sixty years later, hoped to use as a makeweight against the two greater German powers, Austria and Prussia. In the end national feeling and the desire for national unity were to prove too strong for both of them.

The interval before war broke out again was busily employed by Napoleon in reforms at home. There was to be just over a year of peace with England, four years in the case of Austria and Russia; and the ten years of revolutionary struggle had left much to do. The public order, finances, trade, and church were all in confusion, and the Directors had done nothing to restore them. Roads and harbours were falling into decay and bands of robbers infested the land. The first thing was to re-establish and strengthen the police. Two greater tasks were the restoration of the finances and the pacification of the Church.

At the beginning of the Revolution the Church lands had been confiscated and an issue of paper money, called assignats, based upon them. But in the disorder of the time

these had quickly lost their value, and by 1796, under the Directory, three hundred of these paper francs were worth about one gold one. In the year 1800 hardly any taxes had been collected ; so that the first step necessary was to fix and regularly collect them. New government securities were also issued, and the Bank of France was founded to help the credit and the business of the country as the Bank of England does with us.

In Church matters a treaty was concluded with the Pope called the " Concordat," which lasted for over a hundred years. It acknowledged the Catholic religion as that of the majority of Frenchmen and provided for a new division of the country into bishoprics. The head of the government—then the First Consul—was to appoint the bishops and the Pope to confirm them. The priests were to be appointed by the bishops and all to be paid by the government. It was a system like that of the *ancien régime*, but without the abuses and with less of the independence of the old Church. With a formal recognition of the Pope, and with freedom to think and worship as one pleased, the Catholic Church in France became a branch of the civil administration.

The Code Napoleon, the body of laws which remains in force, not only in France but in many other countries, was the final revision of many drafts prepared by revolutionary assemblies. We saw how much the old régime stood in need of legal reform, and the lawyers of the Convention did most to supply it. Napoleon completed the work and put it in force. The spread of rational and uniform principles of justice throughout the lands where French armies had established themselves, is one of the greatest boons the Revolution conferred, and for this Napoleon must receive his due share of credit.

Most of this work was done by Napoleon as First Consul, and it was as First Consul that he resumed the war with

England in 1803. But before the war broke out again on the Continent he had been crowned Emperor of the French in Notre Dame. This was on the 2nd of December, 1804. The Pope had come to Paris to perform the act, but Napoleon showed his estimate of the real meaning of the ceremony by seizing the golden laurel chaplet himself and putting it on his own head before the Pope could touch it. All the forms and adjuncts of a court now followed. A new nobility was created and the old one allowed to return. Fourteen leading generals were made Marshals of France and the old titles and names of streets were revived. Last of all to come back was the old calendar, with its Sundays and its pagan and Christian associations.

Fifteen years of revolution had brought the ablest man in France to the seat of absolute power ; ten years were to pass before those whom it had challenged abroad, and he had subdued, were able to reassert themselves, and, purified and strengthened in many ways by the conflict, depose and finally expel him. Of the opposing forces England was the most powerful and by far the most persistent. She fought continuously, except for the one year's truce under the Treaty of Amiens, from 1793 to 1815. The cause for the renewal of the war was deep-seated and unavoidable. The quarrel over Malta was merely the formal pretext. Napoleon's ambition, frankly avowed in his own circles, left no way out for those who would not accept " a single chief for Europe, with kings for his officers, each having a post in the imperial household." He recognised the inevitable opposition, but, like others in later times, underrated the power of his opponent, and provoked the hostility of commercial England by the methods best calculated to inflame her. Heavy duties were imposed on English goods in all countries which he controlled ; it was the one challenge which " the nation of shop-keepers " was bound to accept.

The war which was renewed with England in 1803 and with Russia and Austria in 1805 brought Napoleon to the climax of his power. England, happily, proved unassailable. The flotilla of flat boats which was assembled at Boulogne never took to sea, and the Emperor's refusal of Robert Fulton's new steam-boat deprived him of the only chance by which the passage might have been accomplished. But even so the chance was small against the skill and determination of Nelson's navy and the elaborate preparations which went on along the English coast. At last, in the autumn of 1805, the approach of an Austrian army through southern Germany diverted Napoleon's attentions finally from sea to land. The new campaign was conducted with all his energy and skill. One whole army of Austrians, under General Mack, sixty thousand strong, was shut up in Ulm and forced to surrender. He then occupied Vienna, and six weeks later fought the terrible and overwhelming battle of Austerlitz. The Treaty of Pressburg followed, and the further humiliation of Austria and Germany. The Holy Roman Empire was formally extinguished and a "Confederation of the Rhine" formed, with Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and thirteen smaller states, under the "protection" of the French Emperor and with the obligation to furnish him with sixty-three thousand soldiers, to be under his command when he required them.

The crushing blows of this campaign, and the fruitless struggle which he was making at the same time to bring Prussia into the alliance, brought Pitt to his grave. At the moment of the capitulation of Ulm, English troops were preparing to embark for Germany. But Napoleon had been too quick. The battle of Trafalgar, won the day after Ulm, revived Pitt for that last Guildhall banquet and the last public appeal to his country. "Let us hope," he then said, "that England, having saved herself by her energy, may save

EUROPE
in 1810
(At the height of
Napoleon's power)
French Empire
Lands directly ruled by Napoleon
Vassal States
IRELAND
Vinegar Hill
Fishguard
ENGLAND
Heligoland
Copenhagen
Tilsit
Friedland
RUSSIA
Camperdown
Walcheren
Spithead
Boulogne
Amiens
Waterloo
Jena
Leipzig
CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE
Berlin
Grand Duchy of Warsaw
Brest
Quiberon
Paris
Fontainebleau
Valmy
Lunéville
Austerlitz
Wagram
Pressburg
Ulm
Hohenlinden
Vienna
AUSTRIAN EMPIRE
Zurich
BAVARIA
Rochefort
FRENCH EMPIRE
KINGDOM OF Milano
Marengo
ITALY
Illyrian Provs.
Cape Finisterre
Coruña
Vitoria
Toulouse
Toulon
TURKEY
Ciudad Rodrigo
Salamanca
Busaco
Saragossa
SPAIN
Vimiero
Talavera
Madrid
Cintra
Torres Vedras
Lisbon
Albuera
Baylen
C. St. Vincent
C. Trafalgar
Cadiz
Gibraltar
Corsica
Elba
Ajaccio
Rome
Naples
KINGDOM OF NAPLES
Ionian Islands (French)
Malta
Emery Walker sc

Europe by her example." Three months later he was dead, in his forty-seventh year, a victim to the great struggle which was not to end until the rival principles of change and order were reconciled in the peaceful progress of France and England as friends. But ere that time could come the prime source of disturbance, which had now become a tyranny, must be removed.

Defeated at sea, Napoleon proceeded in 1806 and 1807 to develop his European empire. The Bourbon king and queen of Naples who had entertained Nelson, were expelled, and his elder brother Joseph Bonaparte appointed king of the "Two Sicilies." A younger brother Louis, who was to be father of the third Napoleon, became king of Holland. But the most serious event in 1806 was the defeat of Prussia. Prussia had been the first to conclude peace—the Treaty of Basel—with the French Republic in 1795. Since that date it had remained neutral, in spite of the earnest solicitations both of England and of Alexander the Tsar of Russia. Hanover was the occasion of the breach with Napoleon. The weak and hesitating king of Prussia, Frederick William III, tried to hold on to Hanover and gain its cession from England. Napoleon drove the Prussians at last to war by offering Hanover himself to George III. The Prussian leader in the war was the old Duke of Brunswick who had issued the manifesto against France in 1792. The battle of Jena in October showed the depth of Prussia's weakness, but sounded too the signal for her recovery. Badly led, disorganised and abased, she contained at that time some of her noblest men and most ardent patriots. The degradation which followed Jena, brought to the front Stein and Hardenberg, the queen Louise and the multitude of poets and thinkers whose minds were set on a free, united, and enlightened fatherland.

After another victory at Friedland, Napoleon met the

Tsar on a raft in the river Niemen and there drew up the Treaty of Tilsit. The basis of his understanding with the Tsar was that he should have his way in western Europe and Russia in the east. Prussia was to be dismembered. On the west another dependent kingdom was created for another brother, Jerome, king of Westphalia—to include Hanover. On the east the Polish territories were formed into a Duchy of Warsaw with the king of Saxony as its ruler. England was to be compelled to make peace, or else the Danes and Portuguese forced to exclude all English ships from their ports. Russia might take Finland from the Swedes, and Moldavia and Wallachia—the Danubian provinces—from the Sultan.

The Treaty of Tilsit was signed in June, 1807. The years which followed—1808–1812—were the zenith of Napoleon's power, but even before the Russian disaster of 1812 fate was beginning to knock at the door in Spain.

It was in Spain that England was able to begin the process of attrition which was ultimately to break Napoleon down. She could attack him there by sea, and from 1807 to the end the attack and the drain of strength went on. The war in this part of the Continent began after the Treaty of Tilsit and was stimulated by it. For at Tilsit Napoleon had made friends for the time with his other greatest rival on terms of common hostility to England, and as England could not be defeated or attacked by sea, her commerce—the sinews of war—must be cut off at the continental ports. If England had not accepted the Tsar's mediation, or before the 1st of December recognised the equality of all flags at sea and restored her conquests, Russia would make war upon her, and the two allies would call upon the three courts of Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Lisbon to close their ports against the

English and declare war also. These were the secret terms of Tilsit, but the English government managed to get wind of them before they were announced, and Canning, who was Foreign Secretary at the time, determined to be beforehand, at least so far as Denmark was concerned. For the Danish fleet was the most important still in neutral hands, and if the Danish eighteen ships and the Portuguese nine were added to those of France and Russia, the balance would be almost equal. Hence the Danes were to be persuaded, if possible—and, if not, compelled—to join the English. Persuasion failed, and on the 7th of September, after bombarding Copenhagen, the English sailed away with the Danish fleet in tow. The turn of Portugal came next. Portugal had continued to admit English ships when it was a question of quarrelling either with England or Napoleon. For before the Tilsit treaty England had declared a "blockade" of all the coast from the Elbe to Brest and given warning that she would capture any vessel entering or leaving any port between. And Napoleon had replied after Jena with his "Berlin Decree," declaring the British Isles "blockaded" and forbidding all commerce with them. After Tilsit, as Portugal still defied him, he sent an army to invade the peninsula. They soon occupied Portugal, but the English fleet were waiting outside to escort the Portuguese royal family away to Brazil and to land English soldiers in the rear of the French. Napoleon did not stop with the occupation of Portugal, but, as the Spanish royal family were quarrelling among themselves, he removed them also and appointed his brother Joseph, who had been king of Naples, to take the throne of Spain instead.

In July the national rebellion broke out which created the Peninsular War, gave England her chance on land, and did not end until the French were driven out and Napoleon fell. Before the end of July two French armies had sur-

rendered and English forces were established near the western coast.

These earliest victories against the most successful soldiers in Europe struck a new note in the whole war and put unconquerable hope in the hearts of the Spaniards. In their case the passion for national freedom was fortified by their religious fanaticism, fanned by the priests and monks who all opposed the emperor as the oppressor of the Church. Napoleon at first took the Spanish rising as seriously as it deserved, and went in November, 1808, himself, at the head of an army two hundred thousand strong, with his best marshals in command. To such forces in the open field the Spanish guerillas could offer no resistance, and Madrid surrendered before Christmas. A magniloquent but threatening proclamation followed, and decrees were issued abolishing the Inquisition, reducing the number of the monasteries and removing feudal restrictions and provincial customs as the French had done in their own revolution. The conqueror then departed, leaving his brother to make what head he could against the real Spanish war which continued as before, with the increasing support of English forces. Napoleon had another war, and still a successful one, to wage with Austria before the final downfall began.

When he returned from Spain to Paris in 1809 he found that Austria had awakened again, and that the Austrian emperor's brother was leading a fresh army westward to the battle-cry of national resistance. Let Germans do what the Spaniards had shown could be done. Two other battles —at Aspern and Wagram—followed, not so decisive as in the earlier campaigns, but sufficient to lead to another peace, that of Vienna, which repeated the terms of Pressburg and added some further strips to the territories of Napoleon and his friends.

Above all, he claimed as his second wife Maria Louisa,

daughter of the Austrian emperor. His first wife Josephine Beauharnais had borne him no children ; she was divorced, and in April, 1810, he married her successor. This was the formal climax of his power. The Papal States were "reunited" to the French Empire ; the emperor of the French was "king of Italy" and "Protector of the Federation of the Rhine" ; Poland had reappeared on the map as the Duchy of Warsaw, and the Empire itself covered all the lands of western Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic.

Yet even then this overgrown and insecure construction was being actively undermined. The Spaniards were everywhere in arms, and Wellington had, by the time of the coronation of the Austrian wife, built up the lines of Torres Vedras, near Lisbon, which were to give safe backing to the fighters till they were free.

But the invasion of Russia led to the first spectacular and large-scale defeat of the conqueror.

In the four years which passed since Tilsit, Napoleon's judgment had weakened as his ambition was overfed. He became jealous of the independence which he left to the Tsar and secretly opposed even the concessions which he had made by treaty. The Tsar, on his side, was a more and more doubtful friend and continued to admit the English manufactures and products which Russia needed, excluding only English ships but admitting others under a neutral flag. The question of the open ports was the immediate cause of war. By 1812 Napoleon had come to believe that he could conquer Russia, though wiser men than he strongly dissuaded him. He collected an army of half a million on the Russian frontier, including contingents furnished by his allies. They marched to one of the greatest tragedies in military history. The Russians retreated as he advanced, and did not offer battle till Borodino in September. The

half a million men were reduced to a little over a hundred thousand before he entered Moscow a week after the battle. The enemy had fired the town before they left, and, perishing from cold and lack of food, the French were compelled themselves to retreat in the depth of winter. Napoleon reached Poland in December with scarce twenty thousand men.

The loss of men led to the continued forcing of young and immature conscripts into the ranks. The crushing defeat, not honestly admitted, led to a progressive falsification of his career by the emperor, which culminated at last in a Napoleonic legend, elaborated at St. Helena and promulgated by his nephew, Napoleon III, and other interested persons.

But though Napoleon never acknowledged the Russian disaster, all the world knew it, and on Prussia especially it had a tonic effect. Yorck, who was in command of the Prussian contingent in support of the French, went over on his own initiative on learning of Napoleon's retreat, and soon the weak-kneed king of Prussia was compelled by public opinion to follow suit and sign a treaty of alliance with Russia. This was the beginning of the final continental bloc which broke Napoleon's power on land and re-organised Europe at Vienna.

Prussia had been in the end invigorated by the defeat of Jena. It led to the abolition of serfdom and other reforms in the same direction which France had taken at the beginning of the Revolution. The Germans in defeat learnt from their conquerors, as the French later in the century learnt from them. The greatest advance of all was in the field of education, for the University of Berlin dates from the years immediately after Jena. The young especially, all over Germany, were stirred to patriotic fervour which lasted till the unity of the country was won fifty years later, and helped to win it.

This re-awakened and re-organised Prussia then stood forth as the leader of the Continent in the final coalition which overthrew Napoleon. The king issued in March, 1813, an appeal to his subjects, and Blücher took command of the forces. During the summer Napoleon, who at once raised another army larger than the last, won more victories round Dresden with the help of his faithful friend, the king of Saxony, but the end was drawing near.

Metternich, who now controlled the policy of Austria, fell away from the French alliance, and Sweden, where one of Napoleon's old marshals, Bernadotte, had been chosen king, also went over to the allied side. The decisive struggle took place at Leipzig in October, where, in a four days' battle, Napoleon was routed with the loss of a hundred and twenty thousand men. This "Battle of the Nations" coincided with Wellington's final victories in Spain. He was crossing the Pyrenees into France as the victorious allies were advancing on Paris from the north-east.

Napoleon still fought hard and refused all offers of a moderate peace. But the allies pressed on, and Paris was occupied in March, 1814, and the diplomatists began to meet in Vienna to arrange the re-settlement of Europe. Meanwhile the fallen emperor was compelled to abdicate and was allowed the sovereignty of the isle of Elba off the north-west coast of Italy.

The escape, the Hundred Days', even the immortal Waterloo, need not detain us long here. Napoleon had been finally beaten at Leipzig, and the conditions of his defeat were long since settled. His enterprise, so far as it involved the personal domination of the civilised world, was foredoomed to failure. At best it was an imitation of certain old world conquerors whose work he never fully understood. At Waterloo the two leading European powers completed his defeat, England, who had done most throughout the struggle

to sustain the combatants; Prussia, who at her re-awakening became the head of the Germanic peoples. To England, by Napoleon's own choice after Waterloo, fell the task of guarding him in exile. It was a task which we would have gladly avoided, and partly for that reason did not do well. He lived in close seclusion for six years on the island of St. Helena, brooding and re-arranging the memories of his past, which went forth finally to the world in an atmosphere of martyrdom and heroic design. Wonderful as was his career, the most wonderful story of successful personal effort in the sphere of command, we must judge it as historians, not by the standard of personal success, still less by the glosses which the great actor would himself put upon it, but by the final result on the welfare and progress of mankind. Such judgment is always profoundly difficult and can never be complete; but it involves taking the right point of view, and, as we pursue it, we gain more and more insight into the complexities of all human happenings.

From this standpoint Napoleon, as the child and sequel of revolution, must be judged. As the child he was great, a wonder-child; as the sequel, he was but a small part, and in some important points counteracted the Revolution which brought him to power. For if we understand it rightly, the whole of our story is the development of the principles which inspired the Revolution, in its best and widest sense, while the work of Napoleon was largely negative, by clearing away abuses and obsolete things, and provocative, by stirring men up to assert their rights and independence when threatened by oppression.

France owed much to him for consolidating her national life after the convulsions of the Revolution. She regained her public order and added to it a new pride in her strength. He beautified and improved Paris in many ways and built fine roads, not only in the capital but all over France. The

Codes of Law which he completed and put in force, were a boon not only to the country of their origin but to many more where the influence of France was felt.

The final result was a settling and conservative process. The bulk of Frenchmen were peasants, and they were confirmed in the lands they had gained during the Revolution. Strengthened in their love of soil and country, they became the cautious and thrifty population which have ever since been the backbone of France.

Abroad, the effect of the great struggle was much more mixed and difficult to disentangle. On the surface it seemed that reaction and opposition to all reform were the chief results. In England this was very marked, and for many years every change, however clearly called for, was opposed as a dangerous step, threatening the convulsions which had shaken France and Europe for so long. And in the counsels of Europe, as we shall see, statesmen of a reactionary type, with Metternich at their head, were put in power and sat there long, attempting to repress the fresh outburst of the spirit of freedom and nationality which had flowed in ungoverned torrents before and was to run as a fertilising stream hereafter. But even the most reactionary of the statesmen of Vienna did not dream of putting back the feudal abuses and privileges which had been swept away by the Revolution. These had disappeared in France early in the Revolution. They were swept away in Spain, and largely in Italy, by the direct action of Napoleon and the French. Much, including the abolition of serfdom, was done in Prussia to prepare the country to face the foe. Nor was the old divided state of Germany revived. All the old clerical principalities which Napoleon had suppressed, and the great majority of petty temporal rulers, went for ever.

The scheme for the government of Germany and the other arrangements made by the Congress of Vienna will

fall to be discussed in the next chapter. We may summarise this one in the shortest way by saying :

(1) That the Revolution swept away the remains of feudalism in France and most of western Europe, and that a system of legal equality and social opportunity was established which Napoleon's power confirmed in France and extended to other countries.

(2) That the national spirit was keenly aroused, first in France by their revolution and military victories abroad, and then in other countries, partly by direct influence, partly in opposition to the conquering French.

(3) That the result of the war demonstrated the impossibility of establishing a unified dominion by force over the developed nations of the West.

(4) That the Industrial Revolution, by increasing the wealth of those nations who adopted and made most use of it, would become the strongest world-force in the coming century. England defeated Napoleon, not only by her sea-power and national tenacity, but quite as much by her commercial and industrial wealth. She financed the coalition against France, as she and the United States financed the allies in the Great War.

National freedom and self-government, the need of alliance and not the subjugation of peoples, the influence of science in organising industry—notes which we shall trace throughout this book—are thus already apparent in its first section.

BOOK II

1815—1848

PEACE—REACTION—BEGINNINGS OF REFORM —SOCIALISM AND REVOLUTION

CHAPTER IV

THE FIRST CONDITIONS AFTER THE PEACE

It was Austria on which Napoleon's blows had chiefly fallen, and Austria which, under the guidance of Metternich, took the lead in the reaction which followed Napoleon's full defeat. The story of the next thirty years consists—putting it in the briefest form—first, in the freeing of France and England from the spirit of repression which was thus aroused, then in the struggle of various ill-governed nations and colonies for independence, and lastly in the breaking out of a fresh revolutionary ferment, this time largely inspired by Socialism, a new doctrine of social and economic organisation based on the changes caused by the Industrial Revolution.

The sovereigns and statesmen who had come together at Vienna, after the first occupation of Paris in 1814, continued to meet even during the Hundred Days of Napoleon's

escape. They concluded their labours in 1815, after his final defeat at Waterloo. The settlement which was then reached, could not, as we saw in Book I, reverse the fundamental social and legal changes which the Revolution and Napoleon had brought about. But, subject to that large qualification, the settlement at Vienna did its best to put back the political constitution of Europe to where it was before the war. The three great monarchies of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, which had combined in the final effort, were re-established in their power. England, who had fought the longest and whose sea-power had been so decisive a factor in the victory, received certain colonial extensions of which the principal were Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope. Her chief gain, however, was undisputed mastery of the seas for the best part of the succeeding century. The other Great Powers all gained certain accessions of territory. Austria, who lost Belgium, received Venice, Lombardy, Illyria, and a part of eastern Bavaria. She thus became for half a century the leading power in Italy, where she was ruling over a population of another language and nationality. As she also had Bohemians, Hungarians, Poles, Serbs, and Roumanians under her sway, she was the most ill-compacted of the Powers, and was on that account driven to be the leader of national repression. She saw, or Metternich saw for her, that nothing but stern and centralised methods could hold together in her system so heterogeneous a host. Many attempts to throw off the yoke were made during the century, and the Great War saw the end of it.

Prussia gave up some parts of Poland but received in return land on the Rhine, and Swedish Pomerania which rounded off her territories on the Baltic. She thus became the leading German power, for the great majority of her population were Germans. But Austria still maintained the formal leadership of Germany, as President of the

EUROPE in 1815
Boundary of German Confed.n
France
Prussia
Austria
Sardinia
English Miles
0 50 100 200 300 400
Atlantic Ocean
North Sea
Baltic Sea
Black Sea
Mediterranean Sea
Adriatic Sea
Ionian Islands (British protection)
Crete
Malta (British)
Gibraltar (British)
Lisbon
Madrid
Paris
Brussels
Amsterdam
Edinburgh
Dublin
London
Copenhagen
Stockholm
Christiania
St. Petersburg
Moscow
Berlin
Warsaw
Vienna
Rome
Lucca
Constantinople
Danube
Dnieper
Dniester
Corsica (to France)
Rhine
Stula
Rep. of CRACOW
NORWAY AND SWEDEN
DENMARK
HANOVER
PRUSSIA
POLAND
RUSSIA
GALICIA
HUNGARY
BOHEMIA
AUSTRIA
BAVARIA
SAXONY
FRANCE
SWITZERLAND
PIEDMONT
LOMB.
VEN.
PAM.
TUSCANY
NAPLES
THE TWO SICILIES
SARDINIA
SICILY
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
AFRICA
IRELAND
SCOTLAND
ENGLAND
WALES
NETHERLANDS
Heligoland (British)
MOLDAVIA
WALLACHIA
BOSNIA
MONTENEGRO
ALBANIA
TURKEY
Emery Walker Ltd. sc.

Germanic Confederation which had been formed out of the thirty-nine States to which Napoleon had reduced the three hundred odd kinglets, dukes, and bishops who had previously enjoyed sovereignty in the country. The decisive tussle between Austria and Prussia was still to come in the next period and will be described in Book III.

Russia took the larger part of Poland and was recognised in her possession of Finland, which she retained until the Great War.

Four other changes, introduced by the Congress of Vienna, remain to be mentioned. Two were entirely beneficial and have stood the test of time. Two others were swept away within the century.

All navigable rivers of Europe were declared open to the trade of all countries, and the governments of Europe declared an emphatic disapproval of the trade in slaves. The latter point was due to the persistent pressure of Great Britain. On the other hand, Belgium, taken from Austria, was added to Holland in order to secure a strong state on the northern frontiers of France. And Norway was joined to Sweden, and both put under the rule of Bernadotte, one of Napoleon's old marshals, who, as we saw, turned against his master during the war. The first of these arrangements almost immediately broke down ; the latter lasted till 1905 when Norway and Sweden peaceably dissolved their forced marriage.

But we must follow the story as we sketched it above, and see first, how Metternich and Austria attempted to prevent all change, how the Holy Alliance, formed in a religious spirit with the same objects in view, broke down in practice, and how the Western powers, and especially England and France, had before twenty years were over set out again on a course of freedom and reform.

The first repressive action which Metternich, at the

head of his alliance of sovereigns, felt bound to take was in south Germany where several of the rulers—in Baden, Wurtemberg, and Saxe-Weimer, for instance—were liberally inclined and thought of giving constitutions to their people. Unfortunately, the enthusiasm and some excesses on the part of the German students gave Metternich an opportunity to intervene. In 1817 they were celebrating rather noisily the anniversary of the battle of Leipzig and denouncing militarism and reaction. The enthusiasm which had been aroused by the fight against Napoleon still persisted, and the League of Youth, and practically all the universities, carried it with equal zeal into a campaign for national freedom and unity. "Constitutions and no feudalism," was the burden of their cry. Metternich, who boasted of being "The Man of the Past," took action at once. Four universities were dissolved, and when a man called Kotzebue, whom they considered to be a Russian spy, was killed by a student in 1819, a state like martial law was established all over Germany. The Press, the universities, and all suspected of revolutionary opinions, were put under strict police control. These measures, decided on at a conference which Metternich summoned at Carlsbad, did much to discredit Austria with progressive Germany and confirmed the leadership to Prussia.

In the two following years, 1821 and 1822, repression in the same spirit, but with even less excuse, took place in Italy, Piedmont, and Spain. For here Metternich and the monarchs of the Holy Alliance were intervening in countries where they had no legal status. And on that account, among others, England, though she was a party to the settlement at Vienna, would have nothing to do with the Holy Alliance or the violent actions to which it lent its support.

In Italy the king of Naples, who had feebly yielded to the

demands of his people and granted a constitution, was led back by Austrian troops, and still more feebly and disgracefully withdrew his promise. Into Spain where a constitution had also been dragged out of another Ferdinand, the French were induced to send an army. The re-established Bourbons were not sorry to do something to gain military glory and help their friends of the Holy Alliance. The "liberals" and the constitution were therefore suppressed in Spain by French, *i.e.* Bourbon, bayonets. And the reactionaries carried out their triumph with wholesale executions and atrocious cruelty.

Such were the actual measures to which the Holy Alliance, first thought of by the Tsar Alexander, in the most humane and Christian spirit, had led its supporters. Started side by side with the settlement of Vienna, and aiming at preventing the repetition of revolutionary war, it proved in practice a cloak for interfering in the domestic politics of other countries and preventing not war but freedom and reform. However, in the 'twenties, the tide began to turn, and both in England and then in France a movement of reform began again, first on political and then on social and industrial lines.

England will appear less often and less directly in these pages than France, but it is well to note at once the broad parallelism between the two countries which throws a constant light on the political and intellectual development of both, and of the whole Western world. A revolutionary movement stirred them both at the end of the eighteenth century, though the violent forms of the Revolution and, in particular, the career of Napoleon, were only possible in the conditions of France. In both a marked reaction took place after 1815 which was only overcome gradually during the 'twenties. Then the Reform Bill agitation and the accession of Louis Philippe coincide exactly, and with them

the beginnings of State popular education and humanitarian reforms of various kinds. Then at the middle of the century we have the Chartists in England and—again in a more violent form—the socialist rising in the Second Republic in France.

CHAPTER V

THE BEGINNINGS OF REFORM AND NATIONAL REVOLTS

France.—In France the restored Bourbons attempted at first, in the person of Louis XVIII, to follow a moderate and constitutional course, modelled largely on that of England. For England, although the weightiest and most persistent enemy of Napoleon, had shown herself after his defeat the most conciliatory and reasonable member of the victorious alliance. England had opposed the threatened dismemberment of France at Vienna, and it was mainly due to English diplomacy that Talleyrand was able to regain for France her due place in the Concert of the Powers. It was on English lines that the " Charte " was drawn up which Louis XVIII "granted" to his people on his restoration.

The constitution which this charter set up, followed the English parliamentary system in admitting the responsibility of ministers to an elected Chamber. But the Chamber was based on so narrow a franchise—not more than 15,000 of the wealthiest taxpayers—that it was less representative than even the English House of Commons before the Reform Bill. There was also a second Chamber, similar in constitution to the House of Lords. Of course so modest a measure of self-government could not contain the violent passions of either side. It had not behind it the popular sanction of centuries of national growth. The first Chamber

elected was of the most violent royalist hue. It passed several laws giving the government powers of arbitrary arrest and setting up military courts to decide on political offences. Meanwhile a fury of vengeance against Napoleonic and revolutionary leaders ran through the country, especially the south. There was a White Terror, and, as in the case of all "Terrors," those attacked and threatened gathered force in the end. In three years' time the liberal opposition in the Chamber became a considerable body, and Metternich called in the autumn of 1818 another Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle which debated the state of France and even offered remarks on a measure of moderate electoral reform which had been passed in 1817. Such external meddling would naturally have strengthened the hands of the reformers had not a crime occurred early in 1820 which led to further repression and encouraged the ultra-royalists. The Duke of Berry, son of the Comte D'Artois, the king's brother, was assassinated by an ex-soldier with the avowed intention of extinguishing the royal family.

In this object the murderer failed, as a posthumous child was born to the Duke in the autumn. This child, the Comte de Chambord, was destined to be the centre of many royalist plans and hopes later on. Immediately, the effect of the crime was to throw the power of the State into the hands of the extremists. The clerical party, inspired by the Jesuits, carried on a campaign against every act or idea connected with the Revolution. Liberal courses of lectures were suppressed at the University of Paris, and the works of Voltaire were thrown on the fire.

In 1821 new elections put into office the most reactionary ministry which had yet held sway, and all movement for reform was driven underground. Secret societies were formed, like the Carbonari which were at work at the same time and for a kindred cause in Italy. It is not surprising

that it was at the hands of this government that the expedition was sent to Spain in 1823 which was mentioned above. The king and his prime minister disliked it, but the hundred thousand French soldiers were sent, to suppress the new Spanish constitution, with words which breathe the full spirit of the Holy Alliance—"invoking the name of St. Louis, to guard the throne of Spain for a descendant of Henri IV, and to preserve that noble kingdom from ruin and reconcile it again with Europe."

The expedition was easily successful and the absolutist Ferdinand restored to this throne. The "ultras" in France profited by their victory, for they proceeded at once to a general election at which only fifteen "liberals" were elected in a Chamber of 430. The new Chamber again altered the electoral system and voted themselves seven years of power by a Septennial Act. As this was being done, Louis XVIII breathed his last, uneasy at the prospect which his more violent supporters had opened up. He blessed the little Comte de Chambord as he was dying and prayed that Charles X would preserve the crown for his infant son—a prayer never to be granted.

The end came quickly, and we had better conclude this part of the story before returning to trace the parallel events in other parts of the world, and especially in Greece and the Spanish colonies where national freedom had been gaining ground even before the Bourbons finally lost their throne.

The new king Charles X was Louis' brother and, as the Comte d' Artois, had been one of the most active of the emigrant princes during the Revolution. He brought this spirit to the throne and became, as one French writer called him, "le roi des émigrés," or, in another French phrase, "a second James II." There was to be no compromise in him with ideas of the Revolution. The old régime was to return with all its émigrés and all its priests,

strengthened in fact by the newly-won power of the Jesuits. Napoleon's general officers—or 250 of them—were retired. Various laws inflicting extreme punishments for irreligious acts were voted by large majorities. Capital punishment for profaning the sacred vessels in a church was one of them. But the two measures which aroused the strongest opposition were the voting of a thousand million francs as indemnity for the nobles who had lost their lands in the Revolution, and the Ordinances of July, 1830, which practically destroyed the Constitution and made the king absolute. A close Press censorship was set up and the property qualification for voters was raised.

The journalists who were thus attacked began the movement of revolt, which was completely successful in three days. They gave the signal, and the republicans of Paris, a small but determined party, put through the work. They tore up the paving-stones as a barricade, and soon held the city. With opinion almost unanimously against him, Charles X fled at once to England.

A new king was found in Louis Philippe, son of the Duke of Orleans who had played a prominent part in the Revolution. Louis Philippe himself had a more blameless record, and was commended to republican hearts by having fought in the great day of Valmy.

The new king was enthroned in August, and the more obnoxious features of the last reign were suppressed. Freedom of the Press and the responsibility of ministers to the Legislative Assembly were affirmed, and the Ordinances of July, which had provoked the new revolution, were so altered as to make it clear that the king had no power to suspend the laws. For the rest, the old limited, undemocratic constitution remained, little changed. A tricolour flag flew over a "bourgeois" monarch instead of the white banner of the Bourbons over the "king of the émigrés."

South America.—The second decade of the century which had witnessed these events in France and the work of Canning and the winning of the Reform Bill in England, saw also two decisive movements carried out in the Near East and in South America. We take the latter first. The emancipation of the Spanish colonies in America was inspired by the independence of the United States, it gave play to the diplomacy of Canning, and it showed the limits of the continental reaction directed by Metternich.

The independence of the United States was from the first a shining example to the colonists of Central and Southern America who, except for Brazil, were for the most part dependent on Spain. Spain, following up Columbus' voyages, had settled in all these lands and largely mingled her race with that of the aboriginals. But though in that respect more human, or at least more equal, in her treatment of the conquered, she showed less regard to their desire for self-government and independent life than did the British. She continued, after the United States had won their freedom, to exploit her colonies for her own profit and govern them through viceroys responsible in theory to Madrid, but in practice absolute. These men used their office mostly in order to pile up fortunes for themselves, and the lot of the workers, many of whom were slaves, was terrible, especially in the mines. The Revolution in Europe gave a fresh impulse and new hopes to those oppressed in America. The insurrection against Spain first broke out in Mexico in 1810, but it achieved its first success in the States of La Plata. In 1813 a Congress at Buenos Ayres proclaimed the independence of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata. Ferdinand VII of Spain attempted to put down the rising with the strong hand and the ruthlessness of Metternich in Europe; he hoped, indeed, that the Holy Alliance would extend its activities to the New World. The struggle lasted

for ten years from this Congress at Buenos Ayres till 1823 when it was closed for ever by the United States with their Monroe Doctrine, and by England with the determination of Canning to "call a New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old."

It suited the policy of Great Britain and the United States to support the South American colonies in their fight for independence, and their action clinched the matter. But this fact does not lessen the merit and the heroism of peoples and leaders who began the struggle and did most to sustain it, often in the darkest hours of defeat. Three names stand out on the roll of patriots: Toussaint L'Ouverture, who struck the first note of freedom in Hayti during the Revolution; Bolivar in Venezuela, Bolivia and Peru; Francia in Paraguay. The story of Bolivar is the most varied, inspiring and decisive. He started life and work in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, where he was born. He travelled and studied as a youth in Europe and witnessed some of the closing scenes of the Revolution in Paris. The United States, too, gave him ideas of free government and union when he visited them on his homeward journey. We cannot tell here the story of his life-long fight, its triumphs and hair-breadth escapes, its magnificent ideas and their partial accomplishment. He secured in the end the freedom of four states, and the verdict of those he served is enshrined in his title of the "Liberator," by which he is universally known among them, and he died in 1830 without a shilling of public money in his possession.

Greece.—The first blow in Europe to the principles of the Holy Alliance was dealt by Greece. In this case the fight for national freedom was enforced, partly by the religious enthusiasm of Christians against Turks, partly by the historic traditions which clung to the name of

Greece and led many Western men of ideas, like Byron at Missolonghi, to fight and work in the Greek cause.

Greece had been ruled since the sixteenth century by the Ottoman Turks, who left the towns a certain amount of independence and permitted the practice of the Orthodox religion to which the Greeks had always adhered. But the taxes were crushing, the hand of persecution was often felt, and nothing was done for the commercial or agricultural prosperity of the country. The Greeks, however, were themselves hardy sailors and industrious traders, and it was from the "Isles of Greece," which harboured bands of traders, pirates, and patriots, that the insurrection arose which was to spread over the mainland and finally sever the Greeks from their hated rulers.

Russia must have the credit for first organising the revolt of Greece. She had the strongest reasons for wishing them success, community in religion and a common hostility to the Turks. A Russian-Greek Empire, with its capital at Constantinople, had long floated as a charming vision before the eyes of Russian rulers, especially of Catherine II who ruled from 1762 to 1796. These secret ambitions flamed out in 1815 when at last the pacification of Western Europe left time and attention for problems elsewhere. Russian agents were already collecting contributions for the Greeks at the Congress of Vienna, and in the October of 1815 a secret society was founded with its centre at Odessa, and its chief an aide-de-camp of the Tsar, expressly to promote an insurrection in Greece. Open hostility began in 1821 when Ypsilanti the leader crossed the Pruth with a small following and occupied Bucharest. Alexander I cheered him on, but Metternich was still able to hold back the Tsar from official support, and the Russian ambassador at Constantinople offered the Sultan the help of his sovereign in suppressing the revolt. But it spread at once, quickly and everywhere, in

Greece and the islands. The Turks replied by a hideous massacre in Constantinople, Thrace and Macedonia. Two archbishops, eighty bishops, and hundreds of others were murdered on Easter Day. The Greeks responded by assembling on New Year's Day, 1822, in a wood near Epidaurus, and solemnly proclaiming their independence. They appointed a senate with an executive committee and appealed to Europe to recognise them as a belligerent State.

The Turkish invasion which followed, the wholesale massacres, the pyramids of heads which marked out the shores of Chios, did nothing to hinder the final triumph of the Greeks. Canning acted here, as he acted on the South American question, with prompt decision and in the same spirit. At his instance, England was the first to recognise the belligerent rights of the Greeks. Alexander, to whom the British ambassador applied to elicit his views, suggested the division of Greece into three portions, to be under the protection of Russia or of Turkey or of both combined. He wished to avoid the creation of a strong and independent Greece. It was the feeble conclusion of a weak though well-intentioned life. Nicholas I, a stronger but less idealist Tsar, succeeded him in 1825.

This change of rulers in Russia was the deciding factor in the liberation of Greece. France and England had liberal and Western ideas which prompted them to her support. Russia, under a new and active Tsar, was able and eager to invade Turkey and coerce the Sultan. The Sultan had in 1825 called in the aid of his vassal, Mehemet Ali of Egypt, who sent a large fleet which ravaged the islands of Rhodes and Crete and landed in the Morea. Navarino was captured, and Missolonghi, where Byron died during the siege, was taken after fifteen months' blockade and burning, from which less than five thousand of the fifteen thousand inhabitants escaped to Salonica in April, 1826. It was

during this siege that Nicholas issued his ultimatum to the Sultan Mahmoud which brought France and England on to the scene. It led to an alliance between them and Russia—the Triple Alliance of London—which secured the freedom of Greece. The Sultan at first refused to hear of any interference between himself and his subjects, and referred the English to the case of Ireland. In October, 1827, four fleets were ranged outside the port of Navarino ; on the one side, the English, French, and Russians, on the other, the Turkish-Egyptian fleet. The allies called on Ibrahim, the Egyptian commander, to cease operations against the Greeks. Firing broke out—it seemed quite accidentally—between French and Egyptians. In the evening, after a three hours' cannonade, the whole Turkish-Egyptian fleet had been wiped out, with a loss of 6,000 men against an allied loss of 140.

In the land war which followed, the French did the fighting in the Morea while the Russians advanced on Constantinople. When Adrianople was taken in August, 1829, the Sultan gave way. The Treaty of Adrianople, which concluded the war, gave complete independence to a very small Greece and automony to Serbia and the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were afterwards to form the kingdom of Roumania. It was the beginning of the dismemberment of Turkey whose advance westward had been arrested by the Austrians at the end of the sixteenth century.* Three years later, Otto of Bavaria accepted the crown of Greece, and her frontiers began to be moved farther to the north, a process which went on at intervals till the settlement after the Great War.

Belgium.—One other change in the map as settled in 1815 must be noticed here before we turn to the wider

* Battle of Lepanto, 1571, won by Don John of Austria. Cervantes, author of *Don Quixote*, fought in it and was taken captive by the Turks.

aspects of the period. This was in the relations of Belgium and Holland which had been joined together under the Dutch King William. Here the problem fell more directly under the influence of France and England, and it involved again their joint action and a further extension of the principle and practice of nationality.

The Revolution of 1830 in Paris encouraged the Belgians to rise against the Dutch. Belgium, consisting of the old Austrian Netherlands which had not been incorporated in the Dutch Netherlands when the latter broke away from Austria in the sixteenth century, was not content now to be treated as a subordinate people. The Belgians were also mainly Catholic and Holland mainly Protestant, under a Protestant king. They demanded independence and war broke out. A French party in Belgium were anxious to have a French prince for their independent kingdom; some would even have been annexed outright to France. The French invaded the country and captured Antwerp before the resistance of the Dutch was broken down, while the English gave help by a blockade of the Dutch coast. Belgium had gained her freedom by the end of 1832, and a treaty, securing this and proclaiming her neutrality, was signed in 1838, first by France and England, later by Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

The accord which had been reached in this affair between France and England was well shown in the arrangement made as to the king of the newly constituted and independent Belgium. Louis Philippe refused the crown for himself or his son, and Leopold of Saxe-Coburg was appointed. He was a Protestant, widower of the English Princess Charlotte and uncle to the Princess Victoria, who was soon to ascend the English throne. But, on the other hand, within two years of his accession he had married a daughter of Louis Philippe, and satisfied the Catholic majority in Belgium by con-

tracting that children of his marriage should be brought up as Catholics.

Thus, by the time of our English Reform Bill of 1832, in the early years of Louis Philippe's reign in France, two or three great obstacles to the progress of Europe had been removed. The domination of Napoleon and the frightful losses and unsettlement which his wars entailed, had passed away. The reaction, born of the Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, was also on the wane. In the East, and wherever Metternich held sway, it was still rampant ; a rising in Poland against Russia was put down in 1831, and in the same year the Austrians were able to reinstate the Pope and the other absolutist monarchs in Italy. But farther West their spell was broken. In fact, the Congress of Troppau in 1820 really marked the end of the reactionary supremacy in Europe as a whole. From that Congress the representatives of France and England were excluded, and we have seen that the common advance of France and England on a more liberal path since that date is the leading feature of the time.

CHAPTER VI

THE GREAT STIRRINGS IN THE WORLD OF THOUGHT

To understand what happens afterwards, it is necessary at this point to retrace our steps a little and take account of the deep thoughts which were stirring men's minds and the tremendous changes which were beginning in the relation of man to nature, just before the convulsion of the French Revolution and the wars which it occasioned.

The period of world history which we are studying in this volume, covers, as we noticed in the introductory chapter, the most complete and rapid transformation of civilised society which the world has ever seen. This is shown in changes of government and in the way people do their work and live together, and this social and political history is the first and main topic of historians. But underlying these visible changes, and for the most part preceding them, there are always changes of mind, new ways in which men look upon and understand the world in which they live, and on their relations to one another. "Man," *i.e.* the history of man, is, as the poet told us, the "proper" study of mankind, and this study must include the development of all sides of man's nature. Though we begin with the political side, *i.e.* how he has learnt to live peaceably with his fellows, we should keep a place for the rest from the first and, above all, for the development of his thought,

what we may call generally the spiritual side of history, which is ultimately dominant. Now, leading up to the French Revolution and running through it, there were changes in the intellectual world going on, which made that age as notable in poetry, philosophy, and science as it was in war and politics. As the wars died down, the other changes became more noticeable, and by the middle of the nineteenth century men could see that a new world was being built up and what was building it. And the chief agents were not the men—even Napoleon—whose names had been most on men's lips, nor were the most important causes those for which so many millions had fallen on the way. In this world of thought, too, France and England stood side by side in the front line, as they had, first as antagonists and then as allies, in politics. But in the intellectual sphere we have to add to them, as equals, the Germans, and all other nations who have taken distinguished parts in their turn.

On all sides of man's life and thought there was an extraordinary awakening and outburst of activity towards the end of the eighteenth century, which continued into the nineteenth and made that century the notable period for constructive and transforming work, which we shall appreciate more fully before the end of this volume. In England, where the "Victorian Age" soon became proverbial, we are only now beginning to understand the greatness of its leading figures and their permanent value. But we need to go back for their birth or origin some little way into the eighteenth century. Only a very few of the greatest names can be even mentioned.

In poetry and music, which each became more splendid in the following century than they had ever been before in modern nations, Germany certainly gave the lead. With her great sequence of Bach, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven, she became so predominant that the natural talents of other

nations, especially our own, were for a time unduly repressed. The effect in music was something like that of Newton's personal authority in mathematics earlier. In poetry it was otherwise, because, with the leading Germans, Goethe among the poets and Lessing among the critics, the new gospel which they preached, and the new works which they produced, looked back to the past, and especially to Shakespeare who became through them an international figure, the great master for all, of humanity, freedom and truth in literature. Shakespeare thus played a large part in the literary and dramatic revival at the turn of the centuries which has come to be known as the "Romantic" movement. It was largely a protest against the formal rules and restrictions of the French stage, and in this matter the example of Shakespeare was the strongest influence. But there were other motives at work too about the same time, which fit in well with what was going on in politics. There was a general tendency to look back to history for inspiration and to idealise the past. Just as the revolutionists were always citing the glories of the ancient republics of Greece and Rome, and making heroes of those who had assassinated kings in the past, so in their turn the defenders of the Church and of the old religion soon began to paint in glowing colours the life of the monks and the happiness and piety of the Middle Ages. Gradually an enthusiasm for history, linked up with a passion for popular freedom and progress in the present, began to take a settled form. Victor Hugo is its greatest voice in the nineteenth century, and he has the forward-looking glance which belongs to that time, just as Goethe, who stands between the two ages, rather inclines towards the past. In England, of the four greatest names—Scott, Wordsworth, Shelley, and Byron—the first is most distinctly linked with the past. Scott also deserves the first place as being not only the undisputed master of historical romance, but also

the greatest influence in the development of the novel, which was to be the leading literary form in the nineteenth century, as the epic had been in earlier days, down even to Milton in the seventeenth century. But Wordsworth stands out pre-eminent for another quality, which is strongly marked throughout the period and has grown down to our own times, that is, the desire to find pleasure, inspiration, and even religion in turning to nature; not only the nature which surrounds us in mountains, seas, and flowering meadows, but is also in the depths of our own hearts if we can throw off the hampering restrictions and conventions by which we are bound. This religion of nature, of which Wordsworth is the poet, has its clear connections with the gospel which Rousseau had preached in politics and education. Revolt in favour of an ideal, is the conclusion to be drawn by the active spirits, driven on and obsessed by the sufferings of mankind. For these Shelley speaks most movingly among the English poets, and both in his case, and abundantly in Goethe, and sometimes in Wordsworth, there is also a clear foreboding of the part which science was to play in the rebuilding of the world.*

It would be easy to illustrate the same points from the writings of the philosophers, historians, and other thinkers with whom this half-century is enriched. One only can be mentioned here, one of the greatest thinkers of all time, Immanuel Kant.

Kant, who was partly Scotch by descent, gradually took rank during the nineteenth century as the most powerful philosophic intellect, certainly since Descartes, perhaps since Aristotle. On this side—the wider and deeper aspects of his thinking—it is impossible to speak here. But it is a remarkable thing that so great a man, acclaimed and followed in France and England as well as in Germany, should bear so

* Preface to the second edition of the *Lyrical Ballads*.

clearly as he does all the signs of the change in social and political life, which we are more specially tracing. In this way he is a truly representative man, summing up as well as forming the opinion of the age in which he lived. He speaks for his time in his "republicanism," the belief that the interests of the whole people must be supreme; this is most pointedly expressed in his great saying that every man must be treated as an end in himself and not a means to some one else's ends. It is clear, too, in his vision of the coming world in which the independent "republics" will be linked together in a common organisation—a League of Nations, in fact, of which he should be regarded as one of the founders. Lastly, he is representative in being trained and steeped in the science of his day, especially the exact or mathematical sciences, in one of which, astronomy, he was a master and made a notable contribution himself.* He was surrounded by a galaxy of other philosophers—Hegel, Fichte, and the rest—who stand for the Germans in somewhat the same position as the "philosophes" who preceded the Revolution did for the French. The Frenchmen were, on the whole, earlier and more critical and practical. The Germans were more metaphysical, nationalist and conservative in the religious sense.

The mention of science, which was so clear in the case of Kant, so dominant in the case of the French "philosophes," brings us to that aspect of the thinking of the time which bore the most solid and measurable fruit. Rousseau fired the French Revolution; the steam-engine gave England the sinews of war by which the revolutionary wars were finally settled in favour of England and the steady, progressive way of settling things. Having done that, it went on in the nineteenth to industrialise and knit up the whole world, to necessitate "social reforms" in all industrialised

* He anticipated Laplace in his "nebular hypothesis."

countries, and to provide the governments with the money to carry them out. From these changes arose the "Socialism" of the Second French Republic of 1848 and the "Condition of England" question which bulks so large in the writings of Thomas Carlyle. But, before reaching that point, we have to go back a little and make good our statement that the Industrial Revolution, which is bound up with Socialism, is also bound up with the growth of science.

The seventeenth century was full of the new science which Galileo, Boyle, and other great men in all Western countries, were building up. It was also full of new inventions in which kings and nobles, as well as men of business, were keenly interested. The two streams of science and invention ran side by side and often mingled. Napier, for instance, who invented logarithms, also made a new warlike machine something like our modern tanks. Newton, the greatest of the mathematical minds, was also and primarily an inventor. He was making water-clocks, windmills, and all sorts of ingenious mechanical contrivances before he went to Cambridge. And the modern man of science had one decisive advantage over the men of Greece, he had no prejudice against industry, and actually wanted to make his invention useful. The opportunity came in the eighteenth century, when the triple alliance between Industry, Science, and Invention was formed, which outlasted the nineteenth, and is dominant in the twentieth.

CHAPTER VII

THE APPLICATION OF SCIENCE TO INDUSTRY

Before the eighteenth century the people of western Europe had been ploughing, weaving, forging, and building much as their ancestors had done from Roman times or earlier. Letters and goods passed from Paris to Rome by the same slow method of horse or wagon that had prevailed for ages. Suddenly—within a hundred or a hundred and fifty years—the whole scene changes, and before the end of the nineteenth century the world is transformed into the busy, restless, mechanical place in which we live to-day. This is the greatest of revolutions, and it was effected by the triple alliance—science, inspiring and strengthening mechanical invention, and mechanical invention congregating, multiplying, and standardising the industrial workers. In the last stage of the process the multiplied and congregated workpeople produce organisations of all kinds from among themselves, or from the State on their behalf, to raise or regulate wages, to give them safety at work and decent houses to live in, education and means of employing their leisure, and such hours of work as would permit of leisure to be thus employed. The mass of this social legislation, or voluntary provision, is the sequel of the Industrial Revolution ; and of the many causes of this revolution science should be put first, because we can clearly trace its working, both in the early days in the

eighteenth century and later in the nineteenth and our own time.

The invention by James Watt of a practicable steam-engine is the crucial point in the story, and it is interesting and easy to remember that a steam-engine was first set up to work a mill in Manchester, in the year of the opening of the French Revolution, 1789. But, though Watt's invention was the turning-point and the best example of the influence of science on invention—as we shall see in a moment—it was preceded and surrounded by a multitude of other inventions. Two series of inventions were brought together in the factory when Watt provided the manufacturer with his engine. On the one hand, there was the series of inventions improving and making much more rapid the processes both of spinning and weaving. Weaving was improved first by Kay's fly-shuttle in 1738. This made weaving so much quicker that the spinners had to set their wits to work to produce more thread. Hence came mechanical methods of spinning by wheels and rollers. These were invented and at work before Watt's engine was introduced. On the other hand, that engine could not have been produced without another series of inventions to provide more and better iron, and above all steel. This was being done also about the middle of the eighteenth century, when the method of smelting iron by coal was at last available. Before that wood-charcoal had been used, and the new method enabled the working of steel and iron to go on in the north and midlands of England near the coal, and where the textile mills had already been set up on the banks of running streams.

The treatment of iron gives, indeed, a striking historic picture of man's relation to nature, involving some sort of science at every stage. It reaches its climax in the nineteenth century when, in the manufacture of steel, the highest skill

and the most advanced knowledge of chemistry are combined. But just before the time of Watt and his steam-engine enough progress had been made in smelting iron by the use of coal to allow of the multiplication of serviceable machines. This is in itself a long and fascinating story. But the crucial point for the Industrial Revolution came in the contact of James Watt in Glasgow with Joseph Black, the lecturer on chemistry, and John Robison, also a lecturer on chemistry and a distinguished mathematician. Watt, being an instrument-maker employed in making and repairing instruments for the university, was in constant contact with those who had to use them. They often discussed plans for improving the steam-engine, of which several types had already been invented.

One of these was Newcomen's, which was a clumsy thing, with only an upright action, but a good deal used in pumping out mines. There was a model of this in the college museum which Watt was given to repair. On this the discoveries and improvements were made which ended in producing the most powerful mechanical agent of the Industrial Revolution. The capital improvement was due to science—the laws of latent heat. Watt invented a separate condenser for the steam, so that the enormous loss of heat which had previously occurred was prevented, and the engine became an economical proposition. Many other improvements were carried out, and Watt left behind him drawings of a locomotive which would have enabled him to anticipate George Stephenson. But his real achievement was in giving to industry an engine which has multiplied the force of man more than anything else yet invented, and in making it he was personally and directly indebted to the leading science of the time. In the 'eighties of the eighteenth century it was adopted in spinning factories, and before the century was out the steam-engine was in

general use and rapidly displacing the old wind- and water-mills.

This discovery put the coping-stone on England's industrial structure. It was based on her natural advantages, her central and insular position, her abundance of coal and iron in useful proximity. It was developed by her maritime skill and energy which had already carried her products all over the world. It was now completed, for the nineteenth century, by her mechanical inventions, which only spread gradually to other countries and gave her a rich century of undisputed sway. France, which came next into the field, had, at the time of Napoleon's fall, only one small steam-engine at work. But by 1847, just before the next revolution, she had multiplied this by five thousand. The industrial process began to spread as soon as the wars were over, and though England retained for long a vast preponderance, yet by 1848 there were great industrial populations in Paris and other cities, especially Lyons, Marseilles, and Lille. By the middle of the century, therefore, the time was ripe for a new movement in which other ideas, besides the abolition of privilege and political freedom and equality, would now come to the top. Looking, in fact, chiefly at France as the touchstone of the times and the nursery of revolution, we may see three stages clearly marked from 1789 to 1848. In 1789 it is abolition of privilege and legal equality that are at stake. In 1830 the middle class—people, that is, with a small independent income—claimed and obtained power. In 1848 the working-class, now in larger and congregated numbers, beginning to form unions and demand better conditions and a fairer division of the new wealth, became the dominant voice. This they were to retain, even under the temporary monarchs—Napoleons, Hohenzollerns and various dictators—who have assumed power down to our own day. We have now to see how the factory system

worked, and how it was related to the social and political development of the times.

One can understand best the difference made by the Industrial Revolution by comparing some part of the world where the old conditions still prevail, with a highly organised modern region, such as abound in Great Britain, western Europe or the United States. In the former—say, for instance, a remote country district in India—each family lives in a cottage to which a piece of land is attached. All they eat or drink is produced by themselves or by some of their neighbours. Their clothes are woven on the spot, and the simple tools they use are also made by themselves or by the village smith. For anything beyond this they are dependent on the occasional traveller or pedlar. Now this was the normal state all over the West down the middle of the eighteenth century. And, where manufactures went on, as in the West Riding of Yorkshire, the same "domestic system" prevailed. You would have seen the land divided into small enclosures of two or three acres with houses standing in them. "Hardly a house out of speaking distance from another. At every considerable house there was a 'manufactory,' and every clothier keeps one horse at least to carry his manufactures to market, and generally a cow or two for his family. By this means the small pieces of enclosed land about each house are occupied, for they scarce sow corn enough to feed their poultry. The houses are full of lusty fellows, some at their dye vats, some at their looms, others dressing the cloth; the women and children carding or spinning, all being employed from the youngest to the eldest." *

A cheerier and more prosperous picture, it may be feared, than would be furnished by any present-day village one can think of in India. Now, with the advent of large and quickly-

* Defoe's *Travels in* 1724–26.

producing machines, these handworkers found themselves dispossessed. The old things could be produced much more cheaply, and a multitude of new machine-made products were put on the market. The old cottage workers therefore either abandoned their trade or betook themselves to the town, where a large factory had been put up by a capitalist rich enough to provide the more elaborate machinery and engines to work it.

In England the process was hastened by the enclosure of land which was going on at the same time. Large farms and estates were being built up systematically, and this also had the effect of driving a large number of cottagers and small holders into the towns to take their place among the factory workers. The process, thus so simple in the individual case, made up collectively the greatest social transformation known in history.

We may consider the effects, first in their immediate results—the working of the machines, the organisation of the factories, the growth of the towns—then in the wider and more remote aspect of the change of mind and life of the workers and the change of mind of the State towards them. And we must remember throughout that the mechanical and organising process is quickening all the time. While factories are multiplying and towns growing, the network of communications is extending just as rapidly. Railways, steamships and telegraphs also belong to this part of the century, and we shall turn to them afterwards for a moment before resuming the political story.

The first result of the new machines was the increase of output. We saw this in the case of Kay's flying-shuttle which so much increased the speed of the loom that inventions were called for to supply more yarn. This is, in fact, the fundamental and final result of increasing mechanical power —to enable men to do more, or more quickly, things that

their unaided physical skill had been doing in less quantities or more slowly before. With the greater output comes a larger consumption and lower prices. Hence every one—at least in industrialised countries—has large quantities of machine-made things whereas before they had fewer things mostly made by hand or simple tools.

Side by side with this increase of output goes the enormous extension of the division of labour and the degradation, or limitation, of the human element to the tending of the machine. Adam Smith's famous example of the making of a pin is the best illustration of this.* A machine is limited to the operation for which it is contrived, and the earlier machines were naturally the simpler, doing only one part of the complicated processes involved even in such a thing as the making of a pin. The mechanical process involved analysis, and Adam Smith shows how the making of a pin has been broken up into "about eighteen distinct operations." By this division in his time ten persons could make more than eight thousand pins in a day. Since that time, by the development of the machinery, seven million pins can be made in a day with only three men to supervise the machines.

The most important, or at least the most immediate, social result of the factory system was the increase of wealth for the capitalist class who had found the money for the machinery and the buildings. There had been capitalists, of course, in the world ever since Noah's Ark, but this new and vast extension of machinery put much greater power and wealth into their hands. They were the legal owners of the means of production and the means of subsistence for a growing number of their fellow-creatures, and in the division of the resulting profits they received at first an altogether disproportionate share.

Owners made fortunes at the time when a weaver might

* *Wealth of Nations*, published 1776.

be earning eight shillings a week by continuous work. This was the capital fact which was bound to strike the popular imagination and moved it progressively throughout the nineteenth century. The case was aggravated by the competition of women and children which kept wages down, while the condition of the workers, herded into new, unattractive and insanitary towns, made the early years of the factory system, especially in England, one of the blackest periods of our social history.

The employment of young children, quite commonly at the bidding of their parents to increase their own small wage, often as gangs of paupers transferred from other parts, was the last touch of horror in the scene. It did more than anything else to rouse the conscience of the nation and lead to the factory legislation which was one line of the social reform which followed.

The most important result in politics was the appearance of the capitalist, owning class and their growing sharp division from the workmen paid by them and operating their machines. The chief social divisions before this time had been between the landed aristrocracy and the townsmen and the peasants without land. Now, above this, there was coming into play a wider and deeper division of those who owned capital and those who lived on weekly wages. The main domestic problem of the nineteenth century in every country throughout the West was to prevent this division from becoming acute. The State regulated conditions and raised taxes for social reforms. The public formed trade unions and, if well-to-do, subscribed money for philanthropic ends.

But the social division became more clearly marked as the century wore on and the Industrial Revolution spread in wider circles. At first the exhilaration of the new wealth and the expansion of commerce throughout the world reigned

supreme. Remedial measures were only thought of when crying evils were exposed, and the earlier risings of discontented workers were, as we shall see, easily suppressed. Before this, however, other great triumphs of applied science were to be carried out. Commerce was to be promoted and the world knit up by railways, steamships, and telegraphs which were all first employed in a regular and paying way in the decade of the Reform Act in England and Louis Philippe in France.

Steam transport by sea was easier to introduce than by land, and steamers were plying between British ports from 1815 onwards. In the 'twenties there were steamers between England and the Continent. In the 'thirties exciting races began between steamers leaving Cork, Bristol, and Liverpool for New York. In the 'forties the Cunard Line was founded with a government subsidy.

By this time the railways were at work both in England and the United States and several countries in Europe. George Stephenson drove his first train from Stockton to Darlington in September, 1825. In 1829 the first locomotive imported from England, ran in New York State, and so on. Later in the century, railways began to be built in the great tracts of the earth's surface where Europeans were settling for trade and empire. In India, China and Africa the building of these railways raised, and still raise, grave political questions. But they have gone on steadily, and in every case the railway, when made, has become a powerful agent of social change. It spreads the products of the Industrial Revolution, breaks up the isolation of primitive communities, and tends to build up the unified world in which we live to-day.

The railway was strongly seconded in its unifying work by the network of telegraphs which followed it, and was first laid along the newly-constructed railways. It was

discovered, about the time of Watt's steam-engine, that signs could be transmitted by electric currents. Then, just as railways were being built, an alphabet was invented for transmission by electricity on wires. This was first done by Morse in America, and by 1837 the wires had been laid along the London and North Western Railway. In the next decade the first public service was opened from Paddington to Slough.

It is thus clear historically that this period, after the fall of Napoleon and before the middle of the nineteenth century, is that in which the most important steps were taken to found a world-wide system of large-scale industry, inspired by scientific inventions. Other, perhaps deeper, results on man's thought and life, arising from the spread of scientific thinking, remain to be dealt with in later books. But here and immediately we have to notice the effect of this industrial change on theories about wealth and industry and the position of the working classes.

CHAPTER VIII

SOCIALISM BORN FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

The great wealth of the new manufacturing class naturally set men thinking of how it was acquired and how it should be used. It had come by a combination of three things—clever brains in inventing, spare money ready to be used by enterprising persons, and a mass of people ready to come together and work under direction, like an army under its officers. This last analogy struck some of the theorists very forcibly. They thought that the world was passing into a stage when industrial armies would be universal and take the place of the old feudal and royal armies of earlier days. But, of course, this interesting parallel did not settle the real questions in dispute. Who was to command the army? How were its operations to be directed? Above all, how were the profits to be shared? It will be seen at once that these are the very questions on which we are still disputing, and on which almost every month some fresh conference is called to bring us a little nearer to a solution which every one might accept. Meanwhile, it is not amiss to remember that the original, and still unsettled, dispute arose from the fact that man by a new and marvellous use of his wits had discovered ways of getting much more out of nature, of becoming most surprisingly rich.

As opinions were at first divided, at the beginning of the

century, you had the two extreme positions. There were those, on the one hand, who held that subject to certain general laws—as to personal freedom and the preservation of health and the prevention of cruelty—the manufacturer should be left entirely free to the operation of what were called the "laws of supply and demand." Let every one make what he thought most needed, in the way he thought best, and pay those who were willing to be employed what wages he could get them to accept. This is called in books on political economy the theory of *laissez-faire*. Its best-known apostle was Adam Smith, who carried great weight at the end of the eighteenth century and was the chief influence in getting rid of many old restrictive laws, on apprenticeship, tariffs, prohibitions of certain trades, monopolies of others, and so forth. Adam Smith was the leading philosopher on that side; but the most popular writer was a deaf invalid, a most determined and industrious woman called Harriet Martineau, who wrote tracts and stories in the 'thirties and 'forties of the nineteenth century which are still worth reading and at the time had a tremendous vogue. Cabinet Ministers in England waited upon her, and European and American sovereigns and statesmen asked for her advice.

At the other end were those thinkers who carried the idea of an army to its logical extreme, but would have the final voice assigned to the mass of the troops. They were to govern, to manage industry as well as everything else, and allot the profits, either equally all round or to every one according to his supposed deserts. This is the collectivist form of socialism; it is the unitary democracy, such as we saw triumphant for a time in the French Revolution, applied to the control of industry as well as the State.

In the event, of course, neither extreme view was found practicable, and England, as usual, led the way in taking the

middle path. Even Harriet Martineau in later life approved of limited factory legislation and was always ardent for State help on behalf of education. The English figure, however, who is best worth studying in this connection is Robert Owen, just as the continental is Marx.

Owen had made his own way as a manufacturer in early life and had a flourishing cotton mill at New Lanark on the Clyde. There were about two thousand workpeople in his works there, including some five hundred children, and he laid himself out to make the place not only a commercial success but also a model home for the workers. He cared especially for the children, and became, from his work at New Lanark, the founder of infant schools in Great Britain and one of the first in the world. When some of his partners objected to spending so much money on philanthropic objects, he founded a new firm with a limited dividend to carry out his ideas in full, and in this Bentham and other leading reformers of the day took shares. It was in this spirit—of a successful manufacturer still more successful in dealing with his workpeople—that after 1815 he began to attack the problem on a larger scale. He advocated the application of his plan universally. Communities should be formed of about twelve hundred persons living and working together, and he appealed in the first place to other employers to follow his example. Failing them—and it was soon seen that he would fail—he fell back upon the State. Who should carry out the work and supervise the settlements, was to him quite a subordinate point compared with the primary necessity of making human welfare prevail ; and in his philosophy happiness and goodness must depend on suitable and stimulating conditions. The solid truths contained in his experiment and teaching have been explored and partially applied in many ways since, but his own life was clouded towards the end, partly by failure in his settlements in the

United States, still more by the opposition he managed to arouse by his religious as well as socialist propaganda. As his personal success wore out, his temper and his attitude to the general public became more antagonistic.

Marx, the continental example, the greatest of theoretical socialists, was the son of a Jewish lawyer and born in Rhenish Prussia in 1818. He studied at the universities of Bonn and Berlin, intending himself to be a professor. But his interest in the social question and his eagerness in attack turned him to journalism. At the age of twenty-five his paper was suppressed, and he sought refuge from the police in Paris where he lived till the Revolution of 1848. Again driven out, he spent the remainder of his days in London, where most of his writing and organising was done, and where he died in 1883. One can almost compound his character and his work from these facts. The intellectual keenness of the Jew, the academic training of the professor, the habit of attack in writing, the international but outlaw temper of the political exile. His work on "Capital," written in several volumes but never completed, became the Bible at least of continental socialists and its burden is the necessity of the class war. He read the history of all hitherto existing society as one of class-struggle. The difference in modern times is that the antagonism is simplified and we are faced by a duel between the two great classes which have resulted from the Industrial Revolution—capitalists and working-class, or, in the French socialist phrase, "bourgeoise" and "proletariat."

To him, as to his later followers in Soviet Russia, the issue was inevitable and the fight was a religion. In Marx one has the complete and logical form of collectivist socialism. All capital is the result of labour, and the products of industry should therefore belong to the workers of every grade. The transition, from a social arrangement by which capital

belongs to individuals, to one in which it belongs to the State, becomes all the easier as businesses are enlarged and companies take the place of individual owners. In the end all capital, means of production and control of industry, will pass to the State, as they have done already in such cases as the roads and the post-office and, in many countries, the railways. The issue is certain, the Marxite thinks, but we must fight for it.

We are now in a position to understand better the new spirit which appeared in the revolution of 1848. It broke out, as in the previous cases, in Paris, but spread from France to many other countries and had its parallel in England in the Chartist movement.

CHAPTER IX

REVOLUTIONS IN FRANCE

The revolution of 1830 which brought Louis Philippe to the throne did not go very deep, and left many questions and grievances surging underground. The king himself was one of the less stable elements on the surface, and his position in France contrasted most unfavourably with that of the young Queen Victoria in England who came to the throne seven years after. The Queen throughout her reign was a great source of strength to England. She was loved and acclaimed as a girl, tutored and protected as a young woman and wife, pitied as a widow, and treated in her old age as a national symbol. No other sovereign could have carried the British Commonwealth over the troubled century so triumphantly and with so little break with its national traditions. With both the French rulers who were her contemporaries, it was far otherwise. Louis Philippe's father had been steeped in revolutionary memories of the most partisan kind, and, though Louis Philippe himself strove to throw off these associations, he never succeeded in establishing himself as "King of the French." He added "by the will of the Nation" to his title; but he never secured it, either by the mode of his succession or by his character or by the policy of his reign. The nation first welcomed him as an escape from a worse evil, then tolerated him as a cautious ruler, trying his best to avoid mistakes, and ended by despising him

as a selfish and avaricious person, quite out of touch with public opinion or the big movements of his time. Worst of all, for a Frenchman, they took to laughing at him, walking about Paris like any other old bourgeois, with his green umbrella under his arm.

The great majority of Frenchmen on whom he might have relied, were excluded, by a narrow electoral law, from casting a vote, and he was hotly opposed by the two extremes. On the one hand, the " legitimists " who supported the older branch of the Bourbons who had ruled in France since Henry IV of Navarre, had their own candidate in a grandson of the late king, and him they recognised as Henry V though he never came to the throne. At the other end were the republicans who were ultimately to succeed, though for the present they were driven underground like the Carbonari in Italy. As the reign went on, this party became stronger, and was strengthened by the growth of the socialists. In the destruction of the bourgeois régime, in making Louis uncomfortable and ultimately overthrowing him, liberal republicans and socialists counted together, just as the same elements in England had combined to pass the Reform Bill. But when the overthrow had taken place in 1848, they fell apart, and the conflicts took place which made the Second Empire possible and led later to the division of parties—Conservatives, Liberals, and Socialists—which we see in France and other countries to-day.

But in the earlier part of his reign Louis Philippe was fairly successful. His government followed a course very similar to that of the contemporary Whigs in England, elected after the Reform Act. The French, like the English, began then to organise their elementary education, and in 1833 passed an Act setting up a primary school in every commune. The teachers were to be paid as well as certificated by the State, and were thus more completely

State officials from the first than those doing the same work in England. The same French ministry which did this, also developed the municipal organisation of France ; just as the English Parliament of 1832 reformed the municipalities in England. Other matters of social reform were also taken up—savings banks, local roads, etc. And we saw above that the French also co-operated with the English at this time in settling the question of Belgium and Holland on terms satisfactory to all four countries.

Later on, differences arose between the two great countries of the West, as they had arisen before, in the eighteenth century, on questions of colonial expansion, and these were not finally solved until the beginning of the twentieth century. But Louis Philippe himself was always anxious for peace and for a good understanding with England. His own colonial ambitions were confined to securing Algeria where the French had been already established before he came to the throne. This conquest began, as frequently happens in conflicts between richer and better organised states and their less settled neighbours, first in disturbances of order, then in disputes about debts. The coast of Algeria and the neighbouring seas had been infested by pirates for generations and fighting had often taken place before. In 1830 the French occupied the town of Algiers, and a long war set in for the subjugation of the tribesmen of the interior which did not come to a close till Napoleon III was emperor more than twenty years later.

The chief difference between France and England during the reign arose in the Near East from which so many quarrels have sprung. Mehemet Ali, the pasha of Egypt, who had been sent by the Sultan to subdue the rebellious Greeks, was afterwards ambitious to supersede his master and become the leading Mohammedan power in the Mediterranean. At first he carried everything before him, and just at the time of his

victories over the Sultan, Thiers, a much more energetic and ambitious man than Louis Philippe himself, became prime minister in France. He thought he saw a chance for France in backing Mehemet, while England and other powers were supporting the Sultan. Palmerston, however, who was foreign minister in England, had better cards to play and was a better player. The Quadruple Alliance of London was formed in July, 1840, between England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and France suffered a severe diplomatic defeat. It was a stage in the decline of Louis Philippe and led to an attempt on the part of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte to succeed to the inheritance of his uncle. He actually disembarked at Boulogne and tried to enter France. But he was soon captured and shut up in a castle at Ham where he waited his time for another six years.

In the last eight years of his reign Louis Philippe and his government were losing ground steadily and the opposition gaining strength. In 1843 a great opposition journal was founded called the " Reforme," supported both by republicans and socialists, and it is interesting to see in its statement of aims how far socialist opinions had gone in permeating public opinion. " The workers," they said, " were once slaves ; then they became serfs. Now they receive wages. The object of our policy must be to raise them to the position of associates. It is for the State to take the initiative in industrial reforms, with this object in view. To the able-bodied citizen the State owes work, to the aged and infirm it owes support and protection. This result can only be obtained by a democratic government based on the sovereignty of the people, and with ' Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity ' as its ends."

Here we have a complete union of the " principles of the French Revolution " with the new ideas of socialism, and in the next few years an attempt was to be made to put them into

practice. Louis Blanc was the chief inspirer of the socialist wing, and when the new revolution came, it was he who took the lead introducing the measures of practical socialism.

Guizot, the historian, was prime minister, and his stolid resistance to all change was a strong provocation. An outbreak took place in the streets and some rioters were shot by soldiers on the evening of the 23rd of February, 1848. By daybreak next morning the whole of working-class Paris was in the hands of insurgents. Louis had abdicated and a republic was proclaimed before the end of the afternoon. At once the two wings of the opposition, now in power, began to draw apart. The republicans, or at any rate the moderate bulk of them, only wished a progressive change of the system, a wider franchise, an honest government, and a President instead of an unpopular king. But, as the working-men had driven out the old rulers, it was for them to determine the policy of the new.

The Provisional Government which had been formed, hoped to placate the socialist wing by establishing "national workshops" in Paris, with a minister of public works in charge. They also set up a Labour Commission which converted itself into a Labour Parliament with delegates from all the trades. This took possession of the Hall of the Peers, and was presided over by Louis Blanc. The Labour Parliament and its President looked forward to organising the industries of the country in a permanent and self-supporting way. The State was to find the money to start with, but afterwards the workmen were to manage the trades themselves, in fact to do what we have seen done recently in Soviet Russia. But the Provisional Government, which commanded the army and held the purse strings, had no such ideas. They only intended the "national workshops" as relief-works, a temporary expedient to keep the unemployed occupied until a permanent government and settled order had

come in. But this was not accomplished without an armed conflict, the most terrible street-fighting which Paris had ever seen.

Before the end of April a hundred thousand men had flocked to Paris and were enrolled in the labour gangs. Millions of francs were being spent on their wages and nothing useful was provided for them to do. In May a National Assembly, elected by practically universal manhood suffrage, took the place of the Provisional Government. The great majority of the new deputies were moderate, or even conservative, men sent up by the peasants of France who have never been socialist. They promptly voted the closing of the national workshops. At once the cry of "bread or lead" was raised and fighting began. From the 23rd to the 26th of June fierce civil war waged in the streets, and when at last order was restored, so much blood had been shed and such severe punishments were inflicted, that a still deeper gulf was dug between capital and labour.

The National Assembly promulgated a new constitution, after six months' debate, in November, 1848. It was to be republican and called upon all Frenchmen to form henceforth a single family. There was to be but a single chamber, elected by popular vote, and a President also elected by popular vote, for a term of four years. The separate election of the President, borrowed no doubt from the United States, was to prove the undoing of the constitution. Religious freedom and the liberty of the Press were guaranteed.

The election of the first President of the Republic took place in December. Louis Napoleon, the nephew of the first emperor, who had attempted risings against Louis Philippe both in 1832 and 1840, was elected by an enormous majority over both the other candidates combined. The French people were walking with their eyes open into another empire when they did this, because the successful candidate

had made no secret of his intention to carry out his uncle's ideas. His father had been put in as king of Holland by the Emperor Napoleon in the time of his power. After his uncle's downfall the nephew had been wandering over Europe, expelled from France, but always cherishing the ambition of coming back some day and re-establishing the dynasty. The rising of 1848 gave him his chance, and he was free from the unpopularity of those who had shot down the populace of Paris in the " days of June." His programme was skilfully drawn to appeal to all classes. He was no socialist, but he offered laws for the benefit of the working classes and reminded them of the glories, but not of the disasters, of the Napoleonic days. As soon as he was elected, he set to work to alter the constitution in his own favour, trying in the first place to have his term of office extended from four to ten years. As the Assembly would not support him, he formed an inner circle of dependent friends who were prepared to back him through thick and thin, and on the morning of the 2nd of December, 1851—the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz and three years after his own election—he dissolved the Assembly by a *coup d'état*, ordered a fresh election of himself as President with enlarged powers, and was re-appointed by a larger majority than before. He was now in fact Emperor, and the title was conferred on him formally after a fresh appeal to the people within a year.

The government which followed was for most of its time as despotic as that of the greater Napoleon on which it was modelled. But it must be remembered that by the force of circumstances, in virtue of what had happened to the greater man, the lesser one was driven to shape his conduct on other lines. Whereas Napoleon I enforced his own rule on the nationalities which the Revolution set out to free, Napoleon III was genuinely anxious for national independence, especially in Italy. Whereas Napoleon I always

treated England as the chief enemy whom he had to subdue, Napoleon III made a good understanding with England a foundation stone in his foreign policy; and whereas Napoleon I was always attracted by the vision of an empire in the East, his nephew made his first serious mistake by an attempt on the West, in Mexico. These matters will come up for further discussion in the next book. For the present it is sufficient to notice that at home the government of Napoleon III, though it professed adherence to the great principles of the Revolution, in fact suppressed all the legitimate methods of making known the popular will. The senate was nominated by the emperor. No political journal could be published without previous authority, and the teaching in colleges and universities was inspired from above. But in matters of social and industrial welfare the country made great strides. Railways were pushed on. Paris was beautified and improved, and in 1855 a great International Exhibition was organised which followed on the lines of that of 1851 in London, due largely to the efforts of Prince Albert, the Consort of Queen Victoria.

CHAPTER X

REVOLUTIONS IN EUROPE

The Revolution of 1848 in France was the signal for many outbreaks in other European countries which had been subject since 1815 to the repressive system of which Metternich was the symbol and the agent. Just as in France the overthrow of Louis Philippe and the succession of another Napoleon to the throne were a striking reversal of the decision of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, so in other countries, not satisfied with their governments, the time seemed to have arrived to throw off yokes and attain conditions more suited to the national desires. But the differences between the cases went deeper than the likeness. France was socially, politically and intellectually more advanced than the countries which imitated her. In France they had no foreign ruler. The chief desire was for a government which would express the nation more worthily and give scope for industrial advance and social welfare. Socialism played more part in the revolutions in France than elsewhere. In Italy, Austria, Poland, and even Germany the motive was a more elementary one—to attain a government arising from and expressing the spirit of the nation which it governed. Until this was gained, there was no reality in the social reforms and the nation could not settle down to peaceful co-operation with other nations. In Italy and most parts of the Austrian Empire the government was alien, while in Germany it

was so much broken up that the nation could never speak with one voice.

In the Austrian Empire, Magyars in Hungary, Czechs in Bohemia, Slavs in the south, and Roumanians in the east were all clamouring for independence, or at least a more popular and representative government. The Austrian provinces were ruled personally by the Emperor who was Ferdinand I from 1835 to 1875. He was a childish and incapable man, often actually out of his mind.* Real power was therefore left in the hands of his ministers, which meant in practice Metternich, until the rising of 1848. All the laws were made and the taxes levied and spent without consulting the people. No one could leave the country without a government passport, and books, newspapers, teaching, and theatres were all supervised in the same spirit to prevent the incursion of new ideas likely to endanger the government. Landlords had still their old authority over their serfs and could prevent their leaving the villages without permission. Non-Catholics were excluded from government offices and Church and State remained very largely as they had been in France before the Revolution.

Hungary had its diet or parliament, but it was composed of an upper house of nobles and a lower house nominated by the smaller landlords. And only the Magyar minority, who had conquered the land in the ninth century, had even these limited rights. The other nationalities, who formed more than half the population—Roumanians, Croats, and Slovaks—were denied all political power or national recognition.

The most prominent reformer in the Austrian Empire was the Hungarian Kossuth. Hungary was indeed the

* One story told of him became a Viennese proverb. Calling, in the rain, at a farmhouse where the family were having dumplings for dinner, he insisted on having one, against his doctor's orders : "Kaiser bin i, und Knüdel muss i haben."

keenest centre of the reform movement in the Austrian Empire, for they had abuses of all kinds to redress in their own system as well as the interference of the Austrian government from outside. Kossuth made himself the mouthpiece of all this so far as it affected the Magyars, and there still remained behind the injustice inflicted on the other races by the Magyars themselves. Kossuth advocated what was merely a liberal programme for Western countries, and became a great hero in England after being imprisoned by the Austrian government at home. He asked for trial by jury, the revision of the barbarous criminal code, the abolition of forced labour from the peasants, and the equal taxation of all classes.

When the revolution of February, 1848, broke out in Paris, all the disaffected areas of Europe caught up the flames. On the 13th of March a number of students in Vienna marched to the Assembly Hall where the local diet was sitting and, supported by the crowd, took possession of the building. The cry was "Down with Metternich," and Metternich, who was now seventy-five years old, gave up hope and fled to England where he was welcomed by the Duke of Wellington who was an old friend of his, engaged at that moment in organising the military forces of London against the Chartists. The Duke, entirely successful in preserving the peace against the Chartists, was to die in 1852, seven years before his Austrian friend. Metternich, who never took office again, survived to see the beginning of the struggle of France and Italy against Austria in 1859, which falls to be recorded in our next book.

The revolutionists, thus left for the time in power at Vienna, began at once to draw up a constitution. The feeble emperor made no resistance and, within three days of the rising in Vienna, both Hungary and Bohemia had followed suit. The Hungarian diet at Pressburg demanded by a

unanimous vote the programme of nationalist reforms which Kossuth had put forward, and began establishing its own ministries of war, finance, and foreign affairs. In Prague, the capital of Bohemia, the patriotic Czechs held a solemn meeting at which they passed a petition for civil liberties and the abolition of serfdom. When they arrived in Vienna waving Czech flags, the emperor received them most graciously, addressed them in the Bohemian language, and granted most of their requests.

It will be noticed that neither in Bohemia nor Hungary did the patriotic reformers repudiate their allegiance to the emperor as their personal sovereign, and Austrian statesmen often argued that a system of autonomous states under one head was possible for them, as it has proved possible in the British empire. This belief and attempts to realise it went on until the Great War. But it was always otherwise in Italy. The same revolution of 1848 swept all over Italy, and there no trace of tolerance for Austrian rule was ever felt. We shall follow up events in Italy and Germany later on, when describing the unification of those countries as a connected story. Long before this the rising of 1848, with its subsequent constitutions and attempts at national autonomy and reforms, had been reversed in blood.

Bohemia, which was to furnish the occasion and the instrument for the reaction, was divided, as it still is, between Czechs and Germans. The Czechs speak a Slavonic language and are connected by race with the other Slavs in Eastern Europe. The Germans, though a minority in Bohemia, were strong through their connection with the Germans in Austria and elsewhere, and through the fact that their language was more generally known. In June, 1848, the Czechs called together a Slavic conference at Prague to which delegates came from Serbia, Croatia, and other places. They were compelled, however, to talk

German among themselves. The conference could do little, and was no doubt not intended to do much except demonstrate the racial enthusiasm of the Czechs which was rather a different thing from the reforming and constitutional enthusiasm which had taken them to Vienna. After it was over, a fight broke out in the streets between some of the more violent members—students and working-men—and the soldiers. The general in command, Windischgrätz, who had fought in all the campaigns against Napoleon, was an imperious person now over sixty. The crowd attacked his house and he replied by bombarding the city and setting it on fire. Next day, the 18th of June, he marched through the flaming streets and declared that the revolution in Bohemia was at an end.

In Vienna, though the circumstances were different, a similar tragic issue soon befell. The assembly called to draft a new constitution made little way. Meanwhile, disorder broke out in the city and the minister of war was killed. The emperor fled to Innsbruck, authorised Windischgrätz to march with his army to Vienna, and do there what he had just done in Prague. The capital made a stouter resistance, and formal siege was laid which lasted for ten days. At last it was taken by storm on the 1st of November, many of the national guard and students were massacred, and the Constituent Assembly was dissolved. Ferdinand, who was thus restored to absolute power, abdicated on the 2nd of December, in favour of his nephew Francis Joseph, who occupied the throne till the middle of the Great War and became the one personal link between our own times and the revolutions which had to be appeased before the world could settle down to normal progress.

In Hungary the repression of the national movement called for still greater efforts. The revolution which Kossuth as leader of the Magyars had achieved, was opposed by the Slav minority, who were able to gain support from

their fellow Slavs in Croatia and Serbia. The Slavs were not at this time so hostile to the Austrian government as they afterwards became, and with the connivance of the emperor were ready to fight the Hungarians when Ferdinand had decided to take the reactionary line. In October he finally avowed himself opposed to the reforms which he had approved in March, and Windischgrätz marched again in December, this time against Pesth, the capital of Hungary. The Hungarians made the greatest effort of the three countries to preserve the freedom they had won, for they had an inspiring leader. They threw off Austrian rule altogether and refused to recognise Francis Joseph when he succeeded. In April they set up a republic, with Kossuth as President, and defied the empire with its Croatian allies. For a time they held their own, and by May, 1849, the new republic had cleared out all its enemies and seemed about to triumph. But Metternich had been succeeded by a reactionary as strong as himself, an old soldier, better qualified than Metternich to deal with revolted peoples. This was Schwarzenberg, who had insisted on the retirement of the feeble Ferdinand and was in consequence the real master of his successor. He formed a close alliance with Nicholas, the iron Tsar of Russia, who had already crushed rebellions in his own domains at Petersburg and Warsaw. An army of 200,000 Russians was sent into Hungary and compelled submission by overwhelming numbers and cruel vengeance. Statesmen, generals, and even women were put to death, to the horror of the more humane and liberal public in Western countries. One Austrian general who was held responsible for some of this, was mobbed later on in the streets of London with the approval of Palmerston.

But blood and iron did its work for the time. It was a revival in its worst aspect of the Holy Alliance and its last appearance on earth.

BOOK III

1848—1871

THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY AND GERMANY —SOCIAL REFORMS—SCIENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROGRESS—NATIONAL AMBITIONS AND THE SECOND EMPIRE IN FRANCE

CHAPTER XI

ITALY

The freeing of Italy from Austrian and other alien rule and her formation into the united national state of the last sixty years, form a story complete in itself and full of heroism, romantic adventure, underground plotting, and idealist philosophy. It has been often told, and by none better than by some of the English historians and sympathisers with the movement. It touches on our general narrative at several points—the revolt against Austria in 1848, the policy of Napoleon III in 1859 and 1870, the action of the British government in 1860. But all these events can best be viewed round one centre, the determination of the best characters and the keenest minds among the Italians to revive the spirit of Italian patriotism, and create a single

government capable of expressing it.* The nucleus for the new state was found in the north, where for hundreds of years the Duke of Savoy and Piedmont had held sway and had become a king, with Sardinia, Piedmont, and Savoy for his kingdom, early in the eighteenth century. His capital was at Turin, and the course of events made it appear like a conquest of southern Italy by the north. But as the movement went on, opinion settled down on that point. Italy must be one, and the only political force in the peninsula, capable of bringing her together, was the kingdom of Piedmont and Sardinia. When this had been accomplished, about 1860, it only remained to secure Rome as the capital of the new kingdom, for to Rome the minds of all Italians were naturally drawn, by its central position and its unique historical grandeur.

The outbreak in the north in 1848 coincided with the general revolution against Austria, described in the last chapter. Austria had been confirmed in her possession of Lombardy and Venice by the Congress of Vienna, and she ruled there even more arbitrarily and with more dissatisfaction among her subjects than in Hungary or elsewhere. The forts were garrisoned with Austrian troops, and power was in the hands of police officials and judges who treated severely all suspected of favouring the Italian cause. The tariffs, too, were so arranged as to check Italian industries and bring money into the emperor's treasury at Vienna. As soon as Metternich had fallen, the people of Milan arose. They drove the Austrian troops out of the city and soon cleared the greater part of Lombardy. The Venetians followed and set up again their old republic which Napoleon had suppressed. Their leader was a great lawyer called

* Edward Fitzgerald to Frederic Tennyson in 1841. "Talk of your Italians! Why, they are extinguished by the Austrians because they don't blaze enough of themselves to burn the extinguisher. Only people who deserve despotism are forced to suffer it."

Daniele Manin, who became president of the republic at the end of March, 1848. By this time a large part of Italy was in revolt, and even the Bourbon king of Naples and the new Pope Pius IX had made a show of yielding to the demand for constitutions in their domains. In this respect the Pope was acting as a temporal ruler of his provinces in the centre of Italy, and there were some who hoped that he might even become the Head of the free Italian states.

But both the revolted states in the north saw that the only hopeful chance was to call in the support of Charles Albert the Sardinian king, and he was compelled by public opinion to assume the leadership against the Austrians. But the first attempt was a miserable failure. The Austrians were firmly entrenched in a great fortified area near Mantua called the Quadrilateral and they had a redoubtable general, Radetzky. The Italians could make no impression upon him, and Charles Albert himself found little active support from the other states. The Pope soon decided that he could not afford to go to war against Austria, one of the staunchest Catholic states, and the king of Naples withdrew the troops which he had at first been induced to send. After a defeat at Custozza in Lombardy, Charles Albert signed a truce and withdrew his forces.

The local republics which remained after his retirement did not add to the strength of the national cause. There was one in Florence, and another was set up in Rome ; a very enlightened minister called Rossi, whom the Pope had appointed to carry out reforms, had been assassinated. And so, when next year Charles Albert renewed the fight, he was still more decisively beaten, close to his own territory, at Novara. Things went back, therefore, to their former condition all over Italy for ten years, except in the Kingdom of Piedmont. Piedmont retained the representative government which Charles Albert had just introduced, and when his

son Victor Emmanuel succeeded him after his defeat, Piedmont began steadily to enter on the course of reform and growing strength which made it the undisputed leader of Italy when those ten years were over.

Victor Emmanuel was a stronger man than his father. He refused to suppress the parliament and responsible ministry which his father had set up. Austria demanded its suppression, but the king preferred to call in the ablest men he could find to help him in working it. Among these Count Cavour was soon included and rapidly rose to command.

Cavour was a man of noble birth, born at Turin in 1810. He was trained as a soldier and superintended, as engineer, defence works at Genoa and various fortresses in the Alps. But from the first he showed still greater interest in politics, and studied them, especially in English books, till he was old enough to visit London and Paris himself and talk to leading statesmen and reformers in France and England. The revolution of 1830 in Paris made a great impression upon him and strengthened his belief that a historic monarchy might become liberal and constitutional. In this spirit, which is essentially the mainspring of British government, he worked all his life to guide and strengthen his own country when at last he was called to the helm. He had been a leading figure in inducing Charles Albert both to grant a constitution to Piedmont and to throw in his lot with the Italian reformers. He kept his head and his hopes after the defeats of 1848 and 1849, and, being already a noted member of the parliament at Turin, he was made minister of finance in 1851. His first task was to increase the resources of the country and improve its internal condition. He worked at this by studying agriculture and applying better methods, first to his paternal estates and then, by means of a Piedmontese Agricultural Society, to the country at large. He was active, too, in

promoting the introduction of steam navigation, railways, and factories, and seemed to be so much anglicised in his ideas that he was often nicknamed the "Milord Camillo." But through it all he was cherishing his greater ambition of freeing Italy from Austria and uniting it under the crown of Piedmont, and, however he might strengthen the country by financial and industrial reforms, he could never hope to make it strong enough to face Austria alone, for Sardinia-Piedmont had but five millions in population and were a good deal divided among themselves. A strong friend must be looked for elsewhere, and, as it could not be England for a war with Austria, it must be France.

His first great opportunity for diplomatic action came with the Crimean War of 1854–55. We shall see later on how this came about, but for Cavour's purpose it had the supreme advantage of bringing France and England together in war against Russia. They needed all the support that they could get, and Cavour offered and sent a Sardinian contingent. When the war was over and the diplomatists met in conference in Paris to arrange the terms of peace, Cavour was entitled to attend as representing one of the combatant powers. There at the council board he warned the other powers that Austrian rule in northern Italy was a danger to peace. The link thus set up with Napoleon III was pursued with vigour. At last a marriage proposal between the house of Bonaparte and the daughter of Victor Emmanuel was put forward in 1858, and in July, 1858, at Plombières, a spa in eastern France, at a secret interview, the emperor agreed with Cavour to make war in his support if Cavour could manage that it should first break out between Austria and Piedmont. This happened in the April of the next year. As soon as rumours of a war of liberation were heard, Italians came flocking to the north from all parts of the country, until at last the emperor of Austria demanded

disarmament from the government at Turin. When this was rejected and war began, the French joined up promptly with the Piedmontese, and before the end of June two victories had been won over the Austrian forces, one at Magenta and the other at Solferino, and Napoleon had entered Milan side by side with Victor Emmanuel.

Then came the change in Napoleon's mind and the bitterest disappointment in Cavour's career. Behind his back, at Villafranca, a truce was concluded with Austria which left the war half completed and enabled Napoleon to march away with Nice and Savoy in his pocket, which he had stipulated for as the price of his intervention. The peace, to which Cavour was compelled to agree, gave only Lombardy and the two little duchies of Parma and Modena to the northern kingdom and left Venice still in the hands of the Austrians.

But with the first move on the mountain side the avalanche soon followed. Tuscany, the country of Florence and Dante, had already expelled its Grand Duke in the spring. It was now ready to join the new Italy which was being built up in the north. Romagna, the northern part of the states of the Pope, had renounced political allegiance to him and did the same.

The south and Rome itself now remained the only outstanding parts of the country where external force was needed to produce a union with the rest ; and, to make this change, the other side of the Italian movement came into play—the unauthorised, underground, more idealistic activities which two great men, unlike in temperament, but united in their love of Italy and the freedom of mankind, promoted and made glorious. Mazzini was the prophet and the organiser of associations ; Garibaldi the soldier and hero of adventure. Mazzini had been doing his work, secretly and in defiance of the police, for years, and had formed the association of

Young Italians pledged to the freedom of the country and a religion of democracy. Garibaldi had been training himself for the grand adventure of his life by years of fighting in South America, where he had secured the independence of Uruguay from Brazil by the efforts of his Italian legion. He had fought for the short-lived Roman Republic in 1849, and, when it was suppressed, had led a marvellous retreat of his 4,000 volunteers before the armies of France, Austria, Spain, and Naples. This story, and all that he did before and after, forms the unmatched romance of the nineteenth century, perhaps of all modern history.

Now came his greatest opportunity and his most decisive exploit. With a thousand men—the famous "Red Shirts"—he set sail from Genoa for Sicily in May, 1860. In five months he had conquered the Neapolitan forces both in Sicily and the mainland. Twenty thousand regular troops in Palermo, supported by nine frigates, were compelled to capitulate, and on the mainland, again and again, he won similar successes against overwhelming odds. The secret was that the population were at heart all on his side, and their enthusiasm spread also to the Bourbon's troops. He was secretly encouraged throughout by the government of Piedmont, and England made the way easy by guarding the seas, for English people had been stirred by these events. They detested the tyranny, and still more the methods, of King Francis in Naples; they adored Garibaldi.

In October Victor Emmanuel marched down and occupied Naples, and southern Italy thus became incorporated in the Italian kingdom.

Venice and Rome remained, the only portions of the peninsula which did not yet acknowledge the authority of Victor Emmanuel. They were added to his kingdom as incidents of two more wars. In 1866, when it was seen that

Prussia and Austria were on the point of a breach, Italy concluded a treaty with Prussia which enabled her to enter Venice while the Austrian troops were withdrawn. And in Rome the French maintained a troubled hold, fighting off an attack of Garibaldi in 1867 in the interests of the Pope. It was another miscalculation of Napoleon III, for it lost him the friendship of Italy in his hour of need, and in 1870, when the Franco-Prussian war broke out, the last French soldier disappeared and Rome became the capital of Italy.

CHAPTER XII

THE UNITY OF GERMANY

The growth of Germany, from the thirty-eight states to which the first Napoleon had reduced her, to the Reich of to-day and yesterday, is the parallel story to that of Italy. The differences as well as the likeness are all instructive. The leading statesmen in each story—Cavour and Bismarck—form an interesting comparative study. There is a war in each case, carefully engineered. There is the final emergence of the northernmost state in each country, Prussia in Germany and Piedmont in Italy. And in each case a large Patria Irredenta remained outside at the end. In the case of Italy the Great War brought the detached Italian territories at last into the fold : in the case of Germany, Austria, though German in speech and blood, still remains cut off.

The unity of Germany, though finally sealed by war, was based on social and industrial facts. The Germans had been for generations conscious of themselves as a nation, and had in the Holy Roman Emperor, who had been a German since the tenth century, the link and symbol of their unity. But this political unity had in the course of ages become merely nominal, and the three hundred states which Napoleon reduced, were practically sovereign and independent. After 1815 commercial and economic forces began to work strongly in support of the national yearning for one state.

Railways were built which were common to the various political units, and a network of telegraph lines was even more effectual in bringing the states into close and constant touch. But the needs of commerce were still more urgent in promoting union. At this time, *i.e.* between 1815 and 1834, goods passing from Hamburg to Austria or from Berlin to Switzerland, would have to cross the boundaries of ten states and pay duties under ten different tariff systems. It was the intolerable nuisance and expense of this tariff business which led in 1834 to the formation of the Zollverein or Customs Union which embraced seventeen of the states with a combined population of twenty-three millions. Within this area goods were allowed to pass freely, but they were protected by a tariff against all outside. Austria decided not to join, and her abstention left Prussia far the largest and strongest state within. It was another step, perhaps the longest, towards the new German Reich grouped round the kingdom of Frederick the Great.

In May, 1848, after the revolutions described in the last chapter, a National Assembly met at Frankfurt to draw up a constitution for a new great German state which was ardently desired by all patriotic and liberal Germans. Frederick William IV, the king of Prussia, had already been frightened by demonstrations in Berlin into promising a constitution for his own kingdom. But the hopes of the reformers went further than this, and had the king of Prussia stood firm to his promise and been willing to go still further, he might then have become the hereditary leader of a united Germany, supplanting Austria and probably excluding her, though without the war which subsequently took place with precisely this result. For the Assembly at Frankfurt offered him the throne, and good statesmanship, one thinks, might have arrived at the solution which was proved necessary in the end, without the crooked measures and the bloodshed which

occurred before that end was reached. But good statesmanship was, in fact, the one thing most conspicuously absent. The six hundred delegates who formed the Frankfurt Assembly did little but talk, and Frederick William was too timid and conservative to take the bold step forward. He feared the jealousy of Austria and a possible war with her, and still more he despised a crown which was offered him by those whom he thought he had the right to command.* So the Frankfurt Assembly passed off without achieving its work. Austria resumed her place as nominal chief of the German Confederation, and Prussia had to be contented with a much curtailed form of its own constitution.

Then in 1858, just before the intervention of Napoleon III in the affairs of Italy, a new and vigorous monarch succeeded in Prussia to the highly cultivated but ineffective one who had disappointed the liberals in 1848. The mind of Frederick William gave way some three or four years before he died, and his brother William succeeded, a vigorous, obstinate man without a tincture of the liberal sympathies or the constitutional timidity which had occasionally led Frederick William to make concessions. William was the true Prussian, bent on improving and increasing his army whatever his parliament might say. It was the collision with his parliament which led him into the hands of Bismarck, who, starting as his minister to help him in the parliamentary crisis of 1862, became in the end his master and the strongest man in Europe.

Otto von Bismarck sprang from an old landed family in the mark of Brandenburg, the heart of Prussia. Like Cavour, he had had experience in estate management on his father's property ; unlike Cavour, his training for the post

* "It would have been a crown of mud and wood," he said. "If any one is to award the crown of the German nation, it is myself and my equals who shall give it."

of minister lay in administration and diplomacy and not in writing and study. He had represented Prussia at the Diet of Frankfurt in 1851 where he supported the claims of Prussia against Austria, but on the other hand stiffened the back of the Prussian king against the liberal and constitutional party. When the new king succeeded, the two men found themselves practically at one with regard to the line which Prussia should pursue, for Prussia was first in their minds, Prussia as a German state, but above all Prussia. It followed that Austria must be expelled from the German Federation of which she was the nominal President and thus leave the leadership to Prussia which, by welding the other German states together under her ægis, would become the first military power in Europe. The essential preliminary was a stronger army, and it was to enable the king to carry his army reforms over the opposition of the Lower House in Prussia that William called Bismarck to his side in 1862. The new minister was at that moment ambassador in Paris where he was enabled to take the measure of the French emperor and make superficial friends with him. When he took office in 1862, Cavour was dead and the crisis in the Italian movement was over. The straining-point in European politics, which in the last decade had been between Austria and Italy, was now transferred to Austria and Prussia.

Bismarck's advice to the king was to continue his plans for strengthening the army and take no notice of the Lower House of the Prussian chambers. They had refused to pass the budget. Let the king go on just as if they had passed it. The constitution had made no provision for a deadlock on the subject of the budget, and if their policy was successful, all would be forgiven. And so it turned out. The army was increased by making the annual levy sixty instead of forty thousand men, and the period of active service two,

or of service in the reserve four, instead of the previous two years. By this means the State gained seven years of the early manhood of its citizens and an army of four hundred thousand men.

Having gained their instrument, the king and Bismarck could go on safely to challenge Austria by diplomacy. A quarrel with Denmark provided the occasion. Attached to the kingdom of Denmark on the south are the two provinces of Schleswig and Holstein, largely inhabited by Germans but recognised for centuries as part of the Danish king's domain. Disputes having arisen as to the succession in these states, the king of Denmark proclaimed in 1847 that he proposed to incorporate them simply in the rest of his kingdom, though the legal relation previously had been something like that of Hanover to Great Britain in the time of the Georges. This proposal was strongly resented in Germany, and the controversy went on until 1863, when Schleswig was definitely incorporated with Denmark. Bismarck first invited Austria to co-operate with Prussia in settling the question. Denmark refusing to yield, the two leading German powers proceeded to make war on Denmark on behalf of the German Federation. Between combatants so unequally matched the combat could not last long. The Danes were heavily beaten in 1864 and retired even from Jutland. France and England intervened and secured an armistice, and England would have gone still further, but Napoleon refused his support : he was already entangled in an adventure in Mexico, to which we shall refer later on. The armistice was broken in June, and the Danes completely defeated in their island retreat. At last they yielded, and gave up not only Holstein, which was mainly German-speaking, but also Schleswig where the people spoke Danish. This state of things was not redressed—in spite of a plebiscite promised at the time—until after the Great War. Bismarck

and his master were only concerned to use the victory to improve their own position, to gain all the territory wrung from Denmark for themselves, and with it a remodelling of the German Federation, which would put Prussia formally at the head. A quarrel was easily forced, and the details are not worth recalling. The main issue was well understood, and when in June, 1866, Austria called out the forces of the Confederation to check Prussia, every one knew that the organisation and leadership of Germany as a whole were now to be decided. Italy, wise before the event, made terms at once with Prussia. She would make war if they did, and her price was Venice. Napoleon, less wise, was backing Austria, though not by fighting, and lost his chance of a solid understanding with the rising Power.

War was declared between Austria and Prussia on the 14th of June, and before the end of July the preliminaries of peace had been signed. It was one of the shortest, most decisive, and most surprising of wars, except to the able men who planned and conducted it on the Prussian side. Except the quite small states in the north, the whole of Germany supported Austria against Prussia ; by swift and well-directed strokes, Hesse, Hanover, and Saxony were first thrown out of action and the main attack delivered on the Austrian forces in Bohemia. The Austrian commander foresaw disaster and begged the emperor, Francis Joseph, to yield before the battle. But honour seemed to him to demand the fight, and it took place at Koenigsgraetz or Sadowa on the 3rd of July. There was one critical moment at which Bismarck declared that he believed himself to be " smoking his last cigar "— for he had decided to kill himself if the Prussians were defeated. But the alarm was short-lived and the Prussian victory conclusive. Bismarck used it in the most statesmanlike way to secure what he thought Prussia and Germany

needed without unnecessary humiliation or further alienation of his beaten rival.

Sadowa and the Treaty of Prague, which ended the war in August, put into shape the German Reich which had been growing since 1815. It was the crown of Bismarck's chief work—the building up of a new united Germany round the superior strength of Prussia. The Franco-Prussian war added the title of Kaiser to the king of Prussia. That title and office have now passed away. The Franco-Prussian war tore away Alsace and Lorraine from France, and gave them for a time to Prussia. They have now returned. But the substantial unity which had been achieved, and of which the Treaty of Prague is the confirmation, still remains. Napoleon tried in vain to gain some compensations from Prussia after an event which he had not foreseen. The only one granted was a clause providing that the populations of the districts in the north of Schleswig should be again united to Denmark if they expressed such a desire by a free vote. No such vote was allowed till 1919.

In the remodelled Germany which thus arose, Prussia annexed the north German states which had opposed her (except Saxony) and became President of a new North German Federation of all the states north of the Main. Within this union a constitution was set up consisting of a popular assembly—the original of the present Reichstag—and a Federal Council in which each of the associated states, however small, had a vote, and the three free towns of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck. Prussia in this new Council could command sixteen of the forty-three votes by virtue of the small states which she had absorbed. The popular voting for the Reichstag was a concession to democracy, but the real power rested, from then till the end of the Great War, with the king of Prussia himself, his president-minister, and his army.

One other masterly idea completed Bismarck's work. The four southern states remained outside the new federation, and French statesmen flattered themselves that a triple division of Germany had thus been created which would be permanently divided and balance one another—Prussia in her northern federation, Austria, and the southern states (Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, and Hesse Darmstadt). But within three days of the Treaty of Prague another treaty had been signed between Prussia and those southern states, establishing an offensive and defensive alliance with them and giving the king of Prussia the command of all military forces in time of war.

CHAPTER XIII

SCIENCE AND PROGRESS

The first Italian parliament met at Turin in 1861 and proclaimed Victor Emmanuel "King of Italy by the grace of God and the will of the people." Piedmont had merged herself in a larger whole. Five years later the new German Confederation was founded by the masterful action of Prussia and under her leadership. Prussia had conquered the new state by arms, and it was to show this character by the title of "Emperor" which its head was to bear for nearly fifty years. In each case the work of consolidation, essential for the stability of Europe, had been accomplished by the middle of the 'sixties, and we may well leave the international sequel for a moment and retrace our steps to see the advance which had been made meanwhile in the other realm of abstract thinking. It would be absurd, of course, to attempt to set up an exact parallel between the two sides of men's activity—to say, for instance, that in 1859 Darwin based the origin of species on the survival of the fittest, and in 1866 Prussia, which was the fittest, survived in the war with Austria. Yet we may be sure that there is a real connection somewhere between the thinking and the acting, even between philosophy and politics, and here and there we can trace this clearly and believe that more will be revealed as the facts are better understood.

In the earlier part of the century the results of the

application of physical science to industry were made evident by the spread of the factory system and the building of railways. At this time it was physics—the laws of heat and gases—which had made most advance, and the steam-engine was the result of the direct application of one of these to a practical invention. Chemistry was then less advanced than physics, and in physics comparatively little was known about electricity. Above all, the great discoveries about animal and vegetable life had still to be made, and these are the special scientific glory of the latter part of the nineteenth century. In building up these sciences it is interesting to note that the three leading nations of the West have always advanced side by side. Often, indeed, one finds a Frenchman, a German, and an Englishman making similar discoveries within a few months of one another. It was so in the case of the outermost planet of our system, Neptune, discovered both by Leverrier in Paris and Adams in Cambridge in 1845, and immediately afterwards confirmed in the observatory at Berlin.

In the next decade—the 'fifties—the most striking physical discovery was that of the constitution of the heavenly bodies, due to the analysis of their luminous rays by two German opticians. The material basis of the universe was thus found to be similar throughout, and astronomy, which had been previously purely mathematical and mechanical, now took its place as the first great chapter in physical science as a whole. This one discovery, which was thought to be impossible by even some of the acutest minds of the time, has done more to transform our knowledge of the universe than anything else since Copernicus and Galileo.

Quickly following this came a multitude of discoveries about light and electricity, which soon had their direct application to life and industry, apart from their profound effect on men's ways of thinking. The speed of light was

measured and found to be the greatest known to us—it would seem the greatest knowable. The work on electro-magnetism, with which the name of Faraday is connected by all nations, had an immediate and illimitable industrial use. The artificial production of electricity and its transmission in large quantities by wire ranked at once in practical importance by the side of the steam-engine. Faraday's work covers the mid-decades of the century, and electricity was being harnessed to man's chariot just when the national states were settling down to their industrial development in the 'seventies and 'eighties.

The dynamo, which is the machine resulting from Faraday's discoveries, has made possible the transmission of the force of waterfalls to light towns, drive machinery and move trains. It may in the end harness even the tides for man's work. Already it takes rank with the steam-engine as one of the capital applications of science to industry, and it must, by its far wider scope, surpass it infinitely at last.

But great though the strides of physics were—especially in regard to light and electricity—in the middle of the last century, most men of science would probably agree that the advance of chemistry was still more important, both as to the central mass of our scientific knowledge and in its bearings on human life. For chemistry, as the study of the composition of substances, has an unlimited scope both upwards and downwards. It becomes merged in physics on its inorganic side and gives the material basis of life at the other end of the scale. And practically the whole of this world of knowledge has been built up in the period covered by this volume. At the beginning of the period—to name only two or three of the greatest French names—we have Lavoisier, who lost his head in the Terror, laying the foundations of the science by the constant and accurate use of the balance and by a logical system of terminology ; and now, in the latter half of

the century, Berthelot and Pasteur make the most brilliant applications of organic chemistry to the conditions of life.

The chair of chemistry was created for Berthelot at the Collège de France in 1864, just at the time of the exciting political events described in the last chapter. He deserves special commemoration both as philosopher and friend of Ernest Renan and still more for his own epoch-making contributions to chemistry. In the year after his appointment as professor, he published his lectures on thermochemistry, treating of one of the most important relations of chemistry and physics. Later on he proceeded to the chemical, synthetic reconstruction of various organic substances—sugar, alcohol, etc., which led the way to the industrial chemistry of our own times. The English had given the lead to the world with the steam-engine and inventions in electricity; the French, and close on their heels the Germans, were the pioneers in industrial chemistry. For if we are only to mention four names, we should have to add here Baron Liebig, the German, of Hesse-Darmstadt, whose laboratory at Giessen became for a time the most frequented in the world. He studied in Paris in the 'twenties, and then on his return to his own country persuaded the government to establish the best-equipped laboratory of the time. Paris-Giessen-Munich, was his career, and he overlapped Berthelot at the close, being himself the older man. Liebig's researches bore specially on agricultural chemistry, transforming the traditional system of fallows by the discovery of suitable chemical manures.

With Pasteur one reaches another stage in the linking up of chemistry and life. Ever since the invention of the microscope in the seventeenth century, men had been penetrating further into the study of the minute. The old physics and astronomy had been the science of masses. With the microscope, science could lay fresh foundations in

the infinitesimal. In this field, on the organic side, Pasteur is the most famous name. He showed that fermentation is the result of life and that the microbes are living organisms which may multiply indefinitely for good or evil, if they find a suitable environment. Fermentation is the chemical result of the action which the microbes exercise on their environment in the process of living. This was the closest connection yet shown between chemistry and life. The chemical reactions in our own body—in breathing, digestion, and so forth—had been known before. Here one had a process, thought to be entirely chemical, demonstrated by the microscope to be another, undreamt of, form of life.

Pasteur also showed conclusively—at least to our own days—that life never originates except from previous forms of life. To him is due, more than to any other man, the extinction of the old idea of spontaneous generation, another result of the study of the exceedingly minute. But his name is most blessed, both in his own country and in the world at large, for the practical benefits his discoveries conferred. He showed how to protect the human body against some of the most deadly plagues which had assailed it, and helped incalculably various forms of cultivation—notably the vine and the silk-worm—by attacking the microscopic organisms which caused their diseases. His crowning triumphs against human diseases came rather later than the period we are discussing in this chapter, but they may best be mentioned here. In 1877 he published his most famous and most beneficial discovery that the virus of microbes may be diminished by successive cultivations, and that we may thus obtain a " vaccine " or " serum " which will give immunity against a dangerous form of the disease. In 1885 such inoculation was tried for the first in Paris against hydrophobia, and its success was a world-resounding event which led to the foundation of the Pasteur Institute and the spread

of the same researches, and of work based on them, in other countries. Lister's name in England and Koch's in Germany show here again how closely knit up is the framework of European thought and how the three great Western nations advance as a rule side by side.

We shall see in the next book the effect of all this scientific expansion on the wealth and industry of the world, after the approaching crisis between France and Germany had been for the time disposed of; but there is still one aspect of thought which must be dealt with here, however briefly, before we go back to politics. This is the growth of knowledge about life itself—especially the life and history of man—which led to what is known as the "doctrine of evolution." This is properly a theory about biology, how species of animals have come to be; but it became linked up with history and social facts and gave the strongest support to the belief in human progress which is the dominant thought of all civilised societies in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

France, Germany, and England co-operated in this high science too, as we saw they did in astronomy, physics, and chemistry, though it happens that French and English names stand out most prominently on the biological side—above all, one quiet and laborious Englishman—while the Germans were most productive in the field of history. But the truth is that the movement of thought was world-wide; men had been studying history more, and thinking of the world and of life as a developing thing, ever since the end of the eighteenth century. We can only give a few sentences here to the tremendous subject, though it means so much to all of us, and has a bearing on politics too as we shall see in the next section.

There is an interesting link between the two leading names —the Frenchman and the Englishman who did most to build up and make known the theory of biological evolution.

Charles Darwin was born in the year in which Lamarck's *Philosophie Zoologique* was published—1809. The life of Lamarck goes back to long before the outbreak of the French Revolution. He had been "Botanist to the King" in the reign of Louis XVI, and went on to the general study of zoology after writing a standard work on the classification of plants. But the principles which he thought governed the evolution of species, and with which his name is now associated, were published in 1815 in the introduction to his *Natural History of Invertebrate Animals*. He held that altered wants in animals led to altered habits, which in turn produced new organs or changes in those already existing. All such changes were transmitted by generation to the new individuals born of the older. Thus the stretching of the giraffe's neck to reach the foliage led in the course of generations to the long neck, and the slender legs of the ruminant animals were due to their flight from the carnivora. They attacked their enemies with the head, and this led to a flow of fluids thither and the development of horns. The whole theory on which this is based, has been contested and minutely studied in every possible case, especially in recent years since the appearance of Darwin's work put another suggested cause of change into the foreground.

Darwin, who was a man of independent means and enabled all through his life to pursue disinterested study at his leisure, approached the same problem, of the change of species, from the different angle of geology. Lyell's *Elements of Geology* appeared in 1830 when Darwin was a young man still at Cambridge. He embraced at once the general conclusions of Lyell, which were contrary to the accepted views of "catastrophic" changes and the comparatively recent creation of the world. It was, thought Lyell, a slow, progressive change, covering millions of years, which had given us the world we live on, and the changes which we now

see going on, slowly before our eyes, are substantially the same as those which, operating through the ages, have laid down the oceans and the strata of the earth's surface and the infinite variety of life upon it. Darwin's patient mind, working on this thesis, hit on another cause for the gradual change of living forms and the evolution of fresh species. He had been, as the Government Naturalist, on a voyage on the *Beagle* to South America and collected a large number of specimens, fossil and living, of plant and animal species from the islands and the mainland. While arranging them at home after his return, he happened to read a famous *Essay on Population*, published by Malthus at the end of the eighteenth century. The argument of Malthus was that, as every animal species is always increasing at a faster rate than the food it lives on, there is a constant "struggle for existence," and that those types will survive which are the best suited to their environment. Here, thought Darwin, is the master-key to the problem of the development of species, and we see at once how widely it differs from that of Lamarck. The giraffe does not get his long neck by constantly stretching out to the topmost foliage, but those giraffes survive, and have similar offspring, whose necks are already longer than their competitors' and enable them to reach more leaves.

But, though he had the master-thought, Darwin worked steadily for over twelve years before he published it. In this delay and careful accumulation of proof he resembled that other great Englishman, Newton, who had determined the course of Western science for the two hundred years which preceded Darwin.

Darwin's theory of the way in which species had arisen and changed in the ages was based chiefly on the survival of favourable variations in the struggle for existence which, as Malthus had shown, is always going on in the animal world. Zoologists since his time—and at full steam in our

own—have been subjecting his explanation to the same sort of minute examination which Lamarck has also received. What is a variation? What causes variations? How are they perpetuated, and will any number of small individual variations suffice to make a new species? These are a few of the deep questions which exercise the minds of biologists, and it is clearly beyond our scope to go into them here. But two general effects of this biological reasoning must be mentioned, which go far beyond the scope of biology and have modified the whole course of Western history. The first is the more limited and dangerous application which has been made, both by individuals and nations, of the doctrine of the survival of the fittest. It was thought, not unreasonably, that as the battle of life had gone to the strong—the strong in mind as well as body—in the past, so progress in the future would consist in a continued struggle on similar lines—the spoils to the conquerors, the world to the white races, and to the strongest nation among the whites. To take this view was a misreading of Darwin and a degradation of morals. For just in proportion as beings rise in the animal scale, so do other motives and other thoughts come in and modify the competitive spirit. It is still there, and should be, in the best of us, but it becomes gradually transformed into something higher and nobler in the human sphere, so that human history, while it contains throughout the traces of struggle, is much more truly to be regarded as the history of growing co-operation. But the narrower application worked widely in the world, and to ill effect, especially in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

It is, however, in its larger aspect and its truer interpretation that Darwin's theory is most important. It gave a basis of fact to the vague belief in progress which had been spreading in Europe for three hundred years. Man had come to believe—we saw it before the French Revolution—

that the course of history was upwards, that he had risen from a lower and savage state and had infinite possibilities before him. This belief, drawn in its general shape from a review of history at the end of the Middle Ages, was now made definite and secure by being linked up with science—first the science of the rocks, which showed a steady movement towards completeness in the fossil forms ; and now the evidence of living things which, in the individual embryo, as in the race, had developed from the simplest elements. Thus made scientific—*i.e.* with a basis of ordered facts—the doctrine of evolution has become dominant in all branches of thought. The universe is seen to be in a process of becoming, and all aspects of it take on fresh light and significance. The astronomer now studies the evolution of a nebula, and all history is the record of a growing and not a static thing. Only by studying the steps in change and growth can we come to understand the nature, the right treatment, or the destiny of any creature or any institution.

The same dominating thought, annexed from biology, has its bearing in life and practice as well as in philosophy. The " philosophes " of the Revolution could look hopefully to the prospect of mankind marching with a firm tread on the road to perfection, but for Darwin and all who came after him these glowing phrases had, if one cared to inquire seriously, a definite and concrete meaning. Progress became a real conception, measurable by the adaptation of the being to its environment, and within this environment are the fellow creatures with whom the being lives. " The ultimate result," said Darwin, " is that each creature tends to become more and more improved in relation to its conditions. This improvement inevitably leads to the gradual advancement of the organisation of the greater number of living beings throughout the world." *

* *Origin of Species*, sixth edition, p. 97.

CHAPTER XIV

THE SECOND EMPIRE IN FRANCE

The doctrine of progress, based on biological evolution and complicated by the theory of the "struggle for existence," took us in the last chapter some way beyond the point we had reached in the main stream of European history. We must now retrace our steps a little before we approach what is undoubtedly the crucial international event in the latter part of the nineteenth century—the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. We shall see, both in the genesis of this conflict, in its results, and in the final solution in our own day, that a large part was played by the competitive impulse of nations which can only be overcome by the larger spirit of co-operation which is now taking its place in the world. All this will appear more clearly in later chapters. But in the general story we have to fix our minds on certain persons and certain events which come into prominence, and round which and through which the course of social life and thought makes its way. In the foreground of the European picture at this time—after the fall of Metternich till the Franco-Prussian war—stand France and Germany ; France recovering herself from the Napoleonic defeat and the series of revolutions she had passed through, but falling for a time into the hands of an adventurer who recalled the name and the military glamour of Napoleon ; Germany, struggling to come together as a nation-state and to make herself felt

as a nation in the world, and having found a man of the strongest will and unrivalled powers of political combination to guide her. Bismarck at the head of one of the two protagonist nations, Louis Napoleon at the head of the other, with England, the necessary complement of the European party, playing for the time a waiting part. That is how we can now see it, looking back. But at the time the issues at stake, and the comparative size of the leading figures, could not be so truly estimated. France, strongly supporting a monarch of Napoleon's name, who had himself shown great skill and perseverance in winning his way back to power, might well hold her head high among the nations ; and the new emperor had many useful ideas of national development at home and national freedom for other people, and all his uncle's mistakes before him to avoid. While, on the other hand, Germany was still a political chaos in 1851, and Prussia, which was to be Bismarck's instrument, seemed still an upstart power, at odds with Austria, the traditional and more respectable head of the nation, and envied and disliked by the other German states.

We have first to trace the course of the Second Empire under Napoleon III, before we reach the collision with Germany and Bismarck which broke it finally in 1870.

Although so different from his uncle—a dreamer, a conspirator, a man of vacillating will, compared with one of the strongest, quickest, and most realistic minds in history—Napoleon III was compelled by his position to do many things as his greater kinsman had done them. He thus began, soon after his accession, to found a family, and while trying to preserve the status of other members of the Napoleonic clan, to give France an Empress and a son of his own. His choice was a Spanish lady whom he married two years after the *coup d'état*. The Empress Eugénie, who lived for many years in England after his death, was a graceful

head of the gay society which gathered around them in their prosperity, and an evil influence in the troubled times which brought on their fall.

In the earlier and absolute period which lasted till about 1860, the emperor arrogated all power to himself. It was inevitable that he should do so, for he had risen by setting aside the legally appointed authorities and then asking for a personal vote of confidence from the country for his act of violence. He had received it by an overwhelming majority, and he repaid the confidence by imposing his own will on France in a series of decrees affecting all sides of the national life. These were drawn for the most part from the system of Napoleon I. The new Napoleon was to be in theory as absolute as the old. Chief of the army and navy, he alone could initiate legislation in the *corps législatif*. All the mayors were to be appointed by the imperial prefects and might be taken from outside the municipal councils. There was to be a strict censorship of the Press, an oath of fidelity from all professors in universities, and a power for the Emperor to raise money as he pleased for public purposes.

This absolute power was largely used for objects of general good. Roads, railways, afforestation, and irrigation were carried on throughout the land, and Paris was rebuilt. Commerce was encouraged by the foundation of new lending banks, and workpeople assisted by savings banks and societies for mutual insurance. To crown all this, a life of social enjoyment was kept going in the capital which made Paris the centre of pleasure for the world. That there was another side to the picture hardly needs saying. Wild speculation, luxury, and the want of real responsibility for the affairs of their country did much to produce the cruel awakening of 1870–71.

It was in the heyday of his reign that Napoleon entered on the Crimean War, which was far more, both in its

inception and its execution, a French than an English undertaking.

When seeking the title of Emperor in the autumn of 1852, Louis Napoleon had toured France as Prince-President of the Republic, and made a famous speech at Bordeaux in which he claimed that the Empire would mean peace. He inherited glory but not war, and the conquests that he proposed to make were over nature and not over men. Yet in the eighteen years of the Empire there were six considerable wars, in the last of which he lost his throne. But we need not impute insincerity to him on that account. The wars happened mainly from circumstances beyond his control, and his will was too weak to control them when he might have done so and avoided the war. In the case of the Crimea the original cause was jealousy between France and Russia for influence in the East and especially for the championship of the Christian populations and holy places which were under the rule of the Turks. The French were the leading nation in the mediæval crusades, and ever since that time they had claimed the protectorate of the Christians in the Holy Land. Meanwhile the Russians with their "Orthodox" Church, as they grew nationally stronger, thought more and more of pressing south, of gaining an opening on the Mediterranean through the Bosphorus and of planting the Greek cross on the ancient church of St. Sophia in Constantinople, which had been turned into a mosque by the Turks. Since the Revolution the French had somewhat neglected their privilege as the "Most Christian" monarchy in Europe, and the orthodox Russians had been taking advantage of their lapse to occupy some of the sanctuaries in Palestine, previously reserved to the "Latins." Louis Napoleon, who was dependent above all on Catholic votes in France, was bound to support the claims of Catholics abroad. His occupation of Rome in the

interests of the Pope was to cost him the friendship of Italy in his greatest conflict. It now led on to the war with Russia.

But the quarrel about the Holy Places was, of course, only a part, ultimately a small part, of the issues involved in the Crimean War. Like all wars in history, its causes were mixed, and in this case one can only say with certainty that Russia did most to bring it about and that probably England could have prevented it, had she wished. England, as happens so often, was holding a waiting brief, trying to keep the balance, and the impetuous Tsar Nicholas hurried on a rupture. He proposed to the English ambassador in the winter of 1853 a division of the Turkish Empire between himself and the English. The Sick Man of Europe must die soon. It would be well to make arrangements beforehand for the disposal of his estate. Let England take Egypt and Crete, and Russia—as protectorates—the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (which afterwards made up Roumania), and Serbia and Bulgaria. He did not, he said, desire to hold Constantinople, but might take it temporarily as a pledge.

As the English government declined to consider this plan, the Tsar proceeded to act alone. He offered early in the spring an alliance to the Sultan of Turkey on condition that he was recognised as the legal protector of all the Greeks in Turkey. As there were about twelve million Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, and in the Balkans more Greeks than Mussulmans, the proposed alliance would have meant in practice the abdication of the Sultan. Now England had other reasons for opposing the expansion of Russia than concern for the Holy Places in Palestine. She had her trade routes to the East to maintain and began to feel that anxiety for the safety of her Indian Empire which became acute towards the end of the century. She supported France and

persuaded the Sultan to reject the ultimatum of the Tsar. Even so war might have been averted, had not the Russians commenced hostilities by sinking the Turkish fleet in the bay of Sinope at the end of November. The Turks were there, encouraging the mountaineers of the Caucasus in their revolt against the Russians, and the Russian fleet bore down upon them and destroyed the whole squadron. This was the opening of the war which centred round the citadel of Sebastopol till the autumn of 1855. Sebastopol being the the Russian stronghold on the Black Sea, the English wished to destroy it, in order to exclude the Russians from those waters and throw them back towards the north. But the French had throughout the larger forces and, as we saw in an earlier chapter, the allies were strengthened by a small Piedmontese army sent by Cavour for diplomatic reasons. We cannot attempt here to give the details of the fighting. The horrors of the winter of 1854–55, and the heroic and successful mission of Florence Nightingale to the English hospitals, were the facts which made most impression on the minds of Englishmen. The French who crowded the hospitals of Constantinople were said by the Turks to have taken possession of that city as they could not take the Russian fort. But in the spring of 1855 a change began to come over the scene. The Tsar Nicholas, whose spirit was broken by the war, died in March of a chill contracted by reviewing, with the thermometer twenty-one degrees below zero, a regiment just setting out for the front. The French increased their efforts during the summer and overwhelmed Sebastopol in a terrific bombardment in August. Thereupon Napoleon, thinking that he had no more to gain by continuing the war, decided to withdraw. The English would have preferred to go on and make the defeat of the Russians more conclusive. In February, 1856, the peace conference met in Paris. It was the most imposing gathering

of the European Powers since the Congress of Vienna and has the importance of being the first occasion on which the affairs of Turkey came under the review of the West. For Napoleon it was the crowning point of his career, made a still greater personal triumph by the birth of an heir, the Prince Imperial, on the 16th of March while the conference was sitting.

The Treaty of Paris which followed, affirmed the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Straits of the Dardanelles were declared neutral, and Russia and Turkey alike were forbidden to put up any arsenal on the coasts of the Black Sea.

For those who reflect rather on the futility of wars, it will be interesting to note that the declaration of the integrity of Turkey was followed within three years by the formation of a practically independent kingdom of Roumania, out of the two principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, and that the clause prohibiting warships in the Black Sea was torn up by the Russians during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870.

It was to Napoleon at the height of his power after the Congress in Paris and the birth of his heir, that Cavour had made his appeal on behalf of Italy. But signs were not wanting that his position was not really so brilliant as might appear from reviews of troops or ceremonial functions at court. In the year following the Treaty of Paris, for the first time a small but solid group of opponents of the empire were elected to the *Corps Législatif* in spite of the strongest official pressure on the electors all over France. This first group became famous afterwards as the Five, and contained two men, Jules Favre and Ollivier, who played a leading part in the war of 1870. But the attempt of Orsini on the life of the Emperor and Empress which was made in the next year caused much more stir than any parliamentary opposition was yet able to arouse. In January of

1858 the emperor and empress were attacked by bombs thrown by two Italian conspirators, and many people in attendance were killed or wounded. It was an act of revenge and intimidation against the emperor who had been in earlier years a conspirator himself, and it had a double effect. It led to a strengthening of the law against supposedly disloyal persons and it stimulated the emperor to his understanding with Cavour. But, though he had a genuine sympathy with national aspirations, his action to Italy did him no good either with the world at large or with Italy itself. He was always vacillating, always self-interested at bottom, and, except in the intrigues which brought him to the throne, never went through to the end with any enterprise that he had undertaken. The expedition to Mexico which took place in 1862, was the best example of all these faults, and the clearest harbinger of his coming fall.

The United States were at that time in the midst of their Civil War, and this seemed to offer a good opportunity for a European adventure in the New World, which was clearly ruled out by the Monroe Doctrine.

To understand the sequel, it is necessary to go back a little both in United States and in Mexican history.

Mexico, which had been discovered and occupied by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century, had thrown off their rule in 1821 just before the Americans, with Canning's backing, had warned off Europe by the Monroe Doctrine. After some of the fighting, which, except for short intervals, has always devastated the country, Mexico decided on a republican constitution, modelled on that of the United States. But early in its independent history it had a war with the United States which lost it Texas, New Mexico, and California. These became United States territory in 1848, and their addition to the great northern republic did a good deal to aggravate the conditions which led to the American Civil

War. They much increased the preponderance of Slave States in the Union which was the cause of the war. It was proposed, after the annexation, that slavery should not be permitted in any newly acquired territories, and the rejection of this provoked the secession of the Southern states from the Union, which took place in the winter of 1860. Abraham Lincoln, who was to be the hero of the struggle and hold the Union together, was elected President in November, and in the following February a separate Congress of the Confederate Southern States was held, which set up Jefferson Davis as a rival President. The war which thus became inevitable, raged for four years and ended in April, 1865, with the complete victory of the North. Lincoln, who in the course of the war had emancipated all the slaves and been elected to a second term of four years' presidency, was shot by a fanatic five days after the capitulation of the Southern armies. He thus died like Wolfe in sight of his victory, but unable to organise or enjoy it.

Meanwhile another civil war had been going on in the republic to the south. There the division was not local, as in the United States, but religious. Just as now, Mexico was sharply divided between Catholics and "liberals," but "liberals" there meant, primarily, people determined to clip the wings of the Church. They were anti-clerical in the sense of the French revolutionists, and Juarez, their leader, when he attained power, at once proceeded to "secularise" some of the enormous properties of the Church, to suppress some of the monasteries and institute civil marriage and other civic institutions which would supplant the Church. He was a patriotic and able man, probably the best leader Mexico has ever had, but his fight with the clericals brought him into tragic contact with Napoleon and the unfortunate man whom Napoleon made his victim.

For the two civil wars, going on at the same time, offered

an opening to the adventurer in France which he thought could not bring him into conflict with European rivals. The Catholic, or reactionary, party in Mexico, when defeated by Juarez, swarmed round the emperor—and still more the empress—in Paris and begged for his help. There was the chance of a new Latin Empire in Mexico, capable of balancing the Anglo-Saxon giant in the North. There were the Catholics to be appeased who had been outraged by the wars in Italy, and behind all this there was a strong financial interest, for millions of French money had been lent to the defeated party in Mexico, especially by one of the emperor's most intimate and powerful supporters. Hence, in 1861, an expedition set out. It was at first a joint fleet of French, English and Spaniards, determined to gain from Juarez some recognition of the international debts which he had proposed to repudiate. But as soon as he showed himself quite ready to treat, the Spaniards and English withdrew and the French admiral, who had other instructions, stayed on. The following autumn a large French army was landed, and Bazaine, who was to earn so ill a name in the war of 1870, was soon in supreme command. The war took on much of the character of the war in Spain which exhausted Napoleon I. The French occupied the city of Mexico, and Juarez and the patriotic Mexicans withdrew to the north. Bazaine called a Constituent Assembly together in Mexico City which decreed an empire. Then Napoleon forced Maximilian of Austria on to the distant and unsafe throne. He was the brother of Francis Joseph, the emperor of Austria, and thus a descendant of Charles V. His appointment was to revive memories both of Spain and of Catholic rule. But the Assembly which invited him could only speak for some three hundred thousand Mexicans out of a population of seven millions. He was foredoomed to failure and only went on the promise of a French army for at least five years.

At once the prospects of Juarez and his men began to rise. A Hapsburg Catholic emperor was even a worse alternative than the French, and Bazaine began to play for his own hand. He married a Mexican wife with a view of succeeding himself. Then came the end of the American Civil War and a note from the United States requesting Napoleon to withdraw his troops. He had no choice, and the disgraceful abandonment of his miserable dupe was covered by an exhortation to Maximilian to make himself agreeable to the population which he had to rule.

In February, 1867, Bazaine and the French left Mexico, and in June Maximilian and Miramon, the leader of the Catholic party, were shot at Queretaro. Charlotte, the widowed empress, went mad, and remained so for the rest of her life.

CHAPTER XV

THE EMPIRE ATTEMPTS TO BECOME LIBERAL

The tragic disgrace of Mexico was the true beginning of the end. It brought out in the sharpest way the fundamental weaknesses of Louis Napoleon and his system—the ill-ordered ambition, the vacillation and failure to make good, the pressure of his social surroundings and especially of his wife, the superficial display, covering bad preparation and inefficiency beneath. But before we see how these qualities combined in the international disaster of 1870, the corresponding steps in the internal economy of France must be noted; for as the emperor was losing his initial prestige and authority, so he struggled to re-establish himself in a more constitutional way, and so also did the intellectual and parliamentary opposition grow in strength. Hence, when the war came at last and swept him away, the ground was already well prepared for another system, and the Third Republic arose as the inevitable and normal state.

The year 1860 was a notable one in the records of the Second Empire. Three events took place, all of which had a close connection with the general policy of the emperor and the progress of France. The first was the expedition to Syria, which employed but a few men and lasted only a month or two. The Maronites, a Christian sect in the Lebanon, were attacked by the Mohammedan Druses, and many of them, especially in Damascus, were massacred or

enslaved. Napoleon, who had just offended the Catholics by his war in Italy, was ready at once to send an expedition to support the Christians and re-establish order. The Sultan took the hint and anticipated the French, who on landing at Beyrout found their work to consist in hunting down the murderers in the mountains and relieving the sufferings of the Christians who survived. A Christian governor was appointed for the Lebanon and another link thus forged between France and Syria, which has led since the Great War to the Mandate for France in that part of the world under the League of Nations.

At home the same year saw an important advance in Franco-English relations. This was due to the great English Freetrader Richard Cobden, who on his own initiative, though supported by Gladstone, visited Paris at the end of 1859 and began negotiations which ended in a Treaty of Commerce between the two countries the following year. The occasion is probably unique, of a private man going as an envoy to another country and, by personal influence and perseverance, carrying through a complicated piece of international agreement. The opportunity was favourable, as France was expanding her trade, building railways and steamships and finding fresh outlets for her goods, especially in the East. Cobden began with the emperor and worked downwards, and in this, too, he was wise, for Napoleon had always cherished good ideas of international peace but wanted the patience and the expert support to work them out in detail. The treaty, which dealt with questions of tariff and gave France certain advantages in free import to England in return for similar concessions, appealed mainly to Cobden on its pacific and international side and as such is still a model which committees of the League of Nations are attempting to carry out on a wider scale.

But the year 1860 was marked by a still more important step forward in French internal affairs. In the autumn before, the political exiles who had suffered for their opposition to the *coup d'état* had been permitted to return to France, and in the November of 1860 an imperial decree opened the way to criticism and opposition in the Senate and Legislative Body. Newspapers were allowed to publish the debates, and soon a stream of eloquence was set going, in the Assembly and the Press, which continued till the overthrow of the Empire. At this time the men began to become prominent who were afterwards to take up the affairs of the country when Napoleon fell. Three main parties drew together, which correspond pretty closely to the triple division seen in so many continental parliaments since. The Right, supporting the Empire, was always pressing for stronger measures of authority and supporting the Papacy. The Left was frankly anti-governmental and ready to seize any fair chance of securing a republic. And, in between, a Third Party, or Centre, appeared which accepted the present régime but tried to make it more liberal and progressive. As one might imagine, all the best brains were to be found in the second and third divisions, and the question for the emperor was how many of the strong men who appeared at first against him could be persuaded to transfer their services to his side. Two men in each of the latter groups deserve mention for the special work they afterwards did for their country. Ollivier and Duruy were of the compromising, progressive type; Thiers and Gambetta were outspoken opponents. Ollivier had been one of the original Five of 1858, but after the forward movement of 1860 he gradually rallied to the emperor's side and played a leading part in the negotiations which preceded the war of 1870. Duruy was perhaps more fundamentally anti-clerical, but he was mainly a scholar and an educationist rather than a

politician. In 1863 when the Pope had issued an encyclical against modern thought more drastic than anything which had come from the Papacy before, the Emperor felt obliged to move somewhat "to the Left." He appointed Duruy as Minister of Public Instruction. Duruy was in favour of universal free primary education, though this he was not allowed to establish. He did, however, a great deal in the higher spheres by introducing better teaching of history and technical instruction in special schools. He even made a beginning with secondary schools for girls which the Right wished to keep as a monopoly for the Church. The emperor's most severe critics allow him some credit for maintaining Duruy in power from 1863 to 1869. Thiers and Gambetta, who were both abler men and with much more popular influence, come into the foreground of the picture later on. At this stage they were making their mark by constant criticism—denunciation of the hollowness and corruption of the imperial system, and the mistakes of its foreign policy. Towards the end of 1868 a demonstration was made in memory of one of the men who had defended the barricades in the fighting which accompanied the *coup d'état* on the 2nd of December, 1851. The government attempted to prevent the demonstration and a lawsuit followed which gave Gambetta one of the great opportunities of his life. "You," he said to the emperor and his party, "have never ventured to celebrate the act by which you came into power. But we will take possession of it and make it the festival of our dead, of our hopes, and of liberty." Such words had not been heard before in public or such boldness shown ; Victor Hugo, who was one of the exiles now permitted to return, was also chastising the emperor in some of his most famous poems, and the whole system was tottering from within just before the fatal blow which levelled it from without.

The year 1870, which was to see the Empire swept away by German arms and organisation, had already seen the formal end of irresponsible government and a series of riots in Paris which looked like the beginning of another revolution. The Third Party, for which Emile Ollivier spoke, could now muster 116 votes for a petition in favour of responsible government. The emperor yielded to this in spite of the protests of his personal supporters, and Ollivier was charged with the formation of a government in the January of that year. It was a brilliant idea—Ollivier's or the emperor's—to gain popular confirmation of the new system by another vote such as that which had put the emperor into power eighteen years before. A plébiscite was therefore taken in May on the question whether the French people approved of the liberal reforms which had been introduced since 1860. It was a clever but a superficial move, like nearly everything that Napoleon did. Seven million voted approval against a million and a half, but who could say whether the majority approved the reforms or the imperial hand which had granted them? One of the critics of the government who afterwards became President of the Third Republic, Jules Grévy, said of the plébesicite: "It is not a means of ascertaining the national will but of confiscating it." The voice of France four months later declared him right.

CHAPTER XVI

THE FALL OF THE EMPIRE

The stage was now set for the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–71, which, however we may view its causes, was the most important international event between the Congress of Vienna and the Great War. It brought to a head the age-long conflict between the two great nations encamped, since the days of Charlemagne, on opposite sides of the Rhine. There, in the low-lying countries which surround the mouths of the river, had been the "Cock-pit of Europe," and, whatever might be the temporary cause of strife, the rivalry of French and Germans in that region was the permanent root of discord. England, which lay off the mouths of the Rhine, was by her insular position saved from the perpetual menace, and thrived accordingly. It was her obvious rôle to hold the balance, and, when the conception of world-peace as the necessary and dominant ideal was accepted by mankind, it fell to England to heal the breach at its most dangerous point. Unfortunately in 1870, when the conditions were most unstable and the danger of outbreak most acute, the foreign policy of England was in the hands of statesmen who were least inclined to take international risks. The Crimean War, which was the only occasion on which we had intervened on the mainland since 1815, was already considered a very doubtful undertaking and denounced by leading

politicians as "A Crime." * It is not to be wondered at, that with men so dangerous as Napoleon and Bismarck in command, with chances so incalculable, in a region where our national interests did not seem to be directly concerned, the nation as a whole acquiesced in a waiting brief. Since that time our view has changed. What might have happened in 1870, if our European responsibilities had been differently conceived, is beyond our scope to discuss, but we may be certain that the issue too would have been different. As it was, the fight was carried through by the two protagonists alone.

Between France and Germany the danger lay in the want of any effective desire for peace on either side, with strong inducements to war on both. Napoleon certainly did not plan the war, and when it threatened, he tried in a wild and wavering way to stave it off. But undoubtedly a successful war would have strengthened his throne, and there was at the back of his mind, and of most Frenchmen, a thoroughly ill-founded confidence in their military strength and preparedness. Bismarck, on the other hand, desired war and laid his plans most skilfully to produce it. In that quite definite sense, therefore, he was responsible, though the blame must be shared, because a wiser guidance in France, or a strong mediating move from abroad, would have baffled his attempt.

The occasion, or pretext, of the war came from Spain. Spain had been troubled for many years by intermittent civil war. Extreme Catholics and liberals who wished for a constitutional government were face to face, and ambitious generals were often disputing in arms under the nominal government of a young queen, Isabella II, who had not a strong national tradition and a united people behind her as

* John Bright to his son, transposing the letters of "Crimea" on the Guards' Memorial in Pall Mall.

her contemporary in England. In the autumn of 1868 two marshals, Prim and Serrano, seized the power and called a "Cortes" to establish a constitutional monarchy. The queen fled to France and the crown was offered to various candidates in turn, among whom Leopold, a Hohenzollern prince but of the Catholic branch, was secretly supported by Bismarck. There is no doubt that in taking this step, on his own initiative, and without the formal support of his master King William, Bismarck was deliberately seeking a breach with France. France and Napoleon, in this at one, were already much disturbed by the aggrandisement of Prussia and the conclusion of the Treaty of Prague with Austria, without compensation or even consultation with France. Bismarck knew that they could not accept the appointment of a Hohenzollern as king of Spain, which would have seemed to hem them in between two branches of the same Prussian royal family, one threatening them on the Rhine and the other in the rear on the Pyrenees. In objecting to this France had the sympathy of all the other Powers, but she so misused her perfectly legitimate grievance that, when the war came, she was found to be on the aggressive side with the general sympathy against her. The news of the Hohenzollern candidature was published in Paris on the 2nd of July, 1870, and on the 6th the government made a formal announcement that they regarded it as dangerous to "European equilibrium" and that, though they trusted to the wisdom both of the German and the Spanish peoples to avoid it, the French were ready themselves to take steps, if necessary. The French government at once set on foot vigorous negotiations by various channels to have the candidature withdrawn. They were perfectly sincere in this, and within a few days they had succeeded. The French ambassador, Benedetti, went to King William himself, as Bismarck and his staff refused to talk about the matter at

all. King William refused to accept any responsibility, but said that if his cousin would withdraw on his own account, he would approve. This would have concluded the business and been a severe rebuff to Bismarck, had the French been well advised or indeed constitutionally governed as they then professed to be. Ollivier, who was chief minister, was active for peace, but a council was called on the 12th, without his knowledge, at which a fresh demand was sent to the Prussian king, that he would declare that he would never give his consent if his cousin should ever come forward as candidate again. So little was France really constitutional at that time that a measure of such importance was decided on quite hurriedly at a council at which the chief minister was absent, and the Emperor and the Duke of Gramont, his foreign minister, with possibly encouragement from the empress, were the responsible agents. Gramont, indeed, appears to have been the chief misleading influence rather than the emperor himself. On these instructions Benedetti presented himself again to William who was at the time taking "a cure" at Ems. He was met by a firm but quite courteous refusal to enter into the engagement suggested. Paris pressed further and Benedetti asked for a third interview which was declined. His government, said the king through an *aide-de-camp*, would in future carry on the negotiations required. A telegram was then sent by the king to Bismarck in Berlin, reporting the events, and Bismarck issued to the newspapers and to Prussian representatives abroad a doctored version in such a form that arrogant insistence was implied on the French side and discourteous refusal on the side of the king. It was this telegram, inflaming both nations to the highest point, which provoked the war. Ollivier then adopted the war policy, and declared in the Chamber, on the 15th, that he accepted the responsibility which had been thrust upon him "with a

light heart." It was this attitude which, after the disaster, ruined him and all on the government side. Thiers, who made the one great speech against war, was afterwards called to the head of affairs.

War was declared on the 17th, and the result was hardly doubtful for a moment after the troops began to move. The French had an excellent new rifle, but on every point of organisation and preparation they were completely outclassed by the Germans. One true story throws a flood of light. The French officers were only provided with maps of Germany, and all their fighting was a desperate rear-guard action to prevent the occupation of Paris. The emperor, who took the supreme command, was physically as well as mentally incapable, and his pretentious plans of crossing the Rhine and separating north Germans from south and rallying Bavarians and Austrians to his banner, only made more pitiable the actual breakdown which speedily followed. He was captured with over eighty thousand men at Sedan on the 2nd of September. Bazaine was shut up with over 170,000 in Metz, and those who were left, tried vainly to cover the capital.

On the 3rd of September the news of the capitulation of Sedan and the imprisonment of the emperor reached Paris. Napoleon himself was confined in a castle in Germany till the end of the war, when he retired with his son and the empress to Chislehurst. Here he died in January, 1873, without making any further experiments in politics. He interested himself in these last years in pensions for workmen and the improvement of stoves. France would have nothing to do with him after his fall. Gambetta, on the 4th of September at a tumultuous meeting in the Chamber, declared that "Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and his family have ceased for ever to rule over France," and no one stirred a finger to prevent a republican government of

National Defence being set up. The empress had already made good her escape across the Channel. The latter part of the war was contested heroically by the French, and when it was seen that they were on the defensive, and that Bismarck was bent on carrying the matter to the bitter end, public sympathy, especially in England, veered round.

A vigorous effort was made by friends of France to organise a diversion in the north of France, but it was too late. Bismarck, who had dealt with Austria, after Sadowa, in a lenient and statesmanlike way, took the opposite course in France. After Sedan, the defeat of France, as represented by her late government, was already so overwhelming that peace would have been possible on almost any terms, except those which were ultimately extracted. But Bismarck at once insisted on the cession of territory, and Jules Favre, who had become Minister for Foreign Affairs in the new government, declared in an interview with him on the 20th of September, that France would not yield an inch of her territory or a stone of her fortresses. It was for this, and not for the original cause of conflict, that the war went on, until Paris was captured at the end of January, 1871. For weeks before the capitulation was signed provisions had completely failed in the beleaguered city, and on the day before the final sortie, the Germans had celebrated their triumph by crowning King William of Prussia German Emperor in the Gallery of Mirrors in the Palace at Versailles.

It was thus that Bismarck proclaimed to the world the realisation of his policy of " blood and iron " as the cement of nations. And the same idea was symbolised for the Germans themselves by a colossal bronze statue of Germania raised in the Niederwald above Mainz, cast out of the cannon captured from the French.

Jules Favre, who had pleaded in vain with Bismarck on the 20th of September, signed the armistice and the

capitulation of Paris. Gambetta stood out and resigned from the government. He would have gone on fighting in the mountains and in Brittany as the Spaniards had fought against Napoleon. But all the generals except Chanzy, who had won the greatest success in the defence on the Loire, were against any further fighting, and peace was signed at Frankfurt on the 10th of May on terms agreed upon between Favre, Thiers, and Bismarck at Versailles in February. France ceded Alsace with Strasbourg and the part of Lorraine called German, including Metz. Belfort, a fortress which had held out to the end, was only preserved on the condition that the Germans were allowed to make a triumphal entry into Paris. An indemnity of five milliard of francs, or about 200 million pounds, was to be paid in three years and the German army withdrawn as the instalments were met.

The Treaty of Frankfurt, which by its title implied the revival of the old German Empire and by its contents proclaimed the abasement of France, created an open sore in Europe which lasted until the Great War of 1914. There was no League of Nations to prevent the outburst of the war or to mitigate its results. Like all human calamities it brought with it some compensations, for, as we shall see, France rallied quickly after the blow, and Germany used her new wealth and unity to build up the best organised and successful of contemporary states. Yet it must be considered a great misfortune, and of the evils which it produced, none was more terrible or afflicted France longer, than the Commune of Paris which followed directly on the conclusion of peace. The working-class population of Paris had always been on the whole hostile to the Empire and always prone to revolution. The unexpected defeat of the French armies and the sudden fall of the Empire produced a state of feeling which called for the most careful handling to appease.

Unfortunately the National Assembly, which was elected to conclude the peace, met at first in Bordeaux, and, when it moved on the 20th of March, came first to Versailles. The choice of Versailles added to the irritation of the Parisians. They saw in it, no doubt with some reason, a distrust of the atmosphere of Paris, and Paris had already suffered during the siege the most acute privations of the war. The Parisians had been indignant at what they considered the slackness and inefficiency of the defence, and they feared from the constitution of the new assembly that a monarchical restoration would be attempted. Hence they determined to set up a government of their own, and started hostilities with the national army by shooting two generals who were sent to claim the cannon which had been put up on the heights of Montmartre. This was the beginning of a second siege of Paris which lasted for two months. The German troops, who were standing by, offered their services, but this was wisely refused, and it was left for Thiers, who had become the head of the new government, to organise a new army from the soldiers just returned from the war to make a fresh war on their fellow-citizens. At length, after terrible cruelties on both sides and the loss of about twenty thousand men, the revolutionary government was overcome at the end of May, and Paris again became the capital of France.

The task of the new government, when order was restored, was twofold. They had in the first place to release the territory of France from German occupation by fulfilling the obligations of the treaty, and in the second to establish a permanent form of government for the country. In both respects the National Assembly, under the able guidance of Thiers, was successful beyond expectation. His own part was so well understood by those whom he guided that, on his retirement in the summer of 1873, the Assembly voted

unanimously that "M. Thiers, President of the Republic, has deserved well of his country."

The debt which had to be raised to pay the indemnity was subscribed many times over, and the army of occupation had left France before the time mentioned in the treaty. Verdun, the town held by the French with the most tenacity and the heaviest losses in the Great War, was the last place evacuated by the Germans on the 15th of September, 1873. But before this date the French army had been entirely re-organised. Borrowing ideas from their conquerors, they introduced universal compulsory service and fortified both the eastern frontier and the circumference of Paris. The war of 1870 thus became the beginning of the state of armed peace in Europe which led by a fatal progression to the war of 1914. Not being by any means the only cause, it was yet the clearest cause of the later and greater outbreak, in the sense that we can feel assured that if the Franco-Prussian war had been prevented, or if a tolerable peace had been accepted after the first decisive defeat, the gravest danger to peace would have been removed, and the relations of France and Germany, which were actually the gravest danger to peace, would have become its strongest safeguard.

The second task of the new administration was to settle the form of government. It contained, when elected, a balance of about fifty votes against a republic, yet by the force of circumstances it was this body which established the republic, now regarded by France and all the world as a normal and permanent thing. The royalists did their best to bring in the Comte de Chambard who was the representative of the older branch of the Bourbon ; but he destroyed his own chances by refusing to accept the tricolour as the flag of France—the white flag was the only colour for him. France had now reached a point in her national evolution at which it was impossible to act as if the Revolution of

1789 had never occurred ; and so the argument went on. For six years after the resignation of Thiers in 1873, Marshal Macmahon was President, chosen deliberately to prepare the way for a monarchist restoration—of the Orleanist branch, if the legitimist heir still proved refractory. But all the time the republican position was growing stronger, for it was the Republic which divided the nation least. At last, in discussing the Constitution of 1875, a formal republican resolution was adopted by a majority of one vote, 353 voting against 352. This resolution conferred on the chief of the Executive the title of President of the Republic, and the decision then taken has never since been seriously questioned. The constitution then established closely resembles our own, with the difference that the Head of the Government, who with us is a hereditary monarch, is with the French elected for seven years by a joint session of the two chambers. He may be re-appointed and—a second most important difference—presides in person at the council of ministers. The French lower house, or Chamber of Deputies, is elected by universal manhood suffrage and renewed every three years. The Senate, or revising chamber, is elected by a process, mainly indirect, but too complicated to be described here. It presents a third great difference in the French constitution compared with ours, in having no hereditary members.

The vote of one which established the Republic, by no means represented the true balance of opinion in the country. At the first trial of strength at the elections, which the reactionaries fought with the utmost vigour in 1877, the republicans were decisively victorious. Thiers died during the contest, and it became largely a duel between Macmahon, who, though President, took an active part, and Gambetta, who had been the soul of the national defence during the war and now carried the Republic to its final triumph. Jules

Grévy, who had denounced the last plébiscite of the Empire, became, after the elections, President of the Chamber, and in 1879, on Macmahon's resignation, President of the Republic.

The Republic thus founded has proved secure. Under wise guidance, in the twentieth century it has re-established with England those relations of free but cordial co-operation which prevailed in the happiest times for both nations, in the age of Elizabeth with Henry of Navarre, in the time of Cromwell with Mazarin. The results of this growing stability and good understanding will appear in our later chapters. But before we close this book we must touch briefly on the two or three most stormy incidents through which France had to pass in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, before she settled down to an unquestioning acceptance of the Republic and became mistress in her own home, and able to take her rightful place in the concert of nations. The story of those twenty-five years brings out clearly the internal difficulties she had to overcome, and exalts to their true eminence Gambetta and his greatest follower, Waldeck-Rousseau, who applied the spirit of Gambetta in solving the crisis of the Dreyfus trial and the relations of France to the Church of Rome.

The royalist pretenders to the throne did not present any serious difficulty ; at each successive election they polled fewer votes. The real obstacle to settlement was the dissatisfaction of the public with the government under which they lived, increased, it must be added, by the faults of some of the politicians who, as a professional class, were always struggling for office. The first, but less serious, crisis was provoked by a showy and incompetent general called Boulanger, who managed in 1889 to capture the popular imagination by military swagger, by reckless language aimed at Germany, and by appealing to the old and discredited device of a plébiscite, aimed, like Louis Napoleon's, against

the politicians. He succeeded in being elected for the metropolitan department of the Seine by a quarter of a million votes. But the government stood firm and were about to arrest him on a charge of treason when his courage failed, and he escaped to Belgium. It was the last attempt at a dictatorship by plébiscite, and discredited the Bonapartist and other reactionaries who had lent him their support.

The Dreyfus case, which was the obsession of French politics for the last five years of the century, was a graver business, for it set in motion all the warring elements in the country—the prejudice against the Jews, the passion for and against the army, the power of the Church, and the determination of the non-clerical and non-military parties that justice should be done, at any cost either to persons or institutions. No trial in history, save that of one or two crowned heads, has ever absorbed so much European interest, and a sigh of general relief went up when, after years of conflict, the wrong was righted in substance though not in form. Dreyfus was a Jewish officer of artillery, condemned by court-martial in 1894 to life imprisonment in the Île du Diable, off the coast of French Guiana, for having supplied a government of the Triple Alliance with French military secrets. He always protested his innocence, and two years later it was discovered that the letter on which his condemnation was based, was a forgery. But to bring home this forgery to the true criminals meant the exposure of other officers and, as it was thought, the discredit of the whole army. And so a determined attempt was made by the army, and all its friends, to prevent the affair being re-opened. Every one in the country had to take a side, and many prominent men, including the novelist Zola, who spoke for justice and denounced the army, were prosecuted and punished. At last the moral sense of the nation was aroused. The socialists were united in demanding revision, and it fell to Waldeck-

Rousseau to carry it out. He formed a government in which for the first time socialists were included, and Dreyfus was brought back from the Île du Diable, and in August, 1899, put on his trial again. Again the army did their worst, and he was condemned, by five votes to two, to ten years' detention, though "with extenuating circumstances." The government lost no time in disposing of the troublesome business by a pardon which did not wipe out either the original accusation or the five years spent in the horrors of a penal colony, but gave France time to breathe and think of something else.

The indirect results were large and unexpected, but in the main wholesome. The reactionaries who had supported a moral wrong were also committing a political folly, and when at last it was realised that a wrong had been done, the forces of the Radicals and Socialists who had denounced it were immensely strengthened. They proceeded at once to remove the restrictions on working-class associations and to put Church associations under strict control. Finally, they destroyed the concordat between Church and State which Napoleon had set up, leaving the republican state in France non-religious, but impregnable. The details of these measures are too complicated to be given here, but they were provoked by the Dreyfus agitation and initiated by Waldeck-Rousseau, who, had he remained in power, would have carried them through with less harshness and opposition than they actually met with. In carrying the law (1904) separating the State from the Church, M. Aristide Briand, who had just appeared as a socialist member for one of the mining divisions of the South, first took a leading and not unconciliatory part. It foreshadowed, perhaps, the future champion of the League of Nations.

BOOK IV

1871—1901

INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH SCIENCE — THE ORGANISING STATE—GERMANY AS THE GREAT EXAMPLE—AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS—RUSSIA—COLONIAL EXPANSION AND THE RIVALRY OF EMPIRES

CHAPTER XVII

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

We saw in Book II how the application of science to industry had led to large changes, first in the mechanism of production and then to the industrial grouping and social status of the producers. In a chapter of Book III we traced very briefly the development of the sciences themselves, as culminating in the theory of evolution, newly enlightened and made definite by the work of Darwin. This intellectual outburst, with its effects on the hope, self-confidence and activities of mankind, especially in the West, is unquestionably the most striking spiritual fact in the nineteenth century. We have still to consider its social and economic effects in their most general aspect. Vast, truly immeasurable, powers had just

been gained by civilised men acting in combination ; they could, and in large measure did, transform nature to their own ends and accumulate wealth previously unknown. This process, and some of its effects, must be looked at in a general way before we return to the particular and to the political story. Germany, which we left as the victor of France in the war of 1870, will re-appear as the typical example of a country using the new powers of invention, knowledge, and organisation for the aggrandisement of its people and the strengthening of the State.

The world, it is said, has been transformed industrially in the nineteenth century. But this broad statement needs some qualification and precision. There are still large tracks of the earth's surface, perhaps the largest part, where men live and work in much the same style as they have done for ages. Such are the greatest stretches of India and China, indeed most of Asia away from the sea coast which has attracted the Westerner and international commerce. It is also true that the ancient and fundamental industries of mankind still remain the same—agriculture, textiles, and metal—in that order of magnitude. All these have undergone great changes according to the nearness of those who practise them to the centres of scientific training, and a growing host of other industries have been added to them. But their importance remains capital, and in the case of agriculture, if we take the world over, its methods are still largely unaltered. The greatest changes have come in that part of the world where vigour of population and the spread of scientific culture have combined with natural resources and utilised them. This means—to put it in geographical terms—first the industrial belt which traverses Europe from west to east, passing from England through northern France, Belgium, the Rhineland to Saxony, and Silesia. Then, as derivative from this, the United States which has now

Emery Walker Ltd s.

THE INDUSTRIAL BELT OF NORTHERN EUROPE IN 1914.

become the greatest industrial and financial unit in the world, and the colonial settlements, chiefly of England ; lastly, within recent years, Japan and certain limited areas in India and China. Leaving agriculture aside for the moment, it will be seen that the expansion has taken place in the neighbourhood of coal and iron. It has been an age of mining. In western Europe, wherever there has been an abundance of coal and iron near together, the industrial development and the growth of population has been most rapid. Such is the character of that northern belt, and the mining activity of the age has found similar outlets in the iron mines in the north of Spain, the gold mines in California and Australia, the oil mines in Russia and America.

The cynic may argue from the race for gold to the general materialism of the age, and draw an unflattering contrast between the rush of crusaders in the Middle Ages to the Holy Land and the swarming of the diggers to Australia and California in the middle of the last century. The former were happy with a fragment of the True Cross ; the latter fought for concessions and exhausted the earth in selfish greed. There is just enough truth in such comparisons to make it possible to draw them. It is true that the modern world cares more for the material resources of the earth than our ancestors of seven hundred years ago. It is true also that in many cases we have drawn on them recklessly without regard to their replacement or to the future. But we need the widest point of view to judge these matters rightly. The material resources of the world are so vast that we are still only scratching on the surface, and though many men made fortunes in the last century without much thought for the welfare of others, the process on the whole has been of inestimable value to the human race. Such is the conclusion which must be drawn by any fair-minded person who weighs the facts as we know them about the state of India before the

British occupation, or of China in our own days in parts unaffected by Western "exploitation." It is confirmed by the vital statistics of all kinds which describe the health, happiness, morality, and intelligence of countries which have passed through the industrial, scientific transformation of recent years. New evils were created, as they must always be by sweeping social changes; more might have been done to protect society from these evils by better foresight. But of the net result there can be no question, and throughout the Western world there is now an active and collective intelligence awake, to minimise the evil and make the good spread more rapidly in the future.

In agriculture we are at a disadvantage in England because we have for many years been more dependent than any other country on manufactures and the export of coal for our prosperity, and on foreign foodstuffs for our subsistence. Hence the improvement of agricultural methods has been more rapid and bulks larger in the national economy of many other peoples than it does in Britain. France, Germany, and the smaller nations of the north of Europe have gained most from this application of science to the oldest and fundamental industry of mankind. More advance has taken place among them in the cultivation of the soil during our period than in all the previous centuries since the Romans. Besides the great extension of the area under cultivation, three lines of improvement in agriculture stand out clearly, and all of them are connected with science. The first is the invention of more productive and more complicated machinery. Gradually, the steam or motor-plough takes the place of the primitive instrument which had descended to us with little alteration from the Romans and Egyptians. Still more completely the ancient flail for threshing has been superseded by a power-driven machine. These changes have played into the hands of the larger as

compared with the smaller cultivators, and in the case of the smaller men have been a strong inducement to co-operation. The other science which has already done much to transform the methods of agriculture is chemistry. Chemical manures are more widely diffused than even improved machinery. Even the smallest cultivator may have his dose of phosphates, if he has the money to pay for it and the intelligence to use it. Compared with more primitive methods of farming, the modern scientific form not only produces a larger yield to the acre but allows continuous cultivation, instead of the ancient fallows. Biology also, affecting both the breeds of animals and of plants, is more and more co-operating with chemistry to raise the productions of the soil. Within the last century special study has given us improved types of cows, horses, bees—every species, in fact, which is directly useful to man—and in our own day a new and intensive science in investigating the species of plants, cereals, fruits, and root-crops, and opens up an unlimited vista of further improvement.

All these are developments in the industry which first arose from the contact of man with his mother-earth ; but science has added to it and surrounded him by a host of other industries of which a mere list would be far too long to give in these pages. Chemistry is the root of all of them ; photography and the multitude of applications of electricity are examples belonging especially to the last half of the last century. Another side of the process must be noted. The same period witnessed a fearful expansion of the means of destruction which was carried still further by the Great War. This arises from the two-edged nature of all we do. The knife which cuts our food may quite as easily cut our throats. Increased powers over nature are not in themselves a safeguard, and the culture of human nature and, above all, of the human will must come in as the coping-stone to make all sound.

Great as the changes have been in all forms of industry, the growth of communication in the modern world is greater still. If a visitor from Mars surveyed the world, and compared its present state with that of two thousand, or even a hundred, years ago, this is the change which would strike him most. The globe is now covered by lines of transport and transmission of thought which were unknown two generations ago, and have made the world mechanically one. Steam was the first agent of this revolution ; oil has since modified it, and electric waves have multiplied and intensified the process and brought it into our homes and our offices.

We touched on the origin of railways in Book II. The Trans-Continental developments belong to the last quarter of the century. That was the time when the North American Continent was spanned by several lines and the Trans-Siberian linked up Vladivostok and Pekin with Paris and London. One often notes these facts complacently without reflecting on the stupendous labour of mind and muscle which they involve. The bridging of rivers, the climbing of mountain-heights, above all the boring of unerring tunnels through miles of mountain-depths, make up the greatest achievement of engineering in the history of man. If from one point of view the age was one of mining, of extracting the wealth of the earth by men, from another and higher it was pre-eminently the age of engineering, of constructing on the earth's surface the instruments of human unity and power.

Railways bring us to the more direct intervention of the State in the industrial transformation of the nineteenth century. The factories had been built by private enterprise, the State only coming in to prevent abuses and improve the condition of the workers. In the case of railways, posts and telegraphs the State has taken a growingly important share. In England and the United States the railways have been

constructed by private enterprise, but the State has been compelled to take a larger and larger part in controlling the rates and the conditions of traffic. In France and Germany the railways are mainly State-owned and State-managed. In Germany, where the railways had from the first more of a strategic and military character than elsewhere, this is conspicuously the case. Sea communications have remained much more in the hands of private companies, though we have seen recently how the United States have thrown themselves, as a government, more and more into the business of transport.

Telegraphs followed the construction of railways, and they have followed also the same lines of ownership and management. Governments have for the most part monopolised the means of internal communication, while the world companies of cables and wireless have been formed by private enterprise, chiefly British. It remains to be seen how far the League of Nations, as it grows in strength, will find it necessary to employ its own means of communication or to make terms with the existing companies.

Still less visible, but perhaps more powerful and significant of the character of the modern world, is the development of finance. In civilised countries man's conception and use of money have undergone as great a change in the period as any branch of industrial activity which we have described. Its leading note is the extension of the idea of credit, which, like science, is an example of spiritual forces in the end controlling the material, and depending themselves on the consent of mankind and our confidence in one another. It is true that the last century saw a larger production of the precious metals than the world had ever seen before. Silver was mined in abundance in North and South America, and gold in the Urals, in Siberia, in Australia and South Africa. Yet great as was the multiplication of these ancient and

conventional forms of money, it sank in importance, and in the end passed largely out of sight, compared with the paper undertakings to pay which have now become the leading form of money in all civilised and highly industrialised countries. First came the bank-note, the undertaking of the bank issuing it to pay the stated amount on presentation of the note. This was a form of money dating back far earlier than the nineteenth century ; our modern period has extended its use and fortified it by State support. Gradually in England—which was the classic land of the private bank—these smaller concerns have been swallowed up by larger, and in every country the largest, or most important concern has become, either a special department of State, a State bank proper, or linked up, like the Bank of England, to the government by a complicated series of laws regulating its operations. Among other things, the government determines how much of the precious metals, and especially of gold, the bank must hold in reserve as a condition of inspiring public credit. With this government guarantee in the background it was soon found that, for most purposes, the business man, and ultimately every individual, preferred to deal in paper to carrying large sums of gold or silver. Hence, except for the small amounts of daily shopping, a still more convenient form of paper money became current, viz. the cheque, which is a request by the drawer to his bank to pay the sum mentioned to the person named upon it.

Behind the banks, again, supported by and often embracing them, come a multitude of financial societies, dealing in money and securities. The object of these is to lend money where it may be profitably used, to promote the circulation of capital. Hence internationalism is their *raison d'être*, and they form collectively one of the strongest bonds of union and safeguards for peace. Within the period

of which we are speaking here, the chief centres of international finance were London, New York, and Paris, in that order. Before we close this volume, we shall have reviewed the causes which have led in our own days to a certain change in this order. But the main fact remains, true after the Great War as in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, that capital, being the life-blood of industry, in spite of all national barriers or rivalries has tended more and more to become international. The comparative position of London or New York as the financial centre of the world is, from this point of view, a matter of small account.

New countries, needing capital for their development, are compelled to come to the older, richer, and better organised to help them. This is a necessity of the case, which often provokes charges of "enslavement" or "exploitation" among the borrowers. The "exploitation" is part of the upward process of civilisation, and the word should have no sinister meaning in this use; the "enslavement" depends on the spirit in which the assistance is offered, and still more on that in which it is received.

CHAPTER XVIII

STATE ACTIVITY AND NATIONALISM

The last chapter has made it clear how the growth of great industries, the massing of people in new centres, the spread of inventions affecting every one and bringing every one in closer touch with his neighbours—all called constantly for more action by the State as representing the interests of all.

Thus the factory system broke down the old theory of *laissez-faire* which had prevailed at the beginning of the century. When men were working mostly at home with their families or a few assistants, it was possible to leave them alone in matters of wages, hours, and sanitation ; it would, in fact, have been very difficult to do otherwise. But when thousands of people, including a majority of women and children, were grouped together in huge barracks, working for the profit of some one else who owned all the plant, it was inevitable that restrictions should be imposed on the conditions of their work. This took place in two ways, either by the action of the workers themselves in combination, or by the State acting on their behalf. The former is the Trade Union method, the latter that of factory legislation. It would be difficult to say which method in the long run has counted for most in determining the conditions of work—probably the action of the workers themselves. But they were not at first strong enough to impose the terms they desired, or even what any reasonable person would have

thought desirable. The growth of the Trade Unions is a long story, of gradual freedom from prohibitive legislation and of gathering strength among themselves. They became legal organisations in England at about the point we have reached in our political narrative (1870), but it was a good many years later before the workers gained freedom of association (syndicats) in France. Hence in the early stages it rested with the State to make proper provision for the protection of the workers, and in the first place for the women and children. This growing mass of factory legislation accounts for a large part of the new activity of the State which is so marked a feature of the modern world. Nine-tenths of the statutes of any modern state belong to the nineteenth century and after. The statute book soon begins to swell with laws due to the Industrial Revolution. And as such legislation extended, so men's ideas began to change as to what it was proper for the State to do. All over Europe, and especially in Germany, governments were doing in the latter part of the century things they would not have dreamt of doing a hundred years before. Education, marriage, burial, all the main incidents of a man's life had been for centuries the concern of the Church, which had stepped into the chief place of power at the passing of the Roman Empire. Now men began to go back to the conceptions of an earlier day and think of the State rather as the Greeks had thought, as the chief engine for a "good life." Thus the State came in touch with almost every department of life. Education, dependent more and more on State money, had also to accept State intervention, and in many cases the State looked to the schools for moral and political support. In the last quarter of the century in Germany and France special efforts were made to build up the national spirit by means of the schools, and England, though she never sought to use the schools in that way, was active in the

same years in developing her higher education, with help from the State for popular schools and technical purposes.

The care of the sick and public health also imposed a completely new burden on the State. In the Middle Ages such care seemed the special function of religious people, but close on the Industrial Revolution came two floods which submerged the old and pious foundations of monasteries and hospitals. One was the flood of a new population, living in masses away from the old centres of religion and nurture. The other was the flood of new light in medicine and surgery, which before the century was out had transformed the practice of the doctors and had called for public funds to extend its use to all classes of the community.

As the State thus became more active, it sought in every case to associate its citizens with its work, to have their interest and assent. This is true even of the autocratic states such as Austria and Prussia, and, as we shall see in the next book, was true of the Tsarist government in Russia just before its fall. In the Western States, and gradually throughout the world, the desire spread for some form of representative government. England had been the model for this ever since the middle of the eighteenth century. In our day, in certain cases to which we shall have to refer later on, a set-back has taken place, and several states have adopted, at least for the time, a system less democratic in form.

But these exceptions do not affect the general conclusions which are clear for the nineteenth century: (1) That a "constitutional" form of government was desired and spread, as the communities concerned awoke to their corporate existence; *i.e.* aimed at, or achieved, their nationhood. This "constitutional" form implied the representation of the governed by some sort of elected assembly, and the responsibility of the ministers actually carrying on

the government to this elected body. (2) That this type of government was mainly derived from British experience, and in the two chief cases, those of France and the United States, were directly derived from it. (3) That in other cases, where the complete system was not at first set up, there was always an effort to associate the formal consent of the governed with the acts of their government. Such were the plébiscites of the Second Empire in France, the popular vote for the Reichstag in Germany and the Dumas in Russia, in the latter days of the Tsars.

Two points should be specially noted as to the way in which a constitution is really democratic in working, whatever may be the details of its form. One is the ultimate authority for the raising and the spending of the taxes. This, as every one knows, was the original source of the authority of our own Parliament, and is the crucial point in all later constitutional systems. On the whole, the tendency has been to assign this most important power to the one popularly elected assembly. The other point on which later differences have chiefly turned, is the personal authority reserved, or possible, either for the recognised sovereign or president, or for the powerful minister acting in his name. In this matter countries have differed from the first, and no doubt will always differ. In this—the tendency to adopt a sort of dictatorship to meet special conditions—modern democracies seem not averse from borrowing a page or two from the history of ancient Rome.

Taking a broad and summary view, it is clear that the growth of active and self-conscious nationalities was one of the two or three most prominent facts in the nineteenth century, and this nationalism involved, and was in turn built up by, the giving to the mass of the population a voice in their own government. In the twentieth century this popular vote is coming to include a vote for women as well as men ;

but in the nineteenth, this had not yet occurred. The universal vote, which was a strong factor in the nationalism of the last quarter of that century, when national rivalries on a large scale were at their keenest, was a man's vote. The men had done the fighting by which in so many cases the nation had been built up, and it seemed natural that they should do the voting also. It will be well to consider for a moment what this nationalism means before we pass to the history of Germany—its most shining example at that time—and to the later events which have laid stress rather on the international framework in which the nations work.

Contrasted with all the previous centuries since the Romans, the wars of the nineteenth century were national wars. The days when men had sold themselves to fight for a foreign master were gone ; whether conscript or free, the soldier was now fighting for a cause in which his own government was concerned. Nor was he fighting, as in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for a distant and general cause like that of religion, which might, and often did, divide his own community and turn the war into a civil as well as a general one. The eighteenth century, and especially the French Revolution, had come as a sponge to wipe these old distinctions out, and steadily throughout the nineteenth we see the nations fighting more and more for things which they regarded as their own concern—the rights of self-government or independence, the possession of some colonial outlets, or, as in the worst case of 1870, a supposed question of national honour or national insult. This is the evil and dangerous side of nationalism, and we are in no danger of forgetting it at the present time. But it is still more important to remember that even at its worst the spirit of nationalism has noble elements, that at its best it is one of the most elevating and consolidating forces

in the world, and that in any case it is indispensable to the building up of a community of nations.

To get the best out of people and make them co-operate vigorously for a high purpose, it is necessary that the individual should subordinate himself to some larger union of his fellow-men. The child gets this training first in the family, and every town or tribe or association of men conveys something of the same spirit to its members. In some vast communities, such as India or the Roman Empire towards the end, where national sentiment, such as we now know it, could not easily develop, the same part was played by the caste or the religious brotherhood to which men owed allegiance and for which they were prepared to sacrifice themselves even to the death. But the nation is the easiest, happiest, and most binding form of such association, coming naturally between the family and the wider bonds of human attachment which, at least at first, are much more lightly felt. The nation has at the back of it attachment to that piece of the earth's surface which we know best and where we first saw the light. On that foundation it is built up, by the common suffering and achievements of those who have lived there before us, and it is cemented by the community of language which has played, and is still playing, so large a part in fostering the nationalities of the present. It is a spiritual bond, and man has ascended through the ages by widening and deepening his spiritual being.

The growth of Socialism in the mid-nineteenth century tended also to strengthen both the national spirit and the activities of the State. It is true that the distinction between the capitalist and the wage-earning class, from which Socialism arose, runs across all national boundaries and is an international question, as the world becomes industrialised in the Western sense. Of this there was clear evidence in the International Association of Workers founded by Karl

Marx in the latter part of the century, and imitated by many such associations in our own days. Yet, on the other hand, the socialist movement, or the social reforms following the Industrial Revolution, have done at least as much to strengthen the nationalist state, and Germany will give us an excellent example of this. We saw how it was found necessary for the State to take action to remedy some of the evils caused by the factory system and to raise the general condition of the workers. In so far as it did this, it was meeting the socialists' case and converting them from international agitators into patriotic citizens of their own country. At the same time it was strengthening the grip of the State machine and giving the workers some additional grounds for attachment to it. We shall see in this book how Germany achieved this partial socialism and became the strongest of the national states after her conquest of France in 1871. In the last book we shall reach the efforts being made to-day by the League of Nations to restrain excesses of nationalism and reconcile national ambitions. On the side of social legislation, the sister organisation, the International Labour Office, attempts to make general for all nations the standards of industrial conditions which have been reached by the best opinion in the world.

CHAPTER XIX

THE NEW GERMAN EMPIRE

THE Germany which we know in this generation, which bulked more largely in the last quarter of the nineteenth century than any other State, arose from the union of two forces. One was racial, linguistic, traditional, the old Germany which had withstood the Romans, settled the forest lands in north-central Europe, and extended the outposts of Western civilisation eastwards round the Baltic. This was the foundation, and on this had risen a new power, Prussia, military, autocratic, strongly organised, and ambitious. The new German Empire is an amalgam of the two, hammered out at the white heat of war by the strongest man who found himself in command of a State since Napoleon went down at Waterloo.

We have seen in previous chapters how Bismarck made use of his opportunities, first to dethrone Austria from her traditional place as head of the German people, then to incorporate northern Germany in a federation based on commercial as well as racial community, and finally to weld the whole, including the allied southern states, though without Austria, into an Empire or Reich. This new State, though incomplete in its nationality and born in war, has, while shedding some of the accretions of war, remained substantially united—a monument to the tenacity of the German nation and the state-craft of its two greatest founders, Frederic

in the eighteenth and Bismarck in the nineteenth century. We shall see in this chapter what other activities besides war went to the building up of a national strength which was the admiration and model of other nations, even of those who had disapproved her aggressive spirit and suffered from it. Of no other country can it be said with so much certainty that a strong hand from above conferred on the whole population a standard of civilisation not enjoyed by many others not so strongly directed. From this point of view the New Germany enjoyed the most perfect type of that social reform, promoted and controlled by an active State, which we saw in the last chapter was the general result of the Industrial Revolution in the West.

For twenty years after the war of 1870 Bismarck remained in power. He resigned in 1890 after the accession of William II whose impetuous and erratic temper could not tolerate the guiding hand to which his grandfather William I had been so long accustomed. Of the change which then occurred we shall speak later. For the policy, internal as well as external, of these twenty years Bismarck as Chancellor was responsible, for at no time before the Great War was the parliamentary system, as we understand it in England or in France, allowed to operate in Germany. The Emperor appointed the Chancellor from among the Prussian delegates to the Bundesrath, or Federal Council, which was the higher house of the new imperial constitution. Twenty-two monarchs and three free cities, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, were represented in this council, and Prussia, including the votes of the states which she had annexed in 1866, enjoyed seventeen out of a total of forty-three. The Reichstag, or House of Representatives, consisted of about four hundred members, distributed among the various states according to their population and elected by all the male citizens of over twenty-five years of age. But the

Chancellor was not bound by any resolution of this popular body. He was President of the Bundesrath and entirely at the command of the Emperor, to whom alone he was responsible. In the Emperor's name he appointed all the imperial, or federal, officers and supervised their work.

Alsace and Lorraine, the lands annexed as the result of the war, were the special field for the exercise of the new imperial authority, for these were governed, not as a Prussian province, but as Land of the Empire—"Reichsland," and here the Chancellor spoke for the Emperor direct.

A clause in the Treaty of Frankfurt had allowed the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine to vote for French rather than German nationality. Over 150,000 did so, and these were compelled to leave the country. Many migrated to Algeria and settled among the Kabyles where they have done much to develop the country. Many others returned to France, often dividing a family into two camps. When in 1874 the inhabitants were allowed for the first time to elect representatives to the Reichstag, all those elected were "protesters," and left the assembly after making their protest against the annexation. In subsequent years the German government made various concessions to their autonomous spirit and in many ways the condition of the provinces became more satisfactory. It cannot be said that the internal problem in Alsace and Lorraine was so acute as to keep the old sore open; it was rather its continued existence between the two great Powers concerned which did this mischief. In one respect at least Alsace contributed to the advance of Germany which we are considering in this chapter. The scheme of social insurance, applied to industry, which spread from Germany to other countries, including our own, about the end of the century, was invented and first put in practice at Strassburg.

The first and most important work of the new imperial

government was to unify the Reich, so far as it could be done by law. To this Bismarck set his hand as soon as the war settlements had been made.

In 1873 a uniform currency law was passed which established one simple system based on the mark. Before this there had been a confusion of coins and various paper notes in the different states. The new coins had on one side an effigy of the emperor, and on the other an inscription round the arms of the empire, "To preach to the people the good news of unity." Laws were also passed establishing a common procedure in all the law-courts. Then, first a uniform criminal code of laws was introduced, and, at the end of the century, a common civil code. Bismarck was here doing for Germany, and on much the same lines, the work which Napoleon had done for France. It needed a strong hand, for all the constituent states clung to their separate institutions. Against such separatism, however, Bismarck was inflexible and prevailed; in two other conflicts he was less successful. This was with the Catholics and the Socialists.

The Catholics throughout the empire looked with natural alarm at the ascendancy in Germany of Protestant Prussia, especially with so masterful a man at the helm; and Bismarck at first, instead of allaying this feeling, went on to exasperate it by passing a series of laws—the May Laws of 1873—expelling the Jesuits and imposing penalties on the clergy for criticising the government. The result of this was to increase the Catholic opposition in the Reichstag from the sixty members of 1871 to ninety in 1874; and the Catholic world, supported by the Pope, was fired by the thought that it was a "Kulturkampf," a war for civilisation itself. But the rise at the same time of a strongly organised Socialist party led the Chancellor to come to terms with his less implacable and dangerous opponents. Nearly all the

objectionable laws against the Catholics were withdrawn, and they settled down to be, what they have remained ever since, a centre party in the Reichstag, holding the balance between the Left, which is always the more revolutionary Socialists—now the Communists—and the Right, which stands for a strong, authoritative, and nationalist policy.

Ten years after the May Laws—in December, 1883—the Crown Prince Frederic went to Rome and made friends with the new Pope Leo XIII, who had succeeded the famous Pius IX in 1878. His pontificate of thirty-two years had covered—the revolutions of 1848, the Italian wars and the Roman Republic, the Vatican Council and the loss of the temporal power in 1870, and, lastly, this conflict with the new empire in Germany. With his successor Leo the new German Empire now made the friendship which endured even the stresses of the Great War.

With the Socialists the conflict was more drawn out and varied. In Bismarck's day the party was new-born, with all the fire and violence of youth. Marx was, of course, a German, but his agitating and organising work was done mainly outside Germany. Since his time industrial conditions in Germany had changed so much that material was provided for the strongest—at any rate the largest—socialist organisation in Europe. The industrial revolution which had taken place in England before the Napoleonic wars and provided the means of victory, came half a century later in Germany. Even at the time of the revolutions of 1848 there was no organised working class, or the story we have told in Book II might have been very different. The change came within the twenty years which followed the revolutions of 1848. Marx had taken up his abode in England and continued his agitation by writing. In 1862 a man of very different

character, Ferdinand Lassalle, began the practical organising work which in a few years was to produce a socialist party in the Reichstag, depending on several million votes. He, too, was of Jewish extraction, but of a prosperous business family, and himself a brilliant orator with great powers of persuasion and command, and unlimited ambition. In 1863, at Leipzig, under his leadership, the General Workingmen's Association was founded. From this a new and more radical association swarmed off in 1869, called the Social Democratic Labour Party, and in 1875 the two combined to create the parliamentary party which by the end of the century was the strongest group in the country. Meanwhile Lassalle, who had a stormy and romantic life side by side with his politics, had been killed in a duel about a lady in 1864.*

In 1875, as the result of the union of the two sections, the socialist party began to poll large numbers of votes for the Reichstag, and Bismarck took alarm. In 1878 he passed a law prohibiting meetings, publications and associations, aiming at the subversion of the social order. The government was authorised to proclaim martial law in any city threatened by labour disturbances. This law remained in force for twelve years and drove the socialists out of public life. But it strengthened their secret propaganda. Like the early Christians, when driven to live in the catacombs, they thought deeply, and, when they came up into the light again, it was to rule the empire.

While the Social Democrats were under the legal ban, an academic party arose which advocated most of their proposals, but wished them to be carried out by the govern-

* George Meredith in 1880 published a novel, based on his life, called "The Tragic Comedians." It is interesting on account of the number of public people who come in. Heine, the poet, was a great friend of Lassalle, and Bismarck often met him and eulogised him in the Reichstag some years after.

ment as it was, thus avoiding a revolution. These "State-socialists" would equalise the distribution of wealth by taxing more heavily the owners of rents or interest. They would have the State take over not only all railways but all means of communication, all city lands and markets, and the business of banking and insurance. They were also in favour of the various measures of social reform in factories and mines, against accident and sickness, which were being passed in England and were soon to be passed in Germany with greater speed. Bismarck took a keen interest in all this, and in the 'eighties began social legislation himself, always professing that he was only carrying on the traditional policy of the Brandenburg State which cared for its subjects in a paternal way, and wished to increase its own power by increasing the welfare of its children—the people. In this spirit government insurance bills against accident and sickness were passed in 1882, and in 1889 old age insurance was also provided. In each case employers, employed and the State all bear a share of the expense, except that for accidents incurred during work the employer alone is held responsible.

Whatever may be the case with other and later wars, that of Prussia with France in 1870 brought a large stream of material prosperity into the land of the victors. In that case the payment of the war indemnity stimulated trade. Within four years from the conclusion of peace both wages and wealth had grown apace and the number of joint stock companies carrying on trade had multiplied fourfold. They went, indeed, too fast for a time, and a reaction with many failures set in, during which Bismarck introduced a tariff system under which raw materials were admitted at a low rate, while high protective duties were imposed against foreign manufacturers in favour of the German. Here again the German experience seemed to contradict a general

belief, for after 1878, when this system was established, German industries and commerce flourished more and more until the War. We need not look either to war or to protection as the cause of their prosperity, but clearly neither of these destroyed their other advantages. They were an ingenious, industrious, and orderly people ; they had a country rich in mineral wealth of many kinds, and a population well divided between various occupations. At the time of which we speak, about one-half of the people were dependent on agriculture and of these at least a fifth had a proprietary interest in the soil.

It will be noticed that the war of 1870 gave a special stimulus to national sentiment, primarily in France and Germany, but in other countries also, by contagion and imitation. In Germany the change is well shown by the contrast of the spirit and work of Marx in the earlier and Lassalle in the later period. Marx was above all an internationalist ; he had been expelled from his own country and later belonged to none ; his heirs are the Third International and the Communists of Russia. His motto was, " Proletarians of all countries, unite ! " Lassalle was national. His ambition was to become the leader of a German Socialist Republic and the effect of his work was the German Social Democratic Party. It rose with the rise of German economic prosperity and identified itself with the nation. When the Great War came, it was found lined up solidly behind the government, and, when the war was over, it furnished the first President of the new republic in 1918, uniting the nation and defeating the Communists.

Bismarck's special field was diplomacy ; here he was a master and by his mastery he was able to render his country the supreme service of twenty years' peace in western Europe, with Germany in command. He called himself the " honest broker," and his principle was to strengthen his

own position, partly by keeping differences alive between rivals, partly by accommodating these differences when they became acute. It was the most brilliant example of the old-time method of the Balance of Power, pursued without any idea of an obligation towards Europe as a whole, still less towards any "Confederation of Mankind," but—the necessary wars once over—with a steady determination to preserve the peace, primarily in the broker's own interest. His first combination was an "entente" of the Three Emperors—Germany, Austria, and Russia—who often met after 1879 to try and reconcile their rival interests. In this combination the rift came between Austria and Russia who both had ambitions in the Balkans. Only Bismarck, with a strong Germany behind him, could have held these two together, and the position sometimes reminds us of 1815 with Bismarck as a new Metternich. But the position did not last long. After the war of 1876 between Turkey and Russia, Russia threatened to gain such a preponderance in the Balkans, that Bismarck threw in his weight with England and Austria against her, and the Treaty of Berlin curtailed her conquests. This we shall see in a later chapter, but as a proof of Bismarck's skill it should be noted here that, though he threw in his weight against Russia at the Congress of Berlin and assured to Austria the possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was careful to safeguard his rear by a secret understanding with Russia which was maintained throughout his official life, and never lapsed until the Emperor William II took over the reins of power himself.

His next combination was the famous Triple Alliance which lasted down to the Great War. Instead of Russia as the third, in this alliance, which was formed in 1879, Italy joined with the two Central Powers in a formal pact to defend one another against aggression. As between Austria and Germany, the undertaking went further than this, but

Italy was careful to limit her obligation only to a case of aggressive war. She was jealous of an attack from France, who, with Bismarck's full approval, was occupying Tunis at this time. She therefore joined the Central Powers and remained with them until the Great War. In that she rightly judged that they were not threatened by aggression, and ultimately threw in her lot with their opponents. But for the rest of the century the Triple Alliance was the strongest political factor in Europe, and only yielded its predominance when England threw her weight into the scales at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Gradually during Bismarck's supremacy, as German trade and wealth and population advanced, the cry arose that Germany, like the other Western Powers, should have colonies. A society was formed, which still exists, to promote the cause and make plans to secure it. Bismarck at first was very doubtful. He was a European, though not a "good European," and saw that his fellow-countrymen were able to settle and prosper wherever they wished in the United States, in South America, and in many other parts of the world under other governments. Colonies would be more expensive than useful, as in practice the German colonies proved to be. But the German business man prevailed ; he called for more markets for his products, and with the commercial motive was soon joined the philanthropy of the missionary, and the pride of the nationalist. In 1884 Bismarck sent out Dr. Nachtigal to establish German control at certain points on the west coast of Africa. Nachtigal had been for many years a brave and successful traveller in Central Africa, and when the French established their protectorate over Tunis in 1881, Bismarck had sent him there as consul-general for the German Empire. From Tunis he went on to the west coast, nominally to inquire into the conditions of German trade, really to plant

the German flag in territories as yet unclaimed by other European powers. Thus Germany entered the "scramble for Africa," and much accelerated the pace. Nachtigal induced the native chiefs to acknowledge a German protectorate in Togoland and Cameroon, and in the same year a merchant from Bremen, also under Bismarck's orders, raised the German flag at Angra Pequena which became the centre of another large German colony known later as South West Africa. In East Africa Dr. Karl Peters was the German agent, who founded a German East Africa Company on English models in 1885. This brought a still larger tract of country under the German flag, and much profitable work was done in planting cocoa-palms, coffee, tobacco, tea, and sugar. In all these cases a high standard of cultivation was aimed at, and the Germans did their work of exploitation with characteristic thoroughness. But the territories never became colonies in the full sense of the term, for all the time German emigrants preferred to go to the United States or Brazil or the Argentine where settled conditions of government already existed and where they could live the quiet, industrious and intellectual life to which they were accustomed at home.

About the same time other German agents were exploring the Pacific and occupying parts of New Guinea and the Caroline Islands, and, later on, a push was made in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia where railways were being built with German money when the Great War broke out. It will be seen later how these German colonies of the 'eighties, falling to the victorious allies after the war, became the basis of the Mandate system under the League of Nations. At this period they are to be noted as features of that general competitive expansion of the European powers which is the leading political feature of the end of the century. Just at this time a change took place in the direction of

German imperial policy which made this competition still more dangerous and in the end fatal to peace. The old Emperor William died in 1888, just after these colonial experiments had been launched. He was ninety-one years of age, and his son the Crown Prince Frederic, already dying of cancer in the throat, only reigned for three months. The way was thus left open for William II to succeed to practically absolute power before he was thirty. His career must necessarily bulk large in later chapters. Here we need note only one or two points in the first ten years of his reign. The first of all is indeed the most important and the most significant. The young man, intensely self-conscious and self-willed, could not endure the guidance of the old statesman who had grown up with his grandfather and knew how to manage an old friend but not a fresh and impetuous master. The two wills were incompatible, and, after a little more than a year's intolerable chafing, the Chancellor's resignation was asked for and the pilot was dropped.

The new emperor, though full of the idea of his divine right, was by no means anxious to provoke war or affront public opinion. He had rather a morbid appetite for approval and affection. Those in recent years who have closely studied his psychology and early training, attribute great effect to the accident at birth by which his right arm was disabled. He was always struggling to bear himself in public as if no defect existed, and this created an artificial atmosphere of show and self-importance. More serious still was the discord which arose between himself and his parents, especially with his mother, who, as eldest daughter of Queen Victoria, introduced an alien and suspect spirit into the Prussian court. Both father and mother were inclined to a much more liberal policy than had prevailed under Bismarck, and Frederick's one important act during his short reign had been to dismiss the reactionary minister of the interior who

had been using official influence in the elections. William was therefore, by nature and Prussian tradition, opposed to both of them and, as by temperament and the rivalry of his position he was also opposed to Bismarck, he had nothing but his own impetuous and erratic disposition to rely on.

But all his earlier acts were conciliatory. He was gracious to the Catholics of Poland and received the Polish cardinal in Berlin. He abolished passports for Alsace and Lorraine and began friendly conversations with France. In 1890 he repealed the anti-socialist laws and called an international conference to discuss working-class questions. All this came to nought. Germany was too deeply divided between the old aristocratic and military tradition and the new industrial democracy for a young man of unstable character, surrounded by sycophants, to weld them into one. Either a long process of wise and patient statesmanship was needed, or the purge of a great convulsion. Events moved on steadily towards the second alternative.

As German commerce and seaborne trade increased, and the colonies founded in the 'eighties called for more and more attention, the new emperor turned his thoughts in the direction of maritime power. England, which had been the model for colonial settlement, had also a commanding fleet to protect her colonies and her trade. Must not the two things go together? And the rivalry of England, sometimes friendly and sometimes hostile, had always been one of the most powerful motives playing on his complicated nature. In 1895 the Kiel canal was cut, giving an outlet to German ships from the Baltic to the German Ocean. In 1898 a vote was imposed on the Reichstag for a naval programme to be completed in six years, which would give the country a fleet as imposing as her army.

In the same year Bismarck died, neglected and ill content, on his country estates at Friedrichruhe.

CHAPTER XX

THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE

One passes naturally from Germany to Austria in telling this story, because the Germans in Austria were the one considerable national group left out of the newly organised German Empire. It was the group which had the leadership of the German race until the rise of Prussia, and, after Prussia had become the governing centre of the new empire to the north, the Germans in Austria remained the chief factor in the older empire, which, cut off from the north, began extending its borders and its ambitions to the east and the south-east. In the concluding period described in Book V this change of direction becomes of capital importance, for it was in this part of the Austrian Empire that the World War broke out, and the rivalry of Austria and Russia in those regions made the war world-wide. Hence, though the development we have now to describe is less central or typical of the general European movement than what has gone before, it deserves the most careful study, and it must be studied with constant reference to the map, for in no part of nineteenth-century Europe were the conditions so complicated or so much determined by considerations of race, language, and geography.

It is interesting to note—perhaps the most important point in the whole political situation at this time—that the same principle of nationality which brought Italy and

Germany together had the effect of disintegrating Austria and Turkey. In Italy the language was one, the country compact and clearly marked out by nature, and the several portions, though different enough in civilisation and habits, preferred to be parts of one nation. In Germany, too, though there were alien populations, Polish, Danish, and French, included in her borders, the mass were united and preponderant. It was quite otherwise in the Austrian Empire. This empire—in the sense in which it lasted down to the Great War—only dated from 1804, when Francis II, the last of the Holy Roman Emperors, being compelled to relinquish that title by Napoleon, made himself Francis I, Emperor of Austria. The emperors with this new title strove, down to 1866, to retain their prestige in the German world, until they met the iron will of Bismarck backed by the strength of Prussia. Deprived by the Treaty of Prague of the Germans now enrolled under the leadership of Prussia, the Germans in the Austrian Empire remained a minority. It will be seen from the map that they were only solid—four or five millions—in the two crown-lands of Upper and Lower Austria, with a considerable fringe round the north and west of Bohemia. Elsewhere there were only individual Germans, or small groups, faced by large masses of other races who had no wish to be ruled by men of another race and language. The other chief groups were Slavs, in Croatia, Bohemia, and Galicia—each of these again forming strongly nationalist units—Magyars in Hungary, Rumanians in Transylvania, Italians in the Tyrol. The Magyars in Hungary, with their capital at Buda Pesth, were in the strongest position, for they were a compact body, not distracted as Poles, Italians, Slavs, or Rumanians by kindred and allegiance abroad, and they had a tradition of governing themselves. We saw in Book II how they had made a stand for a constitution in 1849, and how they had been defeated by the emperor,

supported then by the Croatian Slavs. Now, after her defeat by Prussia, the first necessity for the Austrian emperor was to come to terms with the Magyars of Hungary. Francis Joseph restored to them the rights of self-government they had lost in 1849 and extended these to form a complete autonomy under the dualist constitution of 1867, which is often referred to by its German title of the *Ausgleich.*

The essence of this Ausgleich, or Compromise, was that Austria became two separate states, under one sovereign, who was Emperor of Austria and Apostolic King of Hungary. Each state had its own parliament and separate government, though for common affairs there were three joint ministries, or delegations, which dealt with foreign affairs, army and navy and finance. But the finance thus dealt with in common referred only to common expenses, and commercial treaties or any arrangements imposing burdens on both states had to be approved by the parliaments of both. Transylvania and Croatia were joined to Hungary (with certain privileges for the latter); so that you may say that the net result of the arrangement made in 1867 was to divide the empire into two portions, of which the eastern, Hungary, was ruled by the Magyars, and the western, Austria, by the Germans, with a German sovereign and German influence predominant in all joint affairs.

Clearly the effect of the eastern portion thus breaking away and establishing its independent rights, would be to encourage the other portions and races to do the same, and when, after the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, Austria was allowed to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina to the south-east this separatist tendency was much increased. The two new provinces were mainly Slavonic in population, with a large Mohammedan element in religion. After being assigned to Austria in the Treaty, they were only subdued in a long and difficult campaign, and they broke out in

rebellion in 1881. They were afterwards very efficiently administered by the imperial minister of finance ; but their addition and their formal annexation in 1908 made the empire still more disjointed. It was in their capital, Serajevo, that in 1914 the blow was struck which started the Great War.

The Czechs in Bohemia did their best, short of fighting, to obtain the same treatment for themselves as the Magyars had received in Hungary. They, too, had been an ancient kingdom and traced back their monarchy to "Good King Wenceslas" in the tenth century. They had lost their independence in the Thirty Years' War at the beginning of the seventeenth century, but had never forgotten it, and when the Magyars secured their compromise, the Czechs followed with a Declaration that they would only sit in a national diet at Prague, the capital of Bohemia, and submitted Fundamental Articles to the emperor which would have established a constitution for Bohemia on the same lines as the Hungarian. Francis Joseph spoke them fair, but he was held in a vice between the Magyars in Hungary and the Germans in his home domain. The former, through their new prime minister Andrassy, would have none of it, for they feared that the Slavs of Hungary, kin to the Czechs in Bohemia, would raise their head against their Magyar masters. And, for the Germans in Austria and Bohemia, Bismarck protested ; if their position was threatened by Czech dominance in Bohemia, the Germans might give themselves to the Greater Germany in the north and the whole compromise would be thrown away.*

Hence the Austrian-Hungarian compromise and supremacy were maintained. Andrassy, in 1871, became the joint minister of Foreign Affairs, and the discontent

* "Plutôt mourrir Allemands que pourrir Czechs," was a popular saying at the time.

of the Czechs dragged on till the Great War gave them their new kingdom of Czecho-Slovakia in which the Slavs of Hungary are now included.

It remains to say a few words about the two fringes to the north and the south of this amazing congeries of races in the empire. The whole seemed like a seething cauldron in the latter part of the nineteenth century ; it boiled over in 1914, and we shall see the result in the settlement of new nations in 1919.

In the north there were Poles in Galicia who cherished their ancient hopes round their capital of Cracow. The kingdom of Poland had been partitioned at the end of the eighteenth century between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and the Poles in Austria were the best treated of the three sections. They were loyal to the Habsburg emperors of Austria, if from nothing else, from hatred of the Russians who had taken the largest share of their country. But on the flank of these Poles in Galicia were another race, the Ruthenians, with their capital at Lemberg, and these were more friendly to Russia from their hatred of the Poles. There were some three million and a half each of Poles and Ruthenians, and added to them about a million Jews, with a little Jerusalem at Brody.

In the south were other Slav peoples, stretching down the Adriatic through Dalmatia to Serbia and Montenegro, the tiny State which boasted that it had never been conquered by the Turk. From all these Slav peoples of the south, Croatians and Slovenes, together with Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, the post-war kingdom of Jugo-Slavia has been made up, which means simply southern Slavs.

Lastly come the fringe of three million Rumanians in the east, in Transylvania, and the smaller number of Italians in the Trentino and Trieste. The whole empire contained

between forty and fifty million inhabitants, and ten million and a half Germans, and seven million and a half Magyars, enjoyed nearly all the power.

There were, of course, many politicians who favoured a federalist system, and attempts were made to put it into practice, but without avail. The intermixture of races and especially of languages always caused some insuperable jealousy to arise. Many, therefore, were found to say that if there had not been an Austrian Empire, coming down from history to hold all these people together, we should have had to invent one. . . . But later history sometimes gives unexpected answers to those who invoke the past.

This four-fold pull, Austrians and Hungarians in the centre, Slavs to the south, and Czechs in the north persisted throughout Francis Joseph's reign, which lasted till the first year of the Great War. The old man himself was the chief link which held together the discordant whole ; for he was personally loved and pitied for his many private as well as public troubles. He showed, too, far more real statesmanship in reconciling opposition and clinging to essential points than any of his many counsellors. A long-drawn-out crisis occurred in 1897 when the Compromise with Hungary came up for renewal. The Czechs in the Reichsrath—the Austrian parliament—stoutly opposed this by every means in their power, and the question fought out in 1867 was revived. The emperor stood firm and had recourse for several years in succession to the provision in the Compromise which allowed him to renew the agreement himself, provisionally, by decree, for a year at a time. By 1903 his persistence was rewarded and the Compromise was again renewed for the normal ten years. Then followed a similar firm stand against the Hungarians who agitated for a completely separate army, organised by themselves and under Hungarian officers. This, too, he steadily opposed for three

years, at the end of which time the Hungarian parliament was dissolved by military force. So great was the toil in holding together those who were determined to go their own way and manage their own affairs.

Subject to this constant disintegrating activity, the Austrian government was still not unsuccessful in promoting the welfare of the separate parts of its " ramshackle " empire. In 1905 the emperor agreed to the introduction of universal suffrage in Austria. This was carried out and welcomed in the Austrian part of the empire, but feared and excluded from Hungary where the dominance of the Magyars over the other races would have been endangered. Hungary agreed, however, to drop her agitation for a separate army, and the reconciliation was marked by the formation of a ministry including the most determined advocates of " national independence."

This was just a decade before the empire—the most curious and anomalous survival of a brilliant past, rooted in the unity achieved by the sturdy republicans of Rome—fell finally into its component parts in the Great War. But before this crisis can be described, we need to retrace our steps and review contemporary events in Russia and Turkey.

CHAPTER XXI

RUSSIA AND THE BALKANS

We saw how Russia was beaten in the end in the Crimean War where the objects were so doubtful and the management so bad. This hard-won victory of the allies had, like most victories in war, quite other effects on the defeated country than they had intended or dreamt of. It broke the spirit of Nicholas I, the Iron Tsar, who died before the end, and with the peace there came to the front in Russia both a new set of ideas and a ruler of a different temper to put them in force.* The rule of Nicholas, who had sacrificed all other interests to military power, had been tried by the test of war and found wanting. Public opinion, therefore—the opinion of the small educated class in Russia—demanded steps in another direction, some attempt towards bringing the social, political, and intellectual conditions of the country nearer to the level of the West. For, judged by Western standards, Russia was fully a century or two behind the rest of Europe.

Alexander II, who succeeded his father in 1855, was a cautious and sensible man as well as liberal-minded and open to new ideas. He began to move at once, and thought first of improving the industrial conditions which he saw were at

* The character of Nicholas is well described in a letter of Queen Victoria to her uncle Leopold, written when Nicholas was staying with her in 1844. "He is stern and severe, with fixed principles of *duty* which nothing on earth will make him change. Very *clever* I do *not* think him, and his mind is an uncivilised one," etc.

the root of the superior strength of nations more advanced than his own. Laws were passed giving greater freedom for commerce. Many joint stock companies were formed. A great scheme of connected railways was planned which would have military value as well as develop the resources of the country. But progress in all these directions was barred by the continued existence of serfdom. Twenty-one million persons—more than half the population—were living as serfs attached to the domains, either of the crown or of the nobles, and these lands formed nine-tenths of the arable land of the empire. Such conditions went back beyond the state of France in the eighteenth or of England in the fifteenth century. Some of these serfs were domestic, attached to certain houses or persons, others—the greater number—were fixed to the soil which they cultivated and might be sold with it. They paid certain dues and services according to immemorial custom. Alexander acted in the matter in advance of his ministers and called for provincial committees "for ameliorating the conditions of the peasants." The Polish landowners in the Lithuanian provinces took the lead, and by March, 1861—the sixth anniversary of Alexander's accession—discussions had gone so far that a decree of general emancipation was issued. It was the year before Abraham Lincoln freed all the slaves in the middle of the American Civil War.

The main point at issue in Russia was whether, when the serfs were emancipated, they should continue to work for wages on the landowners' estates or whether they should be put in complete possession of part of the lands. The latter alternative was adopted, the old *mir* or village community being retained as the legal owner. When in 1917 the Bolshevik revolution took place at the centre of government, the *mir* simply marched in and completed the confiscation of the land by evicting the landowners from their remaining

portion and in most cases destroying their houses and sometimes their lives.

The great act of emancipation for which Alexander is chiefly remembered, was followed quickly by other reforms. The army and navy were re-organised and a new judicial system on the French model was introduced. More important perhaps than all the rest, local councils for self-government were set up, both in rural districts and large towns. These were the zemstvos which did good work for many years, until the Duma or parliament for the whole country was attempted at the beginning of the twentieth century. Alexander himself would never face a Duma ; he wished to retain his own power of introducing the reforms he thought fit from above, and a parliamentary system on the Western model would have endangered this. Hence, as his reign went on, he lost touch with the more advanced reforming spirits, and violent parties developed before which in the end he fell. But in his own way he did more than any one to transform an old Russia into a new one. Besides the emancipation of the serfs and the establishment of the zemstvos, he reformed and largely endowed the universities and allowed them to choose their own professors. Through this channel a stream of modern, often revolutionary, ideas began to pour into the country. Germany, their nearest neighbour, was the readiest source, and the doctrines of Marx, which in Western countries found their best soil in working-class organisations, were in Russia chiefly propagated among the student class.

The extremer form of doctrine and activity was known as "Nihilism," which in the latter part of the nineteenth century became as common a term for Russian revolutionism as Bolshevism in our own day. It rested on the idea that to reconstruct society—at any rate Russian society—thoroughly, a clean sweep must be made of all existing obstacles. Nothing

should be allowed to stand in the way, and no deed was to be avoided which seemed necessary to attain the ideal end. And on the *tabula rasa* thus produced the new social state was to be erected. Plans of this sort took possession of the minds of many of the keenest young men and women, students of the latest Western books on biology and sociology. It was natural that the authorities should stir in opposition, and odious police methods, imprisonment or Siberia, became the order of the day in the half-century which intervened before the old Tsarist system went down for ever in the revolution of 1917.

Poland had hoped to profit by the liberalism of the new Tsar, but he had no intention of endangering the unity of the empire. He would have less autonomy in the Polish provinces than in the Russian. But Poland had hopes of more. After the Crimean War, which seemed to have shaken the stability of the empire, the Polish nobles who still cherished traditions of their ancient power, called for autonomy, and when the Tsar refused all their demands, they rose in revolt. They remembered the rising of 1830 and had public celebrations of it. But they were not so strong now as they were then. This time they could not get possession of Warsaw or set up any form of national government. They became bands of wandering rebels, haunting the forests with the connivance of the majority of the population, and in the end their repression was terrible. The Russians never went as far as the Austrians went in 1849, in opening the prisons to let out murderers on their rebels, but quieter methods were steadily pursued to detach the peasants from their old masters by offers of their lands on liberal terms, and when at last order was re-established, all traces of Polish nationality were swept away. In Lithuania the Polish language was forbidden in the schools, and a long fight took place with the Pope as to the ownership of the old

church lands. For, as the Poles were Catholic and the Russians Orthodox, a religious difference embittered the political. Then all the Polish officials were removed and the country divided up into districts, to be governed under a Russian viceroy.

All this seemed greatly to strengthen the Russian imperial system. It is true there was a cancer at the heart, which was in the end to destroy the whole ; but, for the present, and on the surface, all was well. The patriotic Russian applauded the destruction of Polish liberties and urged on the Tsar to further imperialist activities. The south-east gave him wide scope for this. There for many centuries millions of his fellow Christians, members also of the Orthodox Church, had been suffering under the rule of the Mohammedan Turks. And this sympathy was interwoven with the old ambition of Russia to extend southwards and establish herself, if possible, in Constantinople, the ancient centre of her Church. There was also the racial link. All were Slavonic except the Rumanians, and from this common Slav patriotism there arose a movement in the 'seventies called Panslavism, which, though inconvenient to those in charge of the international relations of the empire, was flattering to Russian pride and a useful counterpoise to the revolutionary propaganda which aimed at destroying the government altogether. One's mind goes back to the Hetairæ of 1815 which led to the rising and ultimate freedom of Greece. Now the freedom of the whole Balkan peninsula might be won, under the ægis of Russia.

The Turks—and Europe—had a clear warning in the Treaty of London in 1871. It will be remembered that the Treaty of Paris, which ended the Crimean War in 1856, had declared the Straits of the Dardanelles neutral and prohibited both Russia and Turkey from having warships or arsenals on the Black Sea. This was a restriction which a

stronger Russia could hardly brook, and when the Franco-Prussian War diverted and absorbed men's minds, Russia determined to get rid of it. Prussia's success, too, was a direct encouragement to taking the strong line, whatever a treaty might say or other people think. So in October, 1870, the Russian government informed the other cabinets that "it did not propose any longer to hold itself bound by the conditions of that treaty (of London) in so far as they restrained their sovereign rights in the Black Sea."

England was the Power most likely to object, as she had most interests at sea, and the British government at once protested. To satisfy them, and cover up the breach of an international agreement, a conference of ambassadors was called in London. To this Bismarck agreed, but there was no question of getting the Russians to draw back. They knew beforehand that their illegality would be condoned. It was part of the price of their benevolent neutrality in the Franco-Prussian War.

And so the fruits of the Crimean War went crumbling away, and the ground was prepared for the next stage in the disintegration and reconstruction of south-eastern Europe.

In 1874 a failure of crops brought the smouldering discontent in Bosnia and Herzegovina to a blaze. In these provinces it was the custom for the Turkish tax-gatherer to compel the payment of the tax (a tenth of the produce) in cash, before the crop was harvested. The bad harvest made this still more oppressive, and the impost was refused in many places. The collectors were driven off, and the Turkish troops sent to suppress the rebellion were defeated in the first encounters. Prince Milan in the neighbouring and kindred state of Serbia made ready to play the part of a another Piedmont in a general Slav rising against the Turk. Farther east Bulgaria rose in sympathy the following year. Russia sympathised, connived, but did not move.

At this point two important changes took place in the situation. The three emperors—of Germany and Austria as well as Russia—presented a joint memorandum to the Porte, calling for reforms in favour of the Christians of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This placed the intervention in Turkey on a wider than merely Russian or Panslavist basis. On receiving this the Turks in Constantinople made away with their Sultan and his ineffective nephew and installed a man they thought more capable of dealing with the crisis. This was Abdul Hamid II, clever, tenacious, cowardly, savage, unscrupulous, who in the conflict of rival ambitions around was able to stave off the collapse of European Turkey for the remainder of the century. With his accession events moved on apace. Osman Pasha—a military genius—beat back the Serbs, and Prince Milan was at last reduced to sue for an armistice. In Bulgaria, in order to cow the people and prevent their going to the assistance of the Serbs, the most frightful massacres were carried out by order, and at the end of the armistice the Turkish armies moved on again and threatened Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. But the Bulgarian atrocities had overreached their mark. All Europe was now aroused, and Gladstone's passion overpowered the apathy and anti-Russian prejudice of the nation. Russia was at last able to act. She called for a cessation of hostilities under threat of immediate intervention. The Porte yielded and a conference was called at Constantinople attended by all the Great Powers. Here Abdul Hamid showed the other side of his character—unscrupulous cleverness. The Powers demanded autonomy for Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria north of the Balkans. In other provinces there should be substantial guarantees for the Christian population, under an international commission.

The Sultan laughed to scorn so incomplete a reform and offered instead a brand new constitution for the whole



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empire, drawn on the most modern lines. There should be a general assembly in two chambers, with deputies elected by all the inhabitants and ministers responsible to them. There should be a free Press, immovable magistrates, and universal primary education. In March, 1877, the Powers renewed their request for their own reforms, and the Sultan submitted them to his newly appointed chamber. They were all rejected. It was the last of Abdul Hamid's constitution, for in April Russia, with the support of Rumania, threw in an army under the command of the Grand Duke Nicholas, brother of the Tsar. The war lasted till March, 1878. The Russians were determined to wipe out the disgrace of the Crimea, and had high hopes of restoring the Cross to its old place on the dome of St. Sophia. But events did not give them this unbroken triumph. In the first place, the Turks showed unexpected powers of resistance and under Osman did wonders of defence at Plevna. A good deal of sympathy in England and elsewhere veered round towards them. For months the Russians were held up and suffered several considerable defeats. The Grand Duke himself, on the Tsar's birthday in September, lost 16,000 men in a pitched battle. At the same time other Russian armies were driven back in the Caucasus. It was not till the end of November, by bringing up all their reserves including the Imperial Guard, that they were able to force the passage of the Balkans and threaten the capital. On the 20th of January they entered Adrianople and could begin to think of imposing peace. Then came the other obstacle—the jealousy of the rival Powers, and especially of England. An English fleet went to the mouth of the Bosphorus and the Russians were induced to grant a truce. The truce granted, the fleet was withdrawn and the Treaty of San Stephano signed.

But the end of Turkey was not yet, and the Treaty of

San Stephano was not allowed by the rest of Europe to stand. Russia, though not mistress of Constantinople, would still under that treaty have been too powerful in the Balkans to suit either Austria or England. A Congress was called at Berlin in July to which the treaty and the whole situation were submitted. Lord Beaconsfield, as Disraeli had then become, and Lord Salisbury, attended from England, and the diplomatic defeat of Russia was the crowning success of the English Prime Minister's life.

He brought back "Peace with Honour" from Berlin to the Guildhall. But his success was dependent largely on the backing which this time Bismarck gave to the anti-Russian forces. Russia at least so felt it, and from this moment began that swing of Russia away from Austria and Prussia to which the new grouping of the Powers at the turn of the century was to be due.

The treaty finally settled at this Congress of Berlin provided :

1. That Bosnia and Herzegovina should be put under the administration of Austria. In the Treaty of San Stephano they were to have had "liberal institutions" under the joint supervision of Austria and Russia.

2. That an independent Bulgaria should be constituted between the Balkans and the Danube, organised under a European Commission.

San Stephano had provided for a larger Bulgaria, from the Danube to the sea, under a Russian Commissioner with a Russian army.

3. Greece obtained Thessaly. Serbia obtained Nish, and some other territory, with the title of King for Prince Milan.

4. Russia's gains were limited to Kars, Batoum, and Bessarabia, while England received Cyprus by a special treaty with the Sultan, in return for a guarantee of the Turkish frontiers in Asia Minor.

But the Congress and Treaty of Berlin, in spite of the glamour, had settled nothing. Indeed, by cutting down the larger Bulgaria which had been proposed at San Stephano, the Powers might even be said to have prepared the way for the next war, which took place in 1885 between Bulgaria and Serbia. For at Berlin the Powers, in order to check the aggrandisement of Russia which they thought would have resulted from the big Bulgaria under her control, had carved out two others, one (Macedonia) remaining as before under the Turks, and a third, a new province, still in Turkey, but with a Christian governor to be appointed by the Porte for five years. This province, called Eastern Rumelia, was south of the independent Bulgaria and had its capital at Philippolis. Being as fully Bulgarian in sympathy as the northern state, it agitated continually for union with it. At last this was carried out by a peaceful revolution in 1885 and the Powers were again aghast at the flouting of a public treaty, this time by a tiny State. Serbia, however, was the only country to take active steps to undo what had been done. They marched against their happily re-united neighbours on the ground that "the balance of power in the Balkans had been destroyed." But when they had been decisively beaten in several battles by the Bulgarians, Alexander of Battenberg, who had been made prince of Bulgaria after the Congress of Berlin, was quietly allowed by the rest of Europe to add Eastern Rumelia to his northern domains.

Thus again, as after the Crimean War, the efforts of Europe, and especially of England, to prevent the crumbling away of Turkey came to nought. Time and the determination of the people were too strong.

In Russia, too, the Congress of Berlin was followed by results not unlike those which followed the previous check to Russia in the Crimea. The Tsar's government had not conducted this last war brilliantly, and when they had with

difficulty brought it to a successful end, had allowed the fruits of victory to be snatched away. All this gave added force to the anti-government agitation. The liberals and revolutionaries grew bold and strong, and in Russia, as in every ill-instructed country, with no tradition of self-government, all movements for reform tended to run to extremes. The "Nihilists" became more active. They were people, drawn from the student class and the poor of the great towns, who had no organisation for practical reforms but relied on violent deeds to upset the existing order. They would "oppose the terror of revolution to the terror of government," and were willing to sacrifice themselves as well as others in that cause. There were many attempts at assassination, many fugitives to foreign countries and a growing number of exiles to Siberia. . . . On the 1st of March, 1881, the Tsar himself, who had freed the serfs and begun his reign in an atmosphere of reform, was killed by bombs thrown at his carriage by conspirators, among whom were a student and a young girl of noble family.

The new Tsar Alexander III, son of the murdered man, succeeded with a bold affirmation of his faith "in the power and the truth of autocratic rule." He made no concession to the liberal spirit and pressed forward the work of Russianising the empire which his father had begun. There was a long and complicated struggle with Finland, and she secured her complete freedom only as a result of the Great War in 1917. But the two movements which most concern us here, were that to the east, of which we shall speak in the next chapter, and the anti-German movement in the Baltic provinces. Here the Germans had been encroaching for centuries, and now, with the change of feeling and events, Russia began a counter pressure.

The story of Dorpat or Yuriev, now in Esthonia, then in the Livonian province of the Russian empire, is a curious

illustration of the waves and conflict of race and culture in those parts. Supposed to have been founded by a Slav prince from Kiev in the eleventh century, it passed to the Teutonic Knights in the thirteenth. In the sixteenth it was captured by the Russians, but within a century had passed first to the Poles, then to the Swedes, then to the Poles again, and back again to the Swedes. The greatest of the Swedes, Gustavus Adolphus, founded a university there in 1632, but, before the century was out, the students had twice taken flight to Sweden on the approach of the Russians. At last, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, Alexander I refounded the university, but though refounded by a Russian Tsar, it remained throughout the century thoroughly German in spirit ; the Russians were not then anti-German. Alexander III in the days of expansive nationalism, reformed the university in a Russian spirit from top to bottom.

The little town and university, now ensconced in one of the smallest states created by the War, are thus a living mirror of the dynastic and international strife of a thousand years. Its anti-German bent in the 'eighties was part of the great re-adjustment which brought on the crisis of 1914 and must be the leading theme of later chapters.

CHAPTER XXII

COLONIAL EXPANSION AND RIVALRY OF EMPIRES

We saw in the last chapter how Russia, pressing southward towards Constantinople in the 'seventies, gave powerful assistance to the Balkan States in their struggle to throw off the yoke of Turkey, but was herself checked by the intervention of the other European Powers. She found, as we shall see in this chapter, an easier field for expansion in the farther east. In Chapter XX it was shown how Austria, checked in her career as a German power by Prussia, pressed south-east and gained possession of Slav countries —Bosnia and Herzegovina—which were to cost her dear in the not distant future. In Chapter XIX the new German Empire appeared, pegging out colonial claims beyond the seas, as soon as she had settled her constitution at home. On all sides the story was the same. The economic enrichment of the nineteenth century, the organisation of strong states, the improved means of transport and communication, led every nation, with surplus energy or money at its disposal, to extend its boundaries and take its part in the Western exploitation and civilisation of the world.

England and France, the leading Western powers, who had fought for Canada and India in the eighteenth century, had not ceased their colonial conflicts, although in Europe

their action tended during the nineteenth century to be more harmonious. An *Entente Cordiale* had been first talked of in the reign of Louis Philippe and was assiduously cultivated by Napoleon III, but it had to surmount the obstacles of rivalry in Egypt, Africa, and the Far East before it was brought safely into port by Edward VII.

We have to take up the story in the 'seventies, when England struck a decisive blow in Egyptian affairs which had far-reaching effects not only on her relations with France but also on European and international politics.

Egypt is on the route to British India, but it had also been specially cultivated by the French. Napoleon had invoked the spirit of the centuries under the Pyramids and, since his time, Egypt had become bound to France by many links of archæological research, cultural interests and finance. The French, as we saw in Book II, had supported Mehemet Ali, who ruled Egypt as Khedive under the suzerainty of the Sultan, when he raised his head against his nominal chief. He had been defeated in this rebellious effort largely by the attitude of Great Britain, but he had retained his government of Egypt, and it was with one of his family and successors that Ferdinand de Lesseps negotiated the piercing of the isthmus of Suez. De Lesseps obtained the first authority to proceed with a canal in the winter of 1854. The British government opposed the undertaking at every stage, and the money was found partly in Egypt and partly in France. After ten years of actual cutting, the canal was solemnly opened in the winter of 1869, with the Emperor of Austria, the Crown Prince of Prussia and representatives of other nations present, as well as the Empress of the French. The British government did not send a representative. But the Khedive Ismail, in whose reign the work was done, was an extravagant and luxurious person, who squandered money on his own pleasures and palaces as well as on railways, model farms,

and other Western innovations, which might, at some time and under proper management, be profitable. In this way he accumulated a debt which Egypt was quite unable to shoulder, and bankruptcy would have followed, had not money been found from abroad. He offered to sell his shares in the canal to the French government in 1873 and they refused. In the winter of 1875 these shares were bought, in great secrecy, by the British government, for little more than half their original value. Little wonder that Englishmen have always thought it one of the shrewdest strokes of Disraelian politics, or that the French, who had made the canal in the teeth of British opposition, shared the same opinion from another angle.

The French might truly boast that they had " remade the past of Egypt." At the beginning of the century Champollion had deciphered the hieroglyphics on the Rosetta Stone which had been discovered by an officer in Napoleon's expedition. This at once revealed the records of the past and made the modern world know more of ancient Egypt than did the ancient Greeks. In the time of Ismail, while De Lesseps was making his canal, Mariette was exploring the temples and doing for the religion of Egypt what Champollion had done for its language. And in our own day Maspero, following and learning from Mariette, as Mariette had from Champollion, has widened the whole field of Egyptian antiquities, excavating cities and temples in Thebes and Upper Egypt, and bringing the mass of knowledge into a new and comprehensible order. . . . The Suez Canal looked towards the future, as the archæologists had looked towards the past. It replaced Egypt on the old highway to the East and made its possession or its good government a matter of the first concern to the commercial as well as the political world. England on both counts had more at stake than France, and from the time of the purchase of the

shares she maintained her position, while the attitude of France became more uncertain.

In 1876, Ismail being a hundred millions in debt, mostly to French and British lenders, the British government sent out Lord Goschen to report, and, soon after, France and England jointly imposed on the Khedive a Dual Control—two financiers, one French and one English, who were to administer a special department of the Egyptian revenues set aside for the service of the debt. This involved reforms and economies which fell among other things on the army. It was reduced in numbers and the officers' pay cut down. This was the beginning of an agitation, fomented by the soldiers, which terrorised Ismail in 1877 into dismissing the two controllers. Thereupon England and France demanded the abdication of Ismail and set up his son as Khedive in his place. The controllers returned.

The Egyptian army, however, continued its agitation and found a leader in Arabi Bey who was able to unite the fervour of the Mohammedans with the discontent of the soldiers and form a national movement, with freedom from foreign interference as its programme. Arabi was made minister of war and regarded as the "Saviour of Islam" by the pious Moslems. In May, 1882, all European employés in the Egyptian public service were dismissed, and France and England were openly defied. Their joint fleets came to anchor off Alexandria. This was the signal for an Arab rising in the city which, by the middle of June, had led to the murder of many Europeans and the plunder of their houses. Arabi Bey, whose dismissal had been demanded by the admirals of the two fleets, began to fortify Alexandria against an attack from the sea. Then came the critical decision of the French and the British governments. Were they to attack? Gladstone was in power in England, the last man to wish to do anything of the sort. He decided on

action, and John Bright the Quaker left the ministry as a protest. France, in a mood of non-intervention, decided not to take part; so the ultimatum of the 10th of July went from the British admiral alone. It demanded the cessation of the work of fortification on pain of bombardment. As no notice was taken of the ultimatum, next morning at seven the fleet opened fire and the Egyptian defences were soon silenced. At half-past four two cruisers entered the harbour and Arabi's army left the city, while troops of Bedouins burned and pillaged the richer quarters.

The British army which had now to follow the fleet, was under the command of Wolseley who decided at once to occupy the canal in order to turn the Egyptian army from the east. De Lesseps sought in vain to have the canal declared neutral, but the French chamber, strong against intervention, threw out the ministry which proposed to occupy it with a defensive force. The field of European occupation in Egypt was thus left open entirely for the British; they did the work alone, having invited their partners to help them. By the middle of September Arabi's army had been destroyed at Tel-el-Kebir and the English entered Cairo as "Liberators" of the Khedive from his rebellious troops. Arabi was afterwards captured and put on his trial for treason. He was deported to Ceylon, where he spent most of his remaining days, till the end of the century.

The English had thus become masters of Egypt. But all such expansive movements carried their agents much farther than they set out to go. Egypt meant more than Alexandria, Cairo, and the Lower Nile. Already, under the rule of Mehemet Ali in 1823, she had conquered Nubia and Kordofan in the upper reaches of the river and had a garrison at Khartoum. General Gordon had gone there on behalf of the Egyptian government and organised an Equatorial province including all the Nile valley, except the mountains

to the east which still remained independent in the kingdom of Abyssinia. When the nationalist movement under Arabi became active in Egypt, the Arab merchants in the Sudan—these upper regions—caught the infection, and they had two other motives which made them still more determined. Their principal merchandise was slaves, a trade which the Europeans were pledged to suppress, and they had a true saint, called Mohammed Ahmed, who had lived for many years a solitary life on an island in the Nile. He was brought out, proclaimed a Mahdi, or Prophet of the Lord, and put at the head of a sacred war. Egyptian troops had already been sent against him and defeated before the English took possession of Egypt. The English, therefore, inherited the task of dealing in some way with these disturbed and distant regions, conquered by the country which they had conquered. In December, 1882, Hicks Pasha was sent to attack the Mahdi and was cut off with all his men. Baker in 1884 suffered the same fate, and General Gordon, sent reluctantly to Khartoum to evacuate or settle the country, was murdered early in January by the revolted garrison, just before Wolseley, who was bringing reinforcements, was able to reach him. The tragic story made a profound impression on English domestic politics but it is not from that point of view that we can discuss it here. So far as Egypt and Africa were concerned, it meant the temporary abandonment of the Sudan and the drawing back of the Egyptian frontier to the first cataract of the Nile. When in 1898 the Anglo-Egyptian forces under Kitchener resumed the conquest of the Sudan and destroyed the Mahdists at Omdurman, they found advancing across their path, at Fashoda, a French force under Marchand, sent out by the French colonial office to connect if possible their possessions on the Congo in the west with their stations at Obock and Djibouti on the Red Sea.

This was one of the crises in the scramble for Africa, amusing in form, serious and dangerous in meaning and possibility. Two men representing the two leading Western Powers in Europe, actually meet in mid-Africa, disputing the right of way, one from north to south in the continent, the other from west to east. For both countries had now thrown themselves heartily into the expansionist stream. England, who certainly had not wished to bombard Alexandria, or occupy Egypt, sixteen years before, was now in full chase of an African empire from Cairo to the Cape. France, regretting her abstention in 1882 and anxious to make up for her losses in 1870–71, was pressing forward a colonial Empire in Tunis, across the Sahara from north to south, across equatorial Africa from west to east, and, in the Far East, in Indo-China. A ministry of Jules Ferry for two years, 1883–85, had established the French in firm possession of Tonkin, Annam, Cambodia, Cochin China, and parts of Siam—all that land which juts out between the Malay peninsula and the coasts of China.

These events of the 'eighties in the colonial expansion of France are of the highest interest and importance because they bring out so clearly the motives that were at work among the leading Powers at that time, the discussions and change of mind that took place, the dangers both of rivalry in Europe and of still more lasting conflict and oppression in Africa or the East where the expansion was taking place.

Tunis, Tonkin, Fashoda are the three memorable names in the French story of that decade. Fashoda we have just mentioned. The French there, finding the English determined and in greater force, withdrew, and the plan of a trans-African French dominion, west to east, was never resumed. Tunis and Tonkin had a different sequel.

Tunis came into the hands of France after the Congress of Berlin. England had received Cyprus, Austria,

Bosnia and Herzegovina; it seemed quite reasonable, in the spirit of dividing up the spoils, that France should have her share, and to Bismarck the plan had the special attraction of driving a wedge between France and Italy. Egypt divided France from England; here was another similar weapon, and still more likely to prove lasting, for Italy, facing Tunis and remembering the days of ancient Rome, was sure to desire the land of Carthage.

Such were the inevitable results of a policy which made national interests supreme and was not controlled by the ideal of the general good which the League of Nations has now come into the world to enforce.

The difficulties foreseen ensued in due course, and have not yet entirely disappeared. Italy at once egged on the Bey of Tunis to oppose the French in every way he could, and in 1881 two expeditions from France were necessary before the Bey yielded to the protectorate thus imposed upon him. The Sultan protested in virtue of his ancient suzerainty, and Italy continued to ignore the treaty. But France held on, and Tunis under her rule has grown in prosperity more quickly and with less expense than the older and neighbouring colony of Algeria. Bizerta, which she fortified in front of Sicily and Malta, became a sort of second Gibraltar dividing the Mediterranean into its two prehistoric basins.

These things were settled during the first ministry of Jules Ferry, but as the forward policy was always hotly debated in France, he was defeated at the end of the year and a ministry of another temper succeeded him in 1882, which, as we saw, refused to intervene in Egypt. England was allowed there to act on her own, but Ferry returned to power in 1883 and again set the helm for colonial expansion. The second ministry of Ferry completed the conquest of Indo-China. The French had an old treaty with the emperor of Annam, but, as in Africa with the Turks, the question was

complicated by a claim to suzerainty by the Chinese whose undisputed territory adjoined Tonkin to the north. From Tonkin hostile raiders constantly emerged, supported by China and strengthened by Chinese troops. It was against these that a French expedition went out in 1883 which finally enforced a "treaty of Tien Tsin" on the Chinese government. As this was broken in the following year, a more extensive war was begun by sea and land in 1884, and only brought to a conclusion by a partial blockade of the Chinese coast. At last, in 1885, the Treaty of Tien Tsin was confirmed and enlarged, giving France definitely the domination of Annam and Tonkin and freedom of commerce with the southern provinces of China.

Two things about this business deserve to be carefully noted. One, that this French treaty ranks with others, gained in a similar way, especially by England, in the middle of the century, and is part of a system which all the Powers have agreed to revise in view of a re-organised and national China. The other, that the policy was still in debate in France down to the end of the war in Tonkin.

Clemenceau, who was to become the famous Tiger of the Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919, appeared in the Chamber in 1885, when the credits for the occupation of Tonkin were to be voted. "The task of the republican party," he said, "is not to found an empire in Indo-China, but a Republic in France." The vote was only passed by a majority of 274 to 270.

But colonial expansion went on. The rivalry of the Western Powers was to become still more acute before it was brought to a halt by the catastrophe of 1914, and France and England, who stood side by side in the Great War, were to wrestle again in the East before they agreed to try another course. Siam comes between Burmah and French Indo-China, and England was engaged in much the same way in

Burmah as France was in Annam. In 1895, the French, making claims to lands east of the river Mekong which appeared to infringe on the rights of Siam, were opposed by England on behalf of the Siamese and in defence of her own interests in the West. Lord Rosebery was then in power, and his views and temper in these matters differed widely from Gladstone's. A stand was made as at Fashoda, and this time the quarrel was concluded by an agreement, drawn up next year, in which the independence of Siam was recognised and she was set up as a buffer state on the east of India, dividing the spheres of the two Western Powers there as Afghanistan divided the British and Russian spheres on the north-west. This was the beginning of an era of agreements with France which in 1904 were extended to the whole field.

We have traced so far in this chapter the colonial expansion of France and England in the last quarter of the century, always competitive, sometimes conflicting, and we have seen how Italy, as soon as she became a nation began to take her part—at least in Africa—with the rest. All Western nations with a sea-board did the same so far as they were able. We must very shortly review the fortunes of the other colonisers—of Portugal, Spain, Belgium, as well as Italy—before returning to the more important cases of Germany and Russia, important because they contributed so heavily to the crisis of 1914.

We will take the cases chronologically, and it will be seen how striking is the growth of expansion in the last quarter of the century and how close is the connection with the outburst of nationalism of which the new Germany and Italy were the finest fruits and the Franco-Prussian War a diseased and dangerous expression.

Italy began to think of a colonial empire as soon as she had collected herself as a nation. In 1869, before she had recovered Rome as her capital, her Chambers of Commerce

demanded a depôt on the Red Sea. This was secured at Assab in the following year. Assab was the nucleus of the Italian colony of Eritrea from which they attempted in the 'eighties to build up a protectorate over Abyssinia. England encouraged them. We much needed help at that time in our difficulties in Egypt and the Sudan. The Italians, moved by these considerations and by the rivalry of France, occupied Massawah farther up the coast in 1885. In our view, it was to be a containing movement against the Mahdists, while we were attacking them up the Nile. But the occupation of Massawah and the fall of Khartoum were reported in London on the same day. No further common action with Great Britain followed, and the Italians, being diverted from the west and north, turned their attention to strengthening themselves round Massawah and the south, and thus came speedily under the jealous eyes of Abyssinia.

The story of the relations, military and diplomatic, between Italy and Abyssinia, to the end of the century, is too long and complicated to be given here. But the net result was clear, tragic, and instructive. The Italians, intervening in a succession war between rival claimants to the throne of Abyssinia, were able in 1889 to extract a treaty from Menelek, who afterwards became undisputed negus or ruler of the country, which temporarily enabled them to appear as representatives of Abyssinia in foreign relations. On this they attempted to set up a claim to a permanent protectorate. In 1896 Menelek, revolting against this, was able at Adowa to inflict so serious a defeat on the Italians that the claim was withdrawn, and the complete independence of Abyssinia was secured. The Italian colony was confined to the limits which Abyssinia had never disputed, and Abyssinia became an early member of the League of Nations.

In 1911 Italy, expanding in a region nearer home and making up for the loss of Tunis to France, conquered Tripoli

from the Turks and Arabs. They are also occupying at the moment a number of the Ægean islands to which the Greeks lay claim, and they hoped to secure large tracts in Asia Minor as successors to the Turks. They are good colonists, and the Turks have allowed the land to run to waste. But a solution of this question has not yet come.

The case of Belgium is a strange one because bound up with the personal actions of a masterful but self-indulgent man who happened in the 'eighties and 'nineties to be on the throne. This was Leopold II, son of the Leopold to whom, as her uncle, Queen Victoria had written many letters in the first part of her reign.* Leopold II, being both intelligent and enterprising, had commissioned H. M. Stanley in the years from 1880–84 to explore the basin of the Congo, which, though not so long as the Nile, waters and collects water from the largest river-basin in the world. On the strength of Stanley's explorations, an International Association was formed to "develop" or "exploit" the Congo country, which was rich in many things including ivory and rubber. Rubber, of course, became increasingly sought after as motor-transport spread. This could be cultivated while the ivory by ruthless slaughter was soon exhausted. In order to extract the largest possible return of rubber from the country, inhuman cruelties were practised on the natives, and Leopold, besides being the President of the International Association, managed by secret decrees to acquire, for himself and other private persons, the monopoly of large tracts of the best rubber country. At last both types of scandal were dragged into the light, and a strong agitation arose in other countries besides Belgium against the use Leopold was making of his position and the treatment of the natives which it had entailed. Great Britain was foremost in this protest, and a unanimous

* *E.g.* that quoted on p. 200.



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vote was passed by the House of Commons in 1903 appealing to other European Powers who had recognised the "Congo Free State" to join in action to reform it. Again the story is far too long for these pages, but well deserves a careful study, for it illustrates more clearly and terribly than any other the evils that may result from the unchecked exploitation of weaker people by unscrupulous and inhuman masters. In the end the Belgium government was compelled by public opinion at home and abroad to assume control itself. In 1908 the Congo Free State ceased to exist, and a ministry of the colonies was created in Brussels to take over the administration of the territory. Now, since the Germans have lost their colonies in the War, the Belgian Congo State is bordered entirely, by the French Congo to the west, the British to the east, and the Portuguese territory of Angola to the south.

Portugal and Spain, who had led the colonising movement in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, appear but little in this last phase. A few words will suffice here for Portugal, while the Spanish colonial empire practically ended, just as the century was ending, in a way which brought the United States into the field of responsibility overseas.

Portugal keeps the Cape Verde Islands and one or two places in the Far East. She has considerable territory in Africa and made an attempt, while the other Powers were "scrambling" for the continent, to extend across and join her possessions at the mouth of the Congo to those which surround the Zambezi on the east coast. It was at the time of Fashoda when the French had the same idea farther north. In each case Great Britain took the same line. A gunboat was sent to the mouth of the Tagus to intimidate the Portuguese from occupying the highlands of the upper Zambesi which might have hindered the British plan of a red line from Cairo to the Cape. It seems to have been the one case

in history where we had a temporary difference with "our most ancient ally."

Spain had not done well with her colonies. We saw in an early chapter how in the 'twenties and 'thirties South America had broken away, with the help of Great Britain and the United States. The United States were now in the last decade of the century to deal the final blow. For Cuba, which had always been Spanish since the sixteenth century, had been demanding reforms and autonomy for years. It was heavily taxed and badly governed, and frequently during the century savage rebellions had broken out which were savagely repressed. Many in the island would have preferred annexation by the United States, and in the final war of 1898 the Americans were gradually drawn in, partly by feeding and supporting the Cubans, partly at the direct request of Cuban leaders, finally by the explosion in Havana harbour of a United States battleship, the *Maine*. On this Spain was required to withdraw her forces, and when she refused, a short and decisive war followed. To her surprise Spain was stripped not only of Cuba and Porto Rico in the West Indies, but of the Philippines also—a more extensive group of islands in the China seas. For all this land and the colonial debts which Spain had hoped America would take over, she received six million pounds. For the time she was so grievously impoverished that in the following year, 1899, the Caroline islands, farther out in the Pacific, were sold to Germany for less than one million. It was the last of her Pacific possessions and has now passed with other islands to Japan.

All these cases—Italian, Spanish, Belgian, and Portuguese —of colonial expansion and colonial wars are significant and instructive; on each a treatise might be written explaining its connection with the movement of Western civilisation and drawing the appropriate lessons. But they

are not directly in the main stream of events, as was the competition between England and France from which we started this chapter. To that main stream we must now return, and deal with the expansion of the other two leading actors in the drama of the twentieth century, viz. Germany and Russia.

We saw in a previous chapter how Germany, as soon as she became strong and united, began to found colonies, especially in Africa, and to build a fleet. This policy was started by Bismarck, though reluctantly and with great caution. Throughout the 'eighties, while the first steps were being taken, and Bismarck was in power, there was no serious dispute with Great Britain. Gladstone in 1884 had welcomed the appearance of Germany in the colonial field ; "God speed her. She becomes our ally and partner in the execution of the great purposes of Providence for the advantage of mankind." It was in the same spirit that next year, 1885, a Congress at Berlin recognised the Congo Free State and declared the basins of the Congo and the Niger open to the trade of all the world. All the time the leading Powers, especially France, Germany, and England, were pressing on. In the same year England proclaimed a Protectorate over the Niger Coast and chartered a Niger Company, while Germany extended herself behind Zanzibar. Still it was all done amicably, and in 1889 Lord Salisbury continued the same policy by having a congress called at Brussels to consider questions affecting the welfare of the natives of Africa. The general act of that Brussels conference sets out as clearly as the League of Nations could do, the united purpose of the conferring nations in dealing with a continent, which a hundred years before had been known as "Dark" and was now, except for Abyssinia, divided up into spheres of European control. That purpose, said the Act, should be "to put an end to the crimes

and devastations engendered by the traffic in African slaves, to protect effectively the aboriginal populations of Africa and to ensure for that vast continent the benefits of peace and civilisation."

The following year Lord Salisbury continued his pacific work by concluding an agreement with Germany which marked out their spheres both in East Africa and on the Gold Coast and yielded Heligoland to the new Kaiser.

But from that point onward, while we began settling our differences with France, differences with Germany went on accumulating which it never seemed possible to settle.

It will be remembered that William II succeeded in 1888 and dismissed Bismarck early in 1890. In the year between, the British South African Company had been chartered under the inspiration of Cecil Rhodes. Rhodes was the Englishman who had most clearly conceived the idea of a British strip through Africa from north to south and had done most to achieve it. The rejection of the Portuguese attempt to join up their territories east and west gave Rhodes his opportunity. He formed a company to exploit just those lands which lay between the Zambesi and Portuguese Angola and did his best to extend them north and south. The mining and other rights were bought from a native chief, called Lobengula, through the agency of Dr. Jameson who had been previously in medical attendance on the chief. The company started with a million of capital on which it proposed to make a profit by mining and trading, but so far as its relations with the natives were concerned, it was under strict control by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the British government reserved full rights to revoke the Charter and take up the country itself at any time.

Rhodes' complete plan of the Cape to Cairo connection was blocked by German East Africa to the north of him,

which extended to Lake Tanganyika, and from which no strip could be obtained. And both the Boers of the Transvaal and the Germans in East Africa were jealous of Rhodes' success in securing the succession from Lobengula in a land which they would have been glad to occupy themselves. Dr. Jameson became administrator of the Chartered Company's property, and fighting soon followed with Lobengula's tribe. This added fresh territory to the Company's domain. But still there was no grave difference between England and Germany, until the time of the "Jameson Raid"; it was part of the "scramble," and a "scramble" need not necessarily be murderous, or even ill-tempered.

The story of the relations of the Boer farmers (descendants of the original Dutch settlers) with the British in South Africa is long and difficult and quite outside our scope here; but two recent incidents in it, directly concerned with Jameson's Raid, must be mentioned. There had been a war between Great Britain and the Boers of the Transvaal in 1880 in which the Boers had distinguished themselves. After a defeat of the British forces at Majuba Hill, Gladstone, who was then in power, had granted them independence, subject to a suzerainty which was afterwards defined to relate only to external affairs. The arrangement had given great offence in England, and, together with the death of Gordon, was probably the chief cause of Gladstone's loss of popularity at that time. The other new fact was the discovery of rich gold mines on Boer territory, south of Pretoria their capital, which led to an inrush of foreigners called "outlanders" by the Boers. This new community, Johannesburg, different in every respect from the quiet, old-fashioned, country-loving Boers, began to agitate for political rights. They objected to living permanently under a government, quite out of sympathy with them, in which they

had no part, and which saw in them simply a fertile source for uncontrolled taxation. To the Boers they were but birds of passage, rather a nuisance and a danger than an advantage to the country, traders who should pay a tribute and pass away. At the end of December, 1895, an insurrection of the "outlanders" took place, concerted with various persons outside the Transvaal and supported by a column of irregular troops led by Dr. Jameson from the Chartered Company's territory. The Boers met and easily overpowered the invaders and the rising in Johannesburg was quickly put down. But unfortunately the German emperor, watching events jealously in Berlin, thought fit to send an open telegram to President Kruger, congratulating the Boers on the successful vindication of their independence. As a private expression of sympathy with the threatened republic, every one would have understood it, and many besides Germans shared the feeling. As a public document, it became at once an international event, the most serious breach which had yet occurred between Germany and Great Britain. The sequel, either in England or in South Africa, cannot be given here; it belongs to British colonial history. The second Boer War came in 1899 and arose from the same grievances of the "outlanders," afterwards taken up officially by Lord Milner in South Africa and Joseph Chamberlain, then Secretary for the Colonies. The war dragged out its costly length till 1902. The Boers fought heroically but were overcome in the end by the force of numbers and the skill of the two best British generals of the time, Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener.

The Treaty of Pretoria extinguished the independence of the Boers, who swore allegiance to the British empire, receiving in return the promise of local autonomy which was honoured by Campbell-Bannerman's government in 1907.

Internationally, the Boer War contributed greatly to two

important movements which we have seen developing from other causes. One, the expansion of the German navy, the other, the turning away of England from an understanding with Germany to an understanding with France. Both in the Spanish-American and the Boer War the Germans saw the force of a strong sea-power, possessed by others, and enabling those others to act freely in matters where Germany without sea-power was unable to intervene. The Americans in 1898 had by their fleet picked up a whole string of rich tropical islands under German eyes. And in 1896, after the Kruger telegram, the British at once mobilised a flying squadron which put any German assistance to the Boers out of the question. The Kaiser in 1897, after this rebuff, disclosed his mind by saying in public, "The trident of Neptune must be in our hands," and in 1900, during the Boer War, the great naval programme was laid before the Reichstag. In submitting it, Admiral Tirpitz made no secret of its object. "Germany," said he, "must have a battle-fleet so strong that with the greatest of the sea-powers for adversary, a war against her would involve such dangers as would imperil the foe's own position in the world."

It was that challenge which faced Great Britain at the beginning of the new century and weighed on the minds of each successive British government. Without themselves desiring further expansion, desperately anxious to keep the general peace, they were driven, as guardians of the national interests, to look round for some support to redress so grave a dislocation of the balance. The Boer War made this isolation of England in the world more apparent. She had no friends, and, clearly now, the most jealous enemies of all were in Germany. More than one approach was made about this time by Chamberlain, among others, to Germany for a friendly understanding. As these all proved abortive,

the turn to France became more frequent and more popular ; in fact, in view of the long-standing and unhealed breach between France and Germany, it followed almost inevitably that to quarrel with Germany was to become a friend of France. So matters stood, when during the Boer War Queen Victoria died and was succeeded by her eldest son, a life-long friend of France.

But to understand the whole re-arrangement of the Great Powers which dominated the first two decades of the twentieth century, we must return for a moment to Russia, for Russia had by this time—in 1896—become the formal ally of France, and any one who made friends with France must *ipso facto* become at least more friendly with Russia. And this at the time seemed the most unlikely part of the new arrangement, for Russia had been our most active rival in Asia, as France had been in Egypt and north and central Africa. Indeed, the superficial prophet, thinking of a world-hegemony of the strongest Powers, might easily, in 1890, when Lord Salisbury made friends with Germany, have predicted a German-British alliance—the greatest land-power with the greatest sea-power—to rule the rest. The Kaiser, in his ingenious and unstable way, had often dreamt of it, but it was not the true tendency of modern history which is towards the union of all, not the domination of any. But before this, now obvious, truth could be realised, the world had to pass through the terrific purging of the Great War. Russia, as we saw in the last chapter, had drifted away from her accustomed friendship with Germany about the time of the Treaty of Berlin, when Bismarck had seemed to desert her, and, after Bismarck's disappearance, no steady or competent effort was made to bring her back. Meanwhile the Russians in the latter part of the nineteenth century were pushing forward as feverishly as any other Power.

We must go back a little to understand this eastern expansion of Russia while Germany was seeking overseas colonies and building a fleet, and Austria was extending in the Balkans. The three movements were in fact closely connected. The Russian empire was in the thirteenth century largely infused by Eastern blood and dominated by Eastern conquerors. At that time a Mongol horde had established itself in the lower Volga. Itself an offshoot of the Tartar power in Mongolia, and owning allegiance to the Grand Khans—Jenghiz Khan and his successors—this "Golden Horde" brought the Russian princes into subjection for nearly three centuries. Then under a series of vigorous rulers—Ivan III and IV, down to Peter the Great and Catherine II—*i.e.* from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Russian rulers, having conquered the Mongols and assimilated their rule, turned their eyes longingly to the West and the South. It was the time when the West had awoke itself and was sending explorers and colonisers all over the world. The effect on Russia is best known to us in the figure of Peter the Great who studied shipbuilding in Holland and England, built himself a new capital farther west and nearer to the sea, and in the story of Catherine, who invited French savants to her court and began the active campaign for expansion south and the revival of a Christian empire, seated in Constantinople. While these ideas were uppermost, the eastern roots and possibilities of Russia, though not entirely neglected, were little thought of. But from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, events that we have traced, threw back the Russians on their Eastern connections. Germany became consolidated, and opposed an invincible barrier to expansion round the Baltic. Austria, expelled from the new German body but supported by it, found compensation in the Balkans. England, and the Western Powers generally, were determined that Russia should not

become mistress of Constantinople and the eastern Mediterranean from her vantage point in the Black Sea. The young Powers, shaking off the rule of Turkey, had no desire to submit themselves to another foreign yoke. Hence, hemmed in all round on west and south and frozen to the north, Russia turned again to the east. The story of her expansion there, in the middle and latter part of the century, is one of the most amazing examples of persistent and successful enterprises in history, full of romance and skill and heroism. It has often been compared with the trekking West of the United States which was taking place at the same time. Both led to permanent possession ; both were knit up and made permanent by trans-continental railways. But whereas the United States, when they reached the western ocean, could look across three thousand miles without alarm, Russia, checked on her incursions in mid-Asia by Great Britain, and faced by the immemorial millions of the Chinese farther east, met more than her match in the Japanese, already strongly encamped on their side of the Pacific. Most of this great story must be left untold here—the push across the Caucasus and into Persia, Turkestan, and the Pamirs. But the expansion due east and into China which led to the collision with Japan, comes directly into the main current of events and should be studied in all its bearings.

It was in 1860 that the Russians in their march East obtained from the Chinese by the Treaty of Pekin all the territory from the mouth of the Amour down to Corea with much of the hinterland. They followed up their treaty by building, at the extremity of the sea-coast thus gained, the naval station of Vladivostok, on the borders both of Manchuria and Corea and facing the middle of Japan. The name of the place was not a friendly gesture to the young and ambitious Power which it confronted, for Vladivostok means in Russian, " The Domination of the East." Now Japan was

on the point of consummating the most remarkable revolution in all history. In less than thirty years she modernised herself on Western lines just at the time when the world was approaching the great crisis in Western expansion. Japan adopted, for herself and not by compulsion, at once and not by stages, the science, politics, industrial methods and expansionist ideas of the contemporary West. This was in 1868 when the Mikado threw off his feudal tutelage and stood forth to rule as a modern constitutional monarch. Japan, being compact and obedient, was able to do this quickly and most effectively. Railways and telegraphs were installed, young men sent to Europe to study, the army and navy organised on the latest models. Thus armed and inspired, in 1894 Japan challenged China in her control of Corea. Would China join with her in bringing that country to order—the disorder being presupposed ? China, claiming the sole suzerainty of Corea, refused the invitation and went to war. In six months China was so completely beaten that she begged for European intervention, and Japan, in order to avoid this, made haste to get a treaty signed. It granted "independence"—of course, quite nominal—to Corea, and to Japan Formosa and some other islands and the peninsula of Liao Tung with the stronghold of Port Arthur directly facing Tien Tsin and the approaches to Pekin.

At this point England acted very wisely. Russia, France, and Germany intervened to prevent Japan from securing the dominating position in China which the issue of the war had already given her. They invited Japan to renounce Port Arthur and the peninsula of Liao Tung. No doubt Russia was the prime mover in this step, as it was on her sphere of expansion that the Japanese acquisitions impinged. And she was just approaching the conclusion of her alliance with France, to which, as we have seen, the turn of events had been lately leading. France had been for many years



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THE FAR EAST IN 1914

lending Russia large sums of money for internal development as well as external expansion. Here was a case in which it was thought they could profitably co-operate. Germany chimed in, so that, eager also for expansion, she might not lose her share of the spoil. But England, already having far larger possessions and interests in China than any other Power, was also at this juncture more far-sighted. She saw that Japan, from her position and character as well as what she had just done in the war, might rightly claim a larger influence in China than the newcomers from the West. She would prove a more suitable agent in dealing with China in future than the distant and alien Europeans. She was also like ourselves an island and naval Power. We therefore stood aside from the intervention and prepared to cement our friendship with Japan by an alliance.

Events moved quickly where interests and passions were so keenly opposed. Russia, having obtained the withdrawal of the Japanese, proceeded at once to claim Port Arthur for herself, to fortify the peninsula, to establish herself in Corea and warn off the Japanese from Manchuria. Meanwhile the French and other European engineers were pushing on with all speed the building of railways all over China, which they began to parcel out into spheres of European influence. China, under the rule of a dowager empress of the most conservative and unyielding type, broke out in risings against the foreigners. Two German missionaries were murdered, and in requital the German government enforced the cession practically of the whole province of Shantung, the heart and cradle of Confucian China. In 1900 all the Great Powers and the United States occupied Pekin as a punishment for the attack upon them and their legations.

But Japan had now to try her newly-fledged power with one of these intrusive Westerners and enter the *mêlée*. Russia had provoked her most, and it was Russia who, by

descending from her vast territories to the north, would be best able to overcome the disorganised Chinese Empire. She called on Russia to recognise the independence of Corea and Manchuria, and, relying on her defensive alliance with England, concluded in 1902, she went to war in 1904. The crushing defeat of Russia which followed was one of the most important events in the history of the world. It put a clear limit to the encroachment of the militant West upon the East. It brought Japan herself into the councils of the West as an equal. It reduced the strength of Russia in the combat which was impending from her Western connections. It led, through the alliance of Japan with England, to the formation of the larger Pacific alliance which was to include the United States and will be traced in one of our later chapters.

In this state, then, the world of international politics passed into the new century : all the Great Powers eager for expansion and having already acquired a footing in every quarter of the globe. England, easily the first in colonial possessions and naval strength, but being now keenly challenged by Germany at sea, and alone in a circle of competing ambitions, anxious to secure herself by some reliable friendship or understanding. France, at last allied to the one Great Power which could threaten and contain her unreconciled enemy on his eastern flank. Austria at issue with Russia in the Balkans but closely bound to Germany, which remained since 1871 the unquestioned military leader of Europe. Italy, allied to Germany and Austria for defensive purposes but with no obligation or desire to follow them in an aggressive war. Russia, distraught within and weakened by a succession of exhausting wars, of which the last with Japan was the most damaging. Japan, allied with England for defence and just admitted to the comity of Western Powers. The United States, with a new colonial

empire, and growing more rapidly than any other Power in wealth and population, but still holding a waiting brief in European complications. No League of Nations, no permanent and recognised organisation in which all have a place together, and of which the business should be to foresee difficulties, reconcile interests, avert conflicts.

BOOK V

1901—1920

THE NEW GROUPING OF THE POWERS AND THE POSITION OF ENGLAND—THE GREAT WAR AND THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS—THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND THE NEW NATIONS—THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF ITS WORK—THE GROWTH AND INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE—NEW AND OLD

CHAPTER XXIII

THE NEW GROUPING OF THE POWERS AND THE POSITION OF ENGLAND —THE BALKAN WARS

To an Englishman in particular the opening of the twentieth century will always remain one of the most memorable points in his national history. Its first year was the last in the reign of the queen who had filled the throne longer than any other sovereign and filled it with such dignity and through a series of such stirring and successful events that her name became at once, and even before she died, the description

of an epoch. She died, too, in the midst of a war which, though by no means one of the most glorious in our annals, proved, as we saw in the last chapter, a turning-point in the direction of our foreign policy. Immediately after her death, Great Britain, breaking her rule of not forming alliances except for definite and temporary purposes, entered into one with Japan, thus giving the first example to the world of co-operation on equal terms between East and West. Soon —in 1904—the alliance with Japan was followed by an understanding with France, in framing which Queen Victoria's successor, Edward VII, gave his hearty and efficient support.

King Edward VII, who had always been specially interested in international affairs and enjoyed the society of foreign sovereigns and statesmen, began at once to cultivate friendships for Great Britain by visiting capitals abroad, with representatives of the Foreign Office in his suite. He was already sixty years of age, and throughout his reign—till 1910—he continued the same practice of promoting peace by personal interviews with the heads of states, supported by diplomatic advisers. In this way he visited Italy, France, Spain, Austria, Germany, Portugal, and, though he did not go to the capital of Russia, he met the Tsar Nicholas II in his yacht off Reval with the same view of smoothing over difficulties and building up understandings all round. It is true that he was least successful with Germany, where personal jealousies between him and his nephew the Kaiser increased rather than abated the national tension. But it is not true that he wished in any way to exclude or isolate Germany, and it is as plain as daylight from his life and letters, as well as from the official papers of British Foreign Ministers, that the consuming desire of all concerned was to bring every one into a circle of friendship.

The first result of this peacemaking policy was the

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Entente Cordiale of 1904. In that year, after a visit of the king to Paris and a return visit of the French president to London, two agreements between France and England were drawn up, the first concerning Egypt and Morocco, the second about Newfoundland. In the first France recognised England's predominant position in Egypt and undertook to support her there instead of opposing as before. In return for this, England recognised the special interest of France in Morocco. It was the latter part of this agreement which was soon to prove a touchstone of the Entente. The second agreement put an end to the "Treaty Shore" on Newfoundland, which had been a bone of contention ever since the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. France gave up her right to erect fishermen's huts and workshops on the north-eastern and north-western coast of Newfoundland, and the "oldest English colony" became at last mistress in her own house. In return for this, England ceded a piece of Gambia in West Africa to France. These two agreements were the formal groundwork, the skeleton, of the Entente Cordiale, and round them in the next ten years grew up all the understandings and common plans which made co-operation possible when the Great War came. A curious result of our new peacemaking policy occurred in the Russo-Japanese war, which began in the same year in which we entered the Entente Cordiale. France was already allied to Russia, and we had formed an alliance with Japan two years before. Now war was raging between our ally and the ally of the Power with which we had formed a friendly agreement. But King Edward was pressing on his policy of agreements all round. Between Great Britain and Russia this had always seemed specially difficult to reach, because our differences with Russia were so many and so widespread, and to many keen Englishmen it was not even desirable to make friends while the government of Russia was in auto-

cratic hands and cruel repression was still going on. But there was hope just then of a peaceful constitutional system in Russia ; the first of the Dumas had met in 1906.* And so in 1907 the Triple Entente was completed by a series of agreements between Russia and England. These dealt with Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, and the general purport was that the two countries should not compete with each other for political influence. In the case of Persia, agreement was reached by a process of carving up the country in question. England and Russia marked out spheres of influence in Persia which left the Persians very little which they could call their own. This was an added cause of the unpopularity of the agreement with those English people who had opposed the Boer War and wished to see the rights of foreign nations scrupulously respected, even if they were too weak to assert them by force. The encroachment in this case has since been withdrawn as a result of the Great War.

With the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907, the re-grouping of the Powers became practically complete, and they stood as they were to stand in the Great War, except for Italy. And Italy being but loosely tied to the Triple Alliance and on the best of terms with us, it was impossible to believe that she would go to war on the side of the Austrians, backed by Germany, while numbers of Italians were still unwillingly under Austrian rule. Hence Italy, with whom England has never been at war, might be safely counted among the friends whom the new policy had brought round us at last.

In reviewing these early incidents in the twentieth century, one thinks and talks all the time as if the coming

* It was about this Russian Parliament that Campbell-Bannerman's famous exclamation was made in the House of Commons. It was soon dissolved by the Tsar, and, on the news reaching London, the British Prime Minister exclaimed, "La Duma est morte ! Vive la Duma !"

conflict were inevitable, as if the Great War were already a settled thing. It is impossible to avoid this, although we know, on a moment's reflection, that it was not really the case, no war being inevitable until it has begun. But it is important to remember that to the people and statesmen who witnessed and took part in these events—certainly to the vast mass of English people—the prospect at the time was not of war but of securing peace. In this King Edward was most at one with his subjects ; it was the hope of avoiding continual disputes which might, in modern conditions of alliances and international communications, soon become world-wide, that reconciled men to agreements, such as that with Russia, to which there were many obvious objections. They wished this spirit of conciliation to spread and had always supported proposals for arbitration and such a plan as the Hague Peace Conference, which met in 1899 on the invitation of the Tsar. Still armaments went on mounting up, and for this there were two principal causes. The first was the Franco-Prussian war which made conscription and vast military establishments the rule of Europe. The second was the naval competition between Germany and England, of which we saw the origin in the last chapter, and for which many attempts were made before the war to find a remedy. Germany, however, pressed on, rather at an increasing than a diminishing speed, and those from time to time in charge of English policy felt bound to make a corresponding reply.

Meanwhile, the new grouping of the Powers was beginning to have its international effect.

After the agreement with England in 1904, France began her " penetration " of Morocco. It was the price for which we had bought the undisturbed control of Egypt, but it had been paid without the consent or even the previous consultation of Germany. In March, 1905, the Kaiser William appeared off Tangier in his yacht and there delivered

a speech, in which he spoke of the independence of Morocco, but, more emphatically, of safeguarding the interests of Germany. It was no surprise to see the Kaiser appear anywhere and make a speech. Twice he had been to Constantinople ; the first great ruler in Christendom to become the guest of the Sultan. And on his second visit in 1898, the recent massacres of the Armenians—as terrible and more widespread than those of the Bulgarians—had made the name of Abdul Hamid a byeword to the rest of Europe. The Kaiser went, however, and from Constantinople passed on to Jerusalem where he dedicated a church and made a speech. The novelty and the danger of the Tangier visit was that he used his favourite methods of the "Reise-Kaiser"* to intervene in a diplomatic dispute. The incident, however, passed off harmlessly. A Conference of all the Powers was held next year at Algeçiras, a watering-place on the Spanish coast near Gibraltar. At this conference an Act was agreed to by which the Sultan of Morocco was declared independent and his country open to the commerce of all nations. So far, although his methods were odd, the Kaiser might seem to have won his point and done good service to other people. But things did not work out according to the Conference plan. The Sultan of Morocco could not keep his own dominions in order for the passage of the commerce which industrial Europe was eager to provide. The country was torn by civil war and brigands were rife. In 1911 he applied to France, who was his neighbour in Algiers to the east, to send a force and help him. France, still cherishing her own plans for Morocco and relying both on her agreement with England and on seven years of the Entente, gave notice to the Powers who had signed the Algeçiras Act, and dispatched a small force to Fez, the chief city of Morocco. This was the beginning of the French occupation of Morocco,

* This was a German nickname = "Travel Kaiser."

which has led since the Great War to a long and difficult campaign in Morocco in which Spain has also taken part. It has ended in our own days by a division of spheres between Spain and France and an international commission for Tangier, which is on the coast nearly opposite to Gibraltar.

In 1911, however, the French action, followed by the German retort, brought the world nearer to a European war than it had ever been since 1871. Germany made no objection in April when the French expedition was announced, but in July a gunboat—the famous *Panther*—and a cruiser were sent to the Moroccan harbour of Agadir, as a direct challenge to France. The action was much more serious than the Kaiser's trip to Tangier, for this time the Paris Foreign Office were informed and a speech made by the new German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that Germany was determined to show that she could protect her subjects as well as France. The whole Moroccan question was thus re-opened by Germany, and without consulting England ; for, though France was informed, Great Britain was not, and hence the German action was in the first place a direct naval threat to France. Still more, however, was it the first serious test of the strength of our understanding with France. The new naval power which had been built up, avowedly in our despite, was now to be used to coerce the friends with whom we had been on intimate and cordial terms for seven years. Viewing the matter thus, the British government, through the mouth of Mr. Lloyd George, declared on the 21st of July at the Mansion House that they were not prepared to stand aside. There were certain things that no great country could endure, even at the price of peace.

It was the first time that the average Englishman realised that war was actually possible as a result of the general international position into which we had gradually been

drawn. It was the first time that Germany realised, or might have realised, that the Triple Entente which had come into existence to balance the Triple Alliance, would hold together in war as it had in peace. The demonstration of Anglo-French solidarity was on this occasion sufficient. The coast of Morocco was a part of the world where sea-power would be decisive, and the French and English fleets united would have been irresistible. Besides, in the remote and weakly defended regions of Central Africa, there was land enough which might be handed over to a European competitor as compensation, without arousing the opposition of any other Power strong enough to object in force. And so the quarrel was made up. A reasonably large slice of the French Congo was ceded to Germany, which, with some territory in the Cameroon district, could be presented to the German public as equivalent for their retreat from Morocco. The defeat was, however, keenly felt in Berlin and stored up as material and cause for taking another line on the next occasion. This was to occur in a widely distant region where it was less easy to accommodate the conflicting interests. To this we must now turn.

We saw that by the Treaty of Berlin Turkey had been further dismembered; Russia, though she had fought an exhausting war in the process, had been baulked of her prey, and two Turkish provinces, Bosnia and Herzegovina, had, by the joint action of England and Germany, been put under the actual, though not nominal, control of Austria. She was to "administer" them, though the "sovereignty" still remained with the Porte. Such an arrangement contained, of course, all the elements needed for future wars. The long-simmering cauldron overflowed at last in the summer of 1908. In the first place, the more active and discontented subjects of the Sultan rose against him. They first compelled him to revive the constitution which he had

promised in 1876. They seized all the public officers, and when Abdul Hamid showed plainly that he meant still to play for his own hand, they deposed and deported him and set up a puppet Sultan of their own. This was the revolution of the "Young Turks" which was hailed by many liberals in Europe as the beginning of a real regeneration of the Turkish Empire. The change was, however, like so many revolutions in the world, the mere substitution of one set of scheming despots for another, and no reliable improvement took place either in the internal government or the foreign policy of the country. Meanwhile, all the disjointed and ambitious fragments of the empire began at once to take advantage of the disturbance at the centre. In October of the same year Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed himself independent and assumed the title of "Tsar," and in the same month Austria announced that she intended to annex outright Bosnia and Herzegovina which she had been given to administer. Both of these acts were breaches of the Treaty of Berlin to which all the Great Powers had given their assent. The first, however, made but little stir, and when the now independent Bulgaria offered to take over some small part of the old Turkish debt, even the Young Turks were fain to acquiesce. But with Bosnia and Austria it was otherwise. Here a grave affront was given both to a small and ambitious Power and to a Great Power standing in the background. The Bosnians were blood brothers of the Serbs, and Serbia looked forward to uniting them some day in a Greater Serbia which would embrace also Montenegro and a large part of Macedonia, still to be reclaimed. The action of Austria cut right across these plans and foreshadowed a further extension of the Austrian Empire which would exclude the Serbians for all time from access to the sea. The Great Power behind was Russia, just defeated by Japan in Eastern waters. She was weakened, but looked with all the

more disgust at the fresh blow which was dealt her, without any compensation, by her chief rival in the Balkans. The Tsar Nicholas II would have gladly taken up arms on behalf of Serbia, but he was warned that the position was hopeless. For the Kaiser made now, on behalf of Austria, the same gesture of solidarity that England made three years later on behalf of France. He announced in a speech that if his "august ally"—the Emperor Francis Joseph—were compelled to draw the sword, a "knight in shining armour" would be found at his side. Take these two threats together—the Kaiser's in 1908, and England's in 1911—and you have the genesis of the Great War foreshadowed. In both cases at the moment the offer of assistance to the threatened ally was enough. Russia drew back, and Serbia, under instructions, promised to "live in future on good neighbourly terms with Austria."

But the challenge to the new government in Turkey did not end here. Two years passed by, and then, in 1911, Italy made the attack on Tripoli which was referred to in the last chapter. We can see it now as part of the general movement at this time to divide up the inheritance of the "Sick Man of Europe," dying at last. There was a "scramble" for Turkey, and as the arena was more constricted and the crowd of rivals more determined in their competition and nearer to their base of action, it proved more fatal to the general peace of the world than the "scramble for Africa" of three decades before.

Next year the impossible happened in the Balkans, an alliance of the four Christian states against their common enemy. This led to the First Balkan War of 1912. The occasion was a rising in Albania against the Young Turkish government, which it was unable to put down. The Young Turks had very foolishly tried to impose a new system of law, taxes and military conscription on the Albanian mountaineers

who were largely Mohammedan and natural supporters of a Turkish government. The Albanians resisted Constantinople successfully, and the sight of this encouraged the Christian states—Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro—to make common cause and fall upon the foe while he was sore beset. Besides this, there was the fear that, if they delayed, the Austrians might step in and, using the disturbance in Albania as their pretext, take a long further step towards Salonica and the sea. Working in such a favourable situation, the three prime ministers of Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia were able to draw up a convention to be presented to the Turks, demanding reforms in Macedonia. No doubt M. Venizelos, the prime minister of Greece, who has just now (1928) returned to power after a long absence, must take the chief credit for the achievement, so right and natural in itself, with a Balkan Switzerland as the goal, so long delayed and difficult as to be thought a miracle when it came.

This Macedonian question, on which the Balkan allies were now going to war, was, and still remains, the great unsettled question in the Near East. Macedonia had become in two thousand years, as an Italian writer has put it, a "perfect ethnographical museum," into which the fragments of a multitude of different races and civilisations had been dumped. There were many Greeks in the districts nearest to Greece, and Bulgars near Bulgaria and Serbs near Serbia. But unfortunately these were so scattered that it was impossible to draw boundary lines which would assign the appropriate people to their right state. And throughout the whole there were scattered Mohammedans preferring Turkish rule and ill at peace with their Christian neighbours, while the city of Salonica with a large colony of Jews was a tempting bait for a landlocked power like Austria, eager for an outlet to the sea. It is not surprising that so distracted a region was the

best home in Europe for bandits and massacres and inter-village feuds.

The Turks rejected the demand for autonomy in Macedinia under a Christian governor, and fighting began in October 1912. The victory of the allies was as complete and unexpected to the diplomatists of Europe as was the union between them which had brought it about. Attacked on four fronts at the same moment, the Turks gave way all round, and before the end of November they had lost the great battle of Lule Burgas to the Bulgarians, 40,000 men as prisoners to the Serbs, and were defending Constantinople behind the lines of Chatalja. The Greeks had taken Salonica, which they have held ever since, and the Turkish flag was driven from the Ægean, which remained to be disputed between the Greeks and the Italians who had made captures of some of the islands in their earlier war. The results of the war were so overwhelming that both the victorious allies and the Great Powers who had been looking on, were caught without a plan for a permanent settlement well thought out and agreed upon beforehand. The victors began to quarrel, and Austria, whose ambitions suffered most by the victories of the Serbian Slavs south-east, proclaimed at once that Serbia must not extend her sway over Albania where already their flag was waving at Durazzo on the Adriatic. In this opposition to a Serbian Adriatic, Austria had the hearty support of Italy as well as Germany. France and England would not fight on such an issue, and Russia had again to yield as she had done in 1908. This was conclusive so far as Serbia and Austria were concerned, but left unsettled the more deadly question between Serbia and Greece on the one hand and Bulgaria on the other. If Serbia was to be baulked of her acquisitions in Albania, she felt it intolerable that Bulgaria should carry off the far larger share which she had gained by her advance almost to the walls of Constantinople. In this

Greece stood beside her, and from this arose the Second Balkan War, in which the victorious allies were ranged against one another.

The Second Balkan War was a calamity which brought the Great War palpably nearer and showed how the letting loose of fierce animosities, even in a small area, is incompatible in the modern world with a general ideal of peace. Unfortunately, in 1913 as in 1914, instead of restraining the combatants, the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin looked on encouragingly. Russia pressed, almost imposed, arbitration, which Serbia was willing to accept. The other Great Powers, at Austro-German instigation, proclaimed a policy of non-intervention, though the case was clearly one in which intervention in the interest of peace was called for. Already since the Great War the League of Nations has intervened in more than one similar case with ease and success. Instead of this, through wicked instigation and almost equally criminal apathy, in June 1913, the Bulgarian army fell upon the Greeks and Serbs without warning, and while at certain outposts Bulgarians and Serbs were still fraternising and cooking their suppers together. It was a military coup of the most barbarous kind, devised in cold blood, and Bulgaria paid bitterly for it. She was completely defeated by the Greeks and Serbs, all the old race hatreds of the Balkans were fanned again into flame, and, while Bulgaria was lying prostrate under the blows of her late allies, Rumania embraced the opportunity of descending on her from the north and seizing the strip of territory called the Dobrudja, with the fortress of Silistria.

With Bulgaria helpless before them, the other Balkan Powers then made peace at Bucharest, the capital of Rumania. Having gained their price, the Rumanians were content to act as moderators of the other victorious allies. Bulgaria was allowed to make a small gain of territory as compared with her

boundaries before the First Balkan War. Serbia and Greece between them nearly doubled their area. Greece was the greatest gainer, having added Crete and many islands to her realm besides the coast and town of Salonica.

The Treaty of Bucharest was signed a year—almost to a day—before the Great War broke out. The Great Powers, who had looked on while the tragedy was accomplished, were then plunged by very similar causes into the far greater catastrophe of 1914. In each case one may make bold to say, as was said of the Franco-Prussian War and might have been said of many others, that, so far as any human prediction can come near to certainty, had there been a League of Nations in the world in those years neither war would have taken place. The Second Balkan War would have afforded a minor case, difficult but quite capable of adjustment. And had it already begun, with that treacherous attack of the Bulgarians, before the League had been informed, Bulgaria would have been compelled to retire and pay a very substantial indemnity.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE WORLD WAR

The war of 1914–1918 must always remain a landmark in history. It was unique when it occurred, and as it is the hope of mankind that it may remain unique, the curiosity of students of the past will steadily increase as to its causes. How came it about that all the leading nations of the world, and many of the smaller, allowed themselves to be drawn into a conflict from which they only emerged with difficulty and in which they lost men and possessions of all kinds unparalleled in the human record? What we may say on the subject here can only be an imperfect anticipation of what the researches and reflections of many generations in the future will do more adequately. Yet no one writing or thinking about these times can avoid some provisional conclusions, and enough has been said already in previous chapters to suggest the answer which appears with our present knowledge to be nearest to the truth. We will summarise this briefly before proceeding to a short sketch of the actual events.

Throughout the nineteenth century there had been a growing competition among the strongest nations of the West for territorial and commercial expansion all over the globe. This competition had never become subordinated, as it should be, to an ideal and policy aiming at the general good. Such an ideal and policy had often been dreamt of,

but never embodied in an organisation, until the League of Nations was set up after the war to reconcile and restrain the dangerous rivalry. Hence there were constantly breaking out sharp conflicts, sometimes leading to war, sometimes settled by mutual concessions. Into this arena there entered in the latter part of the century a new competitor, Germany, very ably led and very strong in its manpower and internal resources. Unfortunately, the new Power started its course of expansion with a deep and unreconciled cleft between itself and its nearest neighbour, France. The war of 1870, which took away by force two of the best provinces of France, firmly united by two centuries of peaceful association, had never been forgotten, and in all the reconciliations which took place before the Great War, there had never been a reconciliation between France and Germany. It is quite possible that this might ultimately have been arranged, had it not been for the challenge, deliberately issued and supported by strong nationalist feeling by Germany against England, the one Power which was in a position to compose the quarrel. The naval challenge to England which Germany developed at the end of the century threw England on to the other side, against Germany, in the combinations which were constantly being made and remade among the competing Powers. In the unstable condition which thus prevailed, another quarrel arose, in a distant and highly inflammable part of Europe—the Balkan peninsula—which drew in at once one of the leading competitors for power. Through the system of alliances which had arisen, the backers of the respective sides were soon involved and then the whole mass was in a blaze.

It must not be thought, however, that the world was all expecting war in July 1914. On the contrary, there was a lull after the Second Balkan War, and quite well-informed people, especially in England, France and the United States,

were saying that the danger of a serious war had passed away. The fact was that the danger, for the moment, had been driven below the surface, and it was chiefly rife in Germany and perhaps still more in Austria. Austria and Germany had been hoping for the success of Bulgaria in the last war, and the sweeping victory of Serbia had been a severe disappointment, especially to the cabinet in Vienna. Serbia and her neighbouring, friendly Slavs, were the obsession of those men, as England had become more and more to the Kaiser and the aggressive thinkers in Germany. But there were others in Germany, including the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, who were working all the time against great odds to keep down the war spirit and promote a better understanding.

The match which kindled the conflagration was applied in the Balkan region, where the material was most inflammable. Old Francis Joseph, the Emperor of Austria, was clearly near his end, and his nephew and heir, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was beginning to make official visits to various parts of the empire over which he was expected soon to rule. Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia, was a place where the government thought that it was very desirable that he should go, but neither in Vienna nor in Serajevo were any proper precautions taken to protect him and his wife on their visit on the 28th of June. The omission was so extraordinary that all sorts of rumours and explanations got afloat afterwards to account for it.* What actually happened was simple and terrible. Two revolutionary youths of Serbian blood, but not living in Serbia, had plotted the murder of the imperial visitors and succeeded in the second attempt. One threw a bomb before the archduke's reception in the City

* It will be understood that every incident in the story and the negotiations which followed has been examined in a multitude of books. One of the latest and most vivid is W. S. Davis' *Europe since Waterloo*, an American account.

Hall, which the archduke managed to avoid. The other caught his carriage in a narrow place as he was leaving the function, and killed both him and his wife. The murder excited the greatest horror and consternation all over Europe. The House of Commons passed a motion of condolence. The parliament of Belgrade expressed their profound regret. But unfortunately the government in Vienna was in the hands of men, especially of the Chancellor Berchtold, who were determined to use the event to force a war on Serbia, if it was in any way possible. They hated and feared Serbia in much the same way as the conspirators hated and feared Austria and the archduke, and here was an opportunity to punish and humble Serbia and make it impossible for her ever to raise her head against Austria in future. The one condition necessary was to obtain a promise of full support from Germany, *i.e.* the Kaiser, before any hostile steps were taken. This they secured at once. Francis Joseph was persuaded to write, in his own trembling hand, a letter to William explaining the need of dealing drastically with Serbia, and this was delivered personally to the Kaiser before he sat down to lunch on the 5th of July. Immediately after lunch he had a talk with the ambassador who had presented the letter, and assured him that in this, as in all other cases, Austria might rely on the full support of Germany. Action should not be delayed, though Russia might be hostile. He would regret if they did not make use of the present moment which was all in their favour.

In the strength of this assurance, the Austrian government drew up a note to Serbia in such terms that it was practically impossible for Serbia to accept it and still remain an independent country. Serbia was to suppress all papers inciting to "hatred and contempt of Austria." She was to dissolve the Pan-Serbist society and dismiss all officers guilty of propaganda against Austria, and accept in Serbia the

collaboration of representatives of the Austrian government. This was delivered to the Serbian government in Belgrade on the evening of the 23rd of July, and only forty-eight hours were allowed for a reply. It was intended as an ultimatum and treated as such by the Austrian government. An answer was sent, accepting almost the whole of the extravagant demands and making only a few reservations. This was received as a refusal and war declared by Austria on the 28th.

The "Twelve Days" of which so much has been said and written, were those between the delivery of the Austrian note and the 4th of August, when Great Britain entered the war against Germany. They were the fullest and most excited in the history of diplomacy. Russia this time felt herself bound to support Serbia, and the utmost efforts were put forth, especially on the part of England and Sir Edward Grey, then Foreign Secretary, to obtain a conference, a postponement of the declaration of war, anything which would prevent the universal conflict which, if Russia went in, taking France with her, seemed more and more inevitable. All these failed. The Kaiser at the last moment made a futile effort to restrain Russia from taking action, but as Austria had already begun its war against Serbia, and Russia had declared from the first that she could not stand by and see Serbia overwhelmed, it was impossible to "localise" the fighting, and the only course would have been for all the Powers, including both Germany and Russia, to unite and forbid the Austro-Serbian war to proceed. This Germany had ruled out by her initial encourageAment to ustria to do what she wshed, with as little delay as possible. Great Britain was the last of the Great Powers (except Italy) to join in. Her interests were so much bound up with those of France that she would no doubt have been compelled in any case to come to her assistance when pressed. But the entrance of England was actually due to the German deter-

mination to invade France through Belgium. On this point—the neutrality of Belgium—England, as well as Prussia and Austria, had signed a European treaty in 1839. This undertaking had always been considered so sacred and important that in 1870, at the time of the Franco-Prussian war, Gladstone had renewed it, and the Prussian forces then kept their word. This time everything was thrown to the winds in order to secure a speedy victory over France, before turning to the Russian hosts which were preparing more slowly to invade Germany from the east. On the point of Belgium, the last passionate conversation took place between the British ambassador in Berlin and the German Chancellor. The Chancellor affected to treat the Belgian treaty as a " scrap of paper " which could not weigh with a great nation in a moment of life or death. This attitude finally united the whole English people in support of war, and war was declared at midnight on the 4th of August, three days after Germany had already begun her attack on France.

The war lasted till the 11th of November, 1918, three months and a bit over four years. Before its close all the countries of the world had become involved, except Mexico, Spain, the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland, and many of these, as time went on, suffered as much in the dislocation of their trade and other ways as some of the combatants themselves. It was therefore, really as well as nominally, a World War, but it is interesting to note that it ended, where it began in real earnest, in the fight between France and Germany on the north-eastern frontiers of France. We saw that it was the unhealed breach between those two countries which had kept the world divided, and it was not till the conflict had been decided, on that frontier, in favour of France, with the help of English and American troops, and with the English navy in the background, that the war was over. All the rest—the breaking up of the Austrian and Turkish

empires, the loss of the German colonies, the enlargement of Italy—were from the military point of view subordinate. Germany held out until she was completely broken on her western frontier, where she had made her first assault and where her most inveterate enemy was to be met. The importance of this consideration will become clearer when we review the various treaties and agreements which were found necessary to bring Europe into a state of peace when the war was over.

We must give in brief outline the chief operations of the war, and then summarise the results.

The two most important actions were those which opened and concluded the German attack between Belgium and Paris. The first is commonly called the "Battle of the Marne," and took place in August, 1914; the last might, with almost equal justice, be called the Second Battle of the Marne, and took place from July, 1918, onwards, till the Germans were broken and asked for an armistice. In the First Battle of the Marne the Germans had pressed on to within twenty miles of Paris with the British Expeditionary Force holding them on their right flank. Having allowed them to reach that point, the French general, Joffre, threw out a fresh army which he had been assembling for the purpose, stayed their advance and compelled a retreat to the line of the River Aisne, along which, roughly speaking, the opposing forces were stabilised in a long line of trenches, reaching from the sea-coast just west of Ostend to the frontiers of Switzerland. They so maintained themselves, making advances here and there, and consuming millions of lives and property for four years, till the Second Battle of the Marne, when Foch was in command of the united forces—French, British and American—and drove back the now exhausted German troops after their last desperate advance on Paris. The first Marne saved Paris, the second ended the war.

But, when simplifying the matter thus, we must not forget, (1) That the intervening period, with its hundreds of miles of trenches, the colossal forces both of men and ammunition, the new machines and methods of war was something quite unexampled in history. (2) That all the time gigantic operations were going on in other parts of the world, which would each have constituted a great war in itself, had not the chief centre of the conflict been on the Belgian frontier.

The best plan will be to take the Russian attack first, then Serbia and Bulgaria, then Turkey and the British attempt to force the Dardanelles, then Palestine and the Middle East, and lastly the American intervention, due to the German policy of submarine warfare.

At the beginning of the war the French and English built great hopes on what was called the Russian "steam-roller." While it was felt that it might be difficult for the less numerous French and the inexperienced British troops to make much way in the west against the German military machine, every one hoped that the multitudes of the Russians in the east would prove irresistible ; and this was also the chief anxiety of the Germans. It was because, by joining the French, we had laid them open to the Russian attack that the Germans felt so bitterly against us and sang their "Hymn of Hate." At first something of the sort happened. The Russians began to advance through Eastern Prussia, and their activity on that side did much to occupy the Germans and enable the Belgian army to settle down on its lines along the River Yser, and the French and English to consolidate their trenches. But very soon the internal weakness of Russia began to show itself, and before the general peace the whole imperial system had broken down, the Tsar had abdicated (in 1917), and the new Bolshevik government had concluded a separate peace with Germany. The first great set-back to Russia was dealt by General Hindenburg, now the Presi-

dent of the German Republic, at Tannenberg, in a four days' battle at the end of August, while the French and English were holding back the western German armies from Paris. After Tannenberg, where some hundred thousand Russians were destroyed or made prisoners among the Masurian Lakes, the Germans had no more fear of them. But they held out for many months in the Austrian part of the battle-front. In April and May of 1915, a grand attack of Germans and Austrians combined, under one of the ablest German generals, Mackensen, drove the Russians out of Galicia, and put out of action about a million men. It was in these battles that the Tsar's empire was broken. Men were mown down by the thousand without the protection of any ammunition, and the Russian peasant was prepared by such an experience to abandon the war and its Western connections. The Russian armies were equipped again, and it will always be remembered in England that it was in connection with their re-equipment that Lord Kitchener lost his life at sea in June, 1916. They fought doggedly for many months. In 1917 came the Bolshevik revolution which severed the last link between Russia and the "capitalistic" West. In March, 1918, the new rulers of Russia made the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany which lost to Russia its Baltic lands and all claim to Poland and left the Germans free to throw their whole forces on their western front and to the assistance of Austria. From then onwards it was clearer than ever that the decisive stroke must be delivered on the soil of France where the Americans were then gathering to secure success.

In the autumn of 1915, Serbia was overwhelmed at the hands of the same general, Mackensen, who had defeated the Russians in Galicia. Turkey had joined the Germans in October, 1914, but it was still hoped for many months that Bulgaria might be prevented from taking the same

side. Rival diplomatists argued with the Bulgarian government in Sofia. But their Tsar Ferdinand was a German, and his will prevailed. In the summer of 1915, the British Expedition to Gallipoli was abandoned and with it the hope of saving Serbia. She had been restrained by the Allies from attacking Bulgaria till it was too late, and was now exposed to an attack both from the strong German army under Mackensen and the Bulgarians on their flank. The Greeks refused Serbia the aid which they had bound themselves by treaty to give and threw over Venizelos who urged them to keep their word. For this betrayal Constantine, who had married a sister of the Kaiser, was mainly responsible. The attitude of Greece and Bulgaria combined left the unhappy Serbians to be swept away by the advancing flood. The remnant—some 100,000 half-frozen and destitute men—who had escaped through the mountains of Albania to the coast, were taken off in December by Allied ships and deposited in Corfu.

The second year of the war contained, indeed, its most terrible tragedies. It saw not only the massacre of Russians and the extinguishment of Serbia, but the failure of the Gallipoli expedition, which was the most brilliant idea thrown up by British brains for bringing the war to an early conclusion. Turkey had joined the Germans in October 1914. To force the Dardanelles would have put Turkey out of the war, decided the wavering Balkan states, released the flow of South Russian wheat and enabled France and England to pour in arms and men for Russia on the eastern front. This was the policy of Mr. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, and most critics are now agreed that every effort should have been made to bring it to success. The Turkish forces at the Straits were, when the attack began, so weak and ill provided that a comparatively small force of French and English, thrown in at once, would

certainly have mastered them. This was not done ; and it is no part of our short sketch to attempt to allocate the blame. An attack on the forts was made from sea and was partially successful. Three battleships, however, were sunk by mines, and then, instead of perseverance, the plan was changed and men were landed outside on the western side of the peninsula. But this plan, too, was pursued so slowly that the Turks, under a very able German general, were given time to consolidate their position and increase their forces. After terrific and most heroic fighting, in which over a hundred thousand men were killed or put out of action, our whole army was withdrawn and the attempt given up by the beginning of 1916. The chance was thus lost of saving Russia and shortening the war by about two years.

Meanwhile, in October, 1915, an Anglo-French army was landed at Salonica, with the connivance of the Greeks, and Salonica instead of the Bosphorus became the centre from which, during the last three years of the war, the Allied operations in the Near East were conducted. It could not prevent the overthrow of Serbia or the entrance of Bulgaria into the war on the German side. But, as time went on and the enemy were worn down, it grew stronger, and its advance in the last period of all was the beginning of the end. For in September, 1918, with the Greeks finally mobilised on the Allied side by Venizelos, a composite army under a French commander attacked and defeated the Bulgarians and compelled them to surrender.

Turkey had been attacked mainly by Great Britain farther east. There were two main lines of operation ; one from Egypt and the Suez Canal along the coast into Palestine ; the other from the Persian Gulf through Mesopotamia. The former, in the hands of Allenby, attained the most brilliant success on the British side during the war. In September and October of the last year of the war, Palestine

was conquered and the Turks defeated at their great base of Aleppo in northern Syria. As by this time the Mesopotamian campaign had also come to a successful end and the temporary British reverse at Kut had been made good, Turkey sued for peace soon after Bulgaria. Thus, though Germany had to be beaten in France before the war could end, the break began, where the war began, on the eastern front.

Italy, which had not been consulted as to the events which produced the war, had from the first declared herself quite free from obligation to assist her allies of the Triple Alliance. The alliance was, so far as she was concerned, for defence alone, and neither she was attacked nor were her allies Germany and Austria who had begun the war. Her sympathies and interests, in fact, were all on the other side, for had the Austrian attack succeeded, the Adriatic would have become an Austrian lake. Germany made the utmost efforts to hold her in, by inducing Austria to offer her much of the coveted territory where Italians lived and which was still under Austrian rule. This was mostly the Trentino and lands at the head of the Adriatic sea. The question was long debated in Italy, but the party for war on the Allied side won the day. In April, 1915, just as the Russians were being driven back in Galicia, Italy came in. She was promised in a secret Treaty of London far more than the Germans had been willing to give, more indeed than the Allies found they could give themselves, when the settlement had to be made in 1919.

The war as fought by Italy was the most romantic, costly and difficult part of the whole. They scaled precipices, bridged ravines, and faced rocks and ice-slopes as threatening as the Austrians who were descending from above. The army, too, was more divided in its mind about the issues of the war than any other of the Allies. The country also was

far behind the other western nations in the material equipment which had become the decisive factor in the long-drawn-out struggle. She lacked coal and great industries, and through all these causes suffered more in proportion to her strength and had to receive more help from France and England. In October, 1917, at Caporetto on the Isonzo, she suffered the worst defeat inflicted by the Germans and Austrians combined in all the western theatre of war. Six French and five British divisions were sent across the Alps, and Foch and many others—statesmen and generals—hastened to Italy to help the recovery. It was made good on the River Piave, where a fresh Italian general rallied the troops and the nation rallied behind them. Exactly a year afterwards, this general, Diaz, who had by then made sure of his position, advanced again, and this time the Italians won as complete a victory as Caporetto had been a defeat. Thus the Italians broke the remaining strength of Austria just at the moment of the Bulgarian and Turkish collapse.

To Great Britain and the United States, who bore between them the chief financial burden of the war, it appeared primarily as an attack on their means of subsistence, their power at sea, their freedom to trade by sea. Just as it was the German challenge to our naval power which finally alienated us from them, so the challenge of the submarine drove America to join the Allies in April 1917. Woodrow Wilson, who was to become world-famous in the Peace Conference at Versailles and the foundation of the League of Nations, had become President of the United States in 1913. He had no previous experience of international affairs nor any programme for international problems. When the war broke out, he besought his countrymen to remain not only neutral in act but "impartial in thought." The phrase was difficult for Americans to digest at the moment when German troops were violating Belgium and committing acts reprobated in

any previous war. But the President persisted, though he protested formally to the German government against the "war-zone" which had been proclaimed in the Ocean round the British Isles. On the 7th of May, 1915, the Cunard liner *Lusitania*, with nearly 2000 souls on board, was, deliberately and without warning, sunk off the south Irish coast by two torpedoes from a German submarine. The great majority of the passengers were drowned, including many American women and children. She had a small amount of ammunition in the hold, but was quite unarmed and in no sense a man of war. This was hailed by the Germans as a naval victory over Great Britain, but in the United States, beside the horror, it merely raised the question, "How long can we afford to remain neutral?" This question was answered in 1917, in the only way which most men thought possible at once. The interval was filled by a series of protesting notes, leading in January 1917, to a formal notice from the German ambassador to the United States, stating that from the next day, in a wide ocean area around Britain, France and Italy all navigation, including that of neutrals, would be "forcibly prevented." A single American steamer once a week was to be permitted to come to Falmouth if it was "painted with three vertical stripes, one metre wide, alternately white and red." The privilege of the "ship striped like a barber's pole" added the insult of a bad joke to the injury of loss of American lives, ships and merchandise which had been going on steadily for two years. But things had changed at last. Wilson had been elected for a second term of office; and fresh from the polls, and with the support of the non-interventionists behind him, he felt strong enough to act. On the 9th of January, the Kaiser signed a "strictly secret" order that the "unrestricted submarine war be started with full energy on the 1st of February." On the 3rd of February, the German ambas-

sador in Washington received his passports and left at once. The last straw was the discovery of a note sent during January to the German minister in Mexico instructing him to prepare for an alliance with that country. Germany would finance Mexico, and in return she would arrange a Japanese attack on the United States and the reconquest for herself of the territories she had lost to the United States in New Mexico, Texas and Arizona. Then in March the President called Congress together for a solemn sitting. It was the occasion on which he launched his most oft-repeated motto for the ending of the war. He had done his utmost to preserve neutrality and bring the combatants together on tolerable terms. Now the "world must be made safe for democracy," by America throwing her own weight into the balance. The bill authorising a state of war thereupon passed both Congress and Senate by an almost unanimous vote, and the proclamation was issued from the White House immediately after. Germany in her desperation had lost all sense of reality. She discounted to the last the chance of American intervention, which, when it came, with its enormous man-power and unlimited resources, made the triumph of the Allies not only certain but near at hand. It would have come even sooner had not the United States to improvise her fighting machine almost from the beginning. The first help she could give to the fighting forces was by sea. Six American destroyers steamed into Queenstown harbour on the 4th of May. It was the "return of the Mayflower," most urgently needed, as the toll taken by the German submarines was rising at a terrifying rate. Nearly a million tons of shipping had been sunk in the month of April alone, and England was within two months of the end of her food supplies.

America first multiplied her ships and safeguarded the passage of supplies. Meanwhile an army was prepared on

a similar scale. Compulsory drafts were levied, and by 1918 over 2,000,000 American soldiers had been safely transported to Europe. Only one other thing was now needed to secure success, and that was unity in the command. This was precipitated by the last great victory which was to fall to the German arms. Under Ludendorff's strong but mechanical command this last assault was delivered in the spring of 1918. It succeeded at first in nearly destroying the whole of the British Fifth Army near the point where the British troops adjoined the French. Amiens was nearly taken, and near Amiens the decision was made to put the entire command in the hands of the greatest of the French generals, Ferdinand Foch, afterwards made Marshal of France. It was under Foch that the final advance took place during the summer months, which reduced the German retreat to a rout before the end of October. Foch fought as an artist in war and a man of faith, and against these forces the German military machine, worked now by men in despair, was bound to yield. The German people had for months suffered privations far beyond anything known on the allied side. They were now utterly wearied of the struggle and of the man who had provoked it. When, at the end of October, the news of the military reverses began to spread, revolts took place on the ships at Kiel and open cries were raised for the abdication of William. Bremen, Hamburg and Lübeck passed into the hands of revolutionists on the 9th of November, and huge red flags began to wave over the public buildings in Berlin. Prince Max of Baden, who had succeeded as a liberal Chancellor shortly before, then announced the abdication of the Kaiser. Ebert, once a saddler, the most moderate of the socialist leaders, was to be proposed as Chancellor, with Prince Max as Regent.

On the 10th of November, while the German Commissioners for an armistice were seeking Foch in the forest of

Compiègne; the Kaiser passed in a motor-car from Spa to Holland and left his kingdom and his native land for ever behind him.

The German surrender was signed at 5 a.m. on the 11th of November, and by eleven o'clock, when the last cannon had thundered, a cheer broke out, four hundred miles long, from the Vosges to the sea. The millions of men who filled those trenches, had heard the news.

CHAPTER XXV

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND THE NEW NATIONS

In January, 1919, the representatives of the "Allied and Associated Powers" met in Versailles to settle the terms of peace. The Germans had already been compelled by the armistice to disarm and evacuate the Rhineland and Alsace-Lorraine. Their fleet was confiscated, the minefields swept clean, and all the Allied prisoners returned. Germany was, however, still kept under a British blockade until the peace was signed. The treatment of the conquered was therefore almost as severe as it was possible to make it, short of the actual occupation of Berlin. The Peace of Versailles followed the same hard lines, and it was complained at the time, not only in Germany, that sufficient regard was not paid to the suggested terms—the Fourteen Points of President Wilson—which had been issued before the surrender. On these vexed questions it is impossible to enter here. It must be held sufficient to summarise the terms to which the Germans were compelled, without amendment, to affix their signature on the 28th of June, 1919, and state which of them it was found practicable to enforce and which had afterwards to be modified to meet the necessities of the case.

For France, and for the humiliation of Germany, it was enough at the moment to remember that this "dictated peace" was signed in the same Hall of Mirrors at Ver-

sailles where, forty-eight years and six months before, the mighty men of Prussia and South Germany had proclaimed William I German Emperor, while France lay bleeding and Paris was starving and still resisting in their rear.

By the Treaty of Versailles Germany was stripped of Alsace and Lorraine, and a small district was ceded to Belgium. Northern Schleswig went back to Denmark, and a new Polish Republic was recognised to which a large part of Upper Silesia and West Prussia was added, with the Polish city of Posen. East Prussia was thus cut off from the rest of Germany by a "Polish Corridor" extending to the Baltic, and the mainly German city of Danzig was constituted as a "Free City," to give the new Poland a door to the sea. The German colonies were all taken away and handed over to France, England, Belgium, and Japan under the system of mandates which we shall have to consider in the next chapter. The German army was not to exceed 1,000,000 nor her fleet six small battleships. A commission was appointed to supervise her disarmament; she was compelled to admit her "war-guilt" in a special clause of the treaty and to pay an enormous but unspecified indemnity spread over a period of thirty years. An International Commission on these reparation-payments was set up, and for at least fifteen years the Rhinelands were to be occupied by French, British, and American troops to ensure the carrying out of the Treaty.

Separate treaties were signed soon after with the other defeated states. That with Turkey concerns us least in this volume, and it was not arrived at until after another war with Greece in which Turkey won back Asia Minor, Constantinople and a bit of the peninsula of Thrace. This Turkish treaty was signed at Lausanne in 1923. With Austria a treaty was signed at St. Germains in September, 1919, and with Hungary at the Trianon in June, 1920.

The net result of these minor treaties was to register the complete destruction of the Austrian Empire and the destruction of three-quarters of the Turkish. Added to the results already achieved by the defeat of Germany and the collapse of Russia, the map of Eastern Europe and the Middle East was almost entirely redrawn. We will speak more fully about these new nations in a moment. So far as Germany is concerned, a few words here may summarise the effects of the war and the peace in the immediate sequel.

The part of the Treaty which was found impracticable was that referring to finance. The statesmen at Versailles pitched their demands too high. Their calculations were ill-founded and they included in legitimate reparations items which should have found no place there. Above all, they did not, perhaps could not, foresee the economic collapse of a large part of Europe, as well as Germany, which entailed the revision of the whole calculation within a few years. German credit disappeared, and in the end financial assistance and advice had to be sought from the United States before Germany could be made to pay even more moderate amounts. This was done by the Dawes Commission, called after its American chairman, whose work falls outside the limits of this book. With this revision the recovery of Germany went on apace. Her industries seem no less flourishing than those of her victorious competitors in Europe, and in 1926 she was received into the League of Nations on an equal footing with the Great Powers who had founded it. She had in the early years some difficulties with revolutionists at home, and the opposition of her extreme parties—the Communists on the Left, and the Nationalists, who would restore the monarchy, on the Right—is sharper than in the other countries of the West. But she has so far weathered the storm safely, and the now aged Hindenburg, who became the hero of his people after the victory of

Tannenberg, has accepted the republic and presided over it with dignity and wisdom for over three years. Both the course and the result of the War are in striking agreement with those main points which were suggested in the Introductory chapter as useful signposts for the study of the nineteenth century. It may be well to recur to them here, before we take up one or two for a concluding review. Running through the whole period, it was pointed out, there is a growing struggle for self-government, what is called the democratic impulse. Side by side with this, and mastering it indeed in many cases, is the impulse of nationality, what President Wilson spread still further in the world under the name of "self-determination." Greater than either, though less obvious in the political annals, is the power of science. And, crowning all, comes the international goal of a world-community to conquer war. Of these four currents the last two will be discussed more fully in the two following chapters. But the World War is notable among all wars by being very largely inspired by all. It was in a threefold sense a war of nations. It was pre-eminently the war which inspired and was fought out by, the resources of science—tanks, aeroplanes, wireless, even poison gas are familiar illustrations. And it was the war which ended in the first practicable experiment of an international political organisation—a League of Nations in being.

But it is the prominence of nationalism in the war and the settlement which is most impressive. The competition of great nations—the French, the German, the Russian and the British—was the driving force : without this the war would have remained local, a fight between a small, proud nationality against it envious and grasping rival. But the world ambitions of the Greater Powers made it world-wide. Then in its course the war was fought out by nations as no war had ever been fought before. In

New States set up after the Great War
Acquisitions of France, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Roumania, Greece and Serbia (Yugo-Slavia) after the Great War
FINLAND
NORWAY
SWEDEN
ESTONIA
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
RUSSIA
Atlantic Ocean
NORTHERN IRELAND
IRISH FREE STATE
SCOTLAND
ENGLAND
WALES
North Sea
DENMARK
Baltic Sea
Danzig
HOLLAND
BELG.
LUXEMBURG
Rhine
GERMANY
POLAND
Dnieper
Don
Dniester
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA
FRANCE
SWITZ.
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
ROUMANIA
Danube
Black Sea
YUGO-SLAVIA (SERBIA)
BULGARIA
TURKEY
ALBANIA
GREECE
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
Corsica
ITALY
Sardinia
Mediterranean
Sicily
Sea
Gibraltar (British)
EUROPE in 1927
English Miles
0 100 200 300 400
Emery Walker Ltd. sc.

each case the whole national force of the combatants was thrown into the struggle when once engaged. Food, manufactures, finance, as well as knowledge and physical strength were all employed to the utmost, and this fact only is the most eloquent proof of the extent and the efficiency with which the nations had organised themselves in the hundred years which intervened between Napoleon and the World War. The results corresponded to the national strength which each community had acquired during the period. England and the United States came out of the combat least damaged as nations, and it was their overwhelming participation which brought victory to the Allied side. This was because they added to their tremendous material resources the strength of an excellent national organisation. Russia succumbed before the end, and would have succumbed still earlier had it not been for the special efforts of her allies to assist her. She had also great material resources and even greater man-power, but she lacked national organisation. Germany had both, and the amazing fight which she was able to sustain against the odds of numbers was due to the splendid organisation which she had developed in the preceding half-century. The same cause produced her equally marvellous recovery after the War. Of France it is more difficult to speak in this connection because from the first she was bound to us in such an intimate way. Her spirit was never broken, and her ideals prevailed in the settlement, but her financial credit, even with Anglo-Saxon backing, was severely shaken.

But it is nationalism in another sense which stands out most clearly in the settlement. Before the War there were eight Great Powers which conducted world affairs, and beside them sixteen lesser states which were taken into account when their interests were affected. The great ones were Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria,

Russia, the United States and Japan. The lesser were Spain, Turkey, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Portugal, Rumania, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and the three tiny states of Luxembourg, Albania and Montenegro. Of these it will be noticed that all except one are in Europe, and the one exception, Turkey, is half in Europe and half outside. After the War the picture is changed more completely than by any other revolution in history. Of the eight Great Powers two—Austria and Russia—have disappeared, and, on the other side, instead of sixteen, forty-seven lesser states have been promoted to recognition, and of these only twenty-two lie in Europe, three are in the Middle East, one in the Far East, and the remaining twenty-one are overseas, five being Dominions of the British Commonwealth, and fifteen, in Central and Southern America, are members of the American Entente.

Two facts stand out in this new arrangement. One, the uprising of the smaller states and the comparative sinking of the greater. The other, that the world, though still centring round the old Roman Empire—the Western civilisation of the Mediterranean—is much less so than it was. More than a half of the new lesser states are outside Europe, and the Pacific comes in as a counterpoise to the Atlantic.

But the catalogue deserves a more minute examination and becomes more and more significant as we analyse it. Of these new lesser nations one large and important group came automatically into existence when the greater states, to which they had belonged before the war, fell out or were defeated in the conflict. Thus Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia arose at once when Germany and Austria were beaten. The framework was there, the old national spirit was dormant and only waiting to be revived, and in many cases soldiers of those countries who had been fighting

unwillingly for their former masters transferred their services to the other side before the War was over. Poles had been living for over a hundred years in expectation of some international convulsion which would shake their nation into life again. Horrible and costly as the War was, it may be doubted whether anything less than a considerable war would have performed this miracle. In the case of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the nucleus already existed in the old states of Bohemia and Serbia which are now disguised in the long, strange-sounding names. Another group arose from the defeat of Russia. Already, in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Soviet Russia had been compelled by Germany to resign Poland, Finland and her lands along the Baltic coast. The Allies in the Treaty of Versailles made Germany abandon this Treaty, but this only affected the hold which Germany had thereby gained over Russia. The new states which had been carved out of Russia, took their place in the new international community. These were Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania—in that order, going from north to south. But still other groups have to be added to the roll. Hungary became an independent republic though shorn of much of its territory. Bulgaria, of course, remained, but reduced in importance owing to the part it had taken in the War. On the other hand, Rumania was enlarged, by acquiring not only Bessarabia from the Russians, but also a large slice of the old Hungary, where the population was mainly of Rumanian blood and language.

But of the list of forty-seven, two groups still remain of special interest. One is the constituent members of the British Empire, who, from this time, begin to play an independent part ; the other, the states of the New World, which had been living under the hegemony of the United States, but now, in the new order springing from the War, were to have their own voice in world affairs. Of the

states in the British Empire, six acquired a seat in the Assembly of the League in their own right, besides being represented indirectly by the British government. These were Australia, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, India and Ireland. With Ireland, in 1921, a Treaty was concluded which gave the "Irish Free State" what was called at that time Dominion Status. She was still nominally a part of the Empire or British Commonwealth, with a Governor-General appointed by the Crown, but, like the other dominions, she could not have her own representatives abroad, and take her own seat in the League of Nations. "Northern Ireland" was, by this Act, separated from the larger part of Ireland and remained more closely connected with Great Britain. For India, while the peace was being discussed at Versailles, large new reforms were passed, which aimed at the same goal of self-government within the Empire. But in this case the problem is so vast and different, that India, apart from her gigantic and largely inarticulate population, can hardly be included in a list of the newly active forty-seven.

The states in Central and Southern America, however, are an important part of them, and their position is the more curious because, as we shall see, though the United States do not themselves belong to the League, the American States, whom the United States protect under the Monroe Doctrine, are for the most part included. The states which are thus, as one may hope, enjoying the best of both worlds, are Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, San Salvador, Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Costa Rica.

Another group completes the roll—the states of the Middle East which, besides Turkey, now take a part on their own account in international affairs, whereas before they were subsidiary to some stronger Power. Of these Persia

and Afghanistan are the most obvious, the former having thrown off the tutelage both of Russia and of Great Britain. And Abyssinia may be added, which has won free of Italy and is jealous even of suggested rights of other Great Powers over their autonomy, now secured by the League of Nations.

It will be noticed that this summary of the forty-seven states is not identical with that of those who had joined the League. That is a point which we reserve for the next chapter. We are speaking here of the new world of states, within which the League is making its way, and this new world differs from the old in being based on a far wider foundation of constituent members, these members being now bound together by links of partnership instead of subordination. The four autocratic empires—Germany, Austria, Russia and Turkey—have been broken up, and the two large conglomerates which, though not autocratic, were following the lines rather of authority than of free consent, have changed their course still further in the direction of freedom. The British Empire, which for two hundred years had largely inspired the political development of the world, stands out now again as typical of the new movement. The sentiment of unity which holds it together was probably never so strong, yet the political ties were never so slight. Each part of the Empire, with the great exception of India, and subject to certain provisions here and there thought necessary for the safety of the whole, is perfectly free to go as it pleases, even to go out of the Empire altogether. If we cast our minds back to the spirit of George III and of the majority of his subjects at the time, described in the beginning of this volume, it will be agreed that no greater transformation could have taken place. The World War, with all its losses and horror, has powerfully contributed to this result, and, with the

League of Nations, it is the most solid item on the credit side.

To attempt a sketch of the events, or the development, of even a few of these rising nations is clearly beyond our scope. The multiplication of independent states, especially with the struggles of their early years, increases the volume of history more than in proportion to their number. But it may be possible to note one or two common features, and interesting if we find them consonant with the leading features of the period which we laid down at starting. The states nearest to us in Western Europe will furnish the best examples.

In all of them there has been a marked increase in the interest in popular education. In many cases before the War, education, especially in the higher grades, was hampered by the difficulty of the dominant languages. We noted cases of this in Poland. The same thing was true in Bohemia, Serbia and elsewhere, and in each case the new culture, which is being hotly pressed since their emancipation, is based upon the native language of the majority. The new states are linguistic as well as political units. A new Babel, say the critics, with a confusion of languages all over the world. Yet, side by side with this, the number of actual living tongues, spoken throughout the world is steadily diminishing. The solution will no doubt be reached by various forms of bi-lingualism among the educated, who will add to their mother-tongue one of the larger languages for study and communication with foreigners. In the development of their schools the rising nations show a laudable readiness to learn from others, and it is interesting to notice that, whereas after 1870 the world was all going to school to Germany, in the new era English and American methods are in demand.

Another general feature is the agrarian revolution which has put the peasants in Eastern Europe (outside and apart

from the influence of Soviet Russia) in possession of the soil. Economically, this is the most important change in that part of the world since the Middle Ages. In some cases the new states have expropriated the old landowners, giving them some slight compensation. In others the landowners by a voluntary act have handed over the bulk of their property to those who were cultivating it. Rumania is the classic example of this. The Rumanian landlords, who, in continuation of Roman times, were in possession of very large estates, agreed in solemn session to make the sacrifice in the interest of national unity and to stave off the class war which threatened them from the north. The peasants in return, and in pursuit of their own ideal of democratic power and enlightenment, have, since this agrarian change, built at their own cost 10,000 school buildings. If teaching equal to their zeal is provided, that state will have the strongest basis for democratic rule in Eastern Europe.

This democratic spirit is the third most general and important feature of the new states. In some countries since the War dictators have arisen, of whom Italy, Spain and Turkey give the strongest and best known examples. But it cannot be said that dictatorship is their common badge. Where it has flourished, it is due to special circumstances, which made a strong uniting hand necessary, at least for a time. In Spain and Italy, which in any case do not belong to the class of post-war states, internal divisions forced a dictator to the front and gave him power. In Turkey the military success of their dictator, who saved his nationals from expulsion from Europe, sufficiently explains his position. It would seem, indeed, that Europe in the near future has not to fear the aggrandisement or imperialism of the larger states ; that was the pre-war danger. The horizon is rather darkened by the restlessness and jealousy of smaller democracies not yet settled down within their necessary

bounds, and often containing a minority impossible to disentangle territorially, but rebellious against the linguistic and racial majority who have formed the state. Such minorities exist in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and a special law was passed, as part of the settlement of Versailles, to secure protection for Minorities, and give them freedom of religion and language. These laws, as well as all disputes between the states, are under reference to the League of Nations, which is pre-eminently the League of the smaller states, with the support of the larger. To the League, therefore, we must now turn, leaving for a short description later the great state of Russia which fell out of the European Commonwealth owing to the War, and is now estranged and antagonistic to the League, which comprises all the other European states except Turkey.

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THE WORLD AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1920.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF ITS WORK

We saw in the last chapter that after the World War the position of the Great Powers who had made the war was seriously altered. Some of them had disappeared completely, the others relaxed the ties which bound them to their subordinate parts. In fact, the very idea of subordination seemed to have gone out of the relations of one political unit to another. Still more striking was the fact that a host of smaller states had arisen, all with a claim to speak, not only on their own affairs but on the general ordering of the rest, and this host was drawn, not as before from Europe only (with the great exceptions of the United States and Japan), but from the whole world. Not only were there some fifty states now speaking with a decided national voice, but some others of far greater bulk—China, India and Mexico, for instance, were on the way to asserting still greater weight. And these still incompletely organised states, all feeling their way to nationhood, were all extra-European. The world, in short, was coming to a consciousness of itself though the medium of nations. But for a good hundred years the world had been coming together by other means than nations. The story has often been told in recent books,* but it is essential to grasp it fully because

* *E.g.*, Mr. Delisle Burns : *Short History of International Intercourse* (Allen and Unwin).

it is at the root of the League of Nations and bids fair also to be a more and more important factor in the history of the world in future. Here, however, we are concerned not with the future but with the past. For nearly four hundred years, since the Portuguese began to feel down the west coast of Africa towards the Far East and the Spaniards under the lead of Columbus to explore and exploit the Western Hemisphere, trade and domination had been spreading from Europe round the globe. But the process was so much quickened in the nineteenth century that it appears as one of the special features of which we treat in this book. This quickening was due to one or two applications of science which made the transport of men and merchandise and the communication of men with one another far easier and quicker than they were before. The steam-propelled boat was launched in the eighteenth century and slightly preceded the railway as a commercial success. The railways did more, and also the telegraphs which immediately followed them. The aeroplanes and wireless of our own days, though greater mechanical marvels, have done less in binding the world together and reducing its relative size than the heavier machines of the nineteenth century. At once international relations began to quicken also and to take shapes which portended the permanent organisations of the latter part of the century. Within the sixty or seventy years which intervened between the establishment of railways and the Great War, some thirty different agreements were made between Western states, touching matters of common interest not political in the strict sense. Among the subjects of these agreements are postage, telegraphs, navigation, railways, copyrights, insurance, sanitation, fisheries, prisons, slave-trade and liquor traffic. They have received less attention than they deserve because they are not political and because they have not led to wars. But their story,

e.g. that of the foundation of the International Postal Union which has its office in Berne, is often as romantic, and always as important, as the story of most wars. One thing was clear enough. A set of relations was being set up between states, closely similar to those which had grown up within each state between its citizens, by which the old chronic hostility of castle against castle, tribe against tribe, was transformed into a normal state of peaceful business and mutual aid. No one who did not cherish the idea of the natural and unalterable enmity of man to man and state to state, could fail to draw the moral, and efforts were made by statesmen to extend the principle to politics. The growth of arbitration and of arbitration treaties in the same period are a proof of this ; and in the last year but one of the nineteenth century the Tsar Nicholas II went still further and called a Peace Conference of the Great Powers at The Hague to discuss the reduction of armaments. Armaments had been mounting, as we saw in previous chapters, mainly as the result of the competition of France and Germany in the 'sixties ; they went on mounting still higher till the Great War and have not yet sunk to the pre-'70–71 level. The Tsar was sincerely anxious, as Alexander I before him, to bring the world to peace, and he saw in the growing habit of international conference a ray of hope. But the Conference did nothing to secure its main object, though it resolved that a " restriction of the present military burden was desirable " and recommended the nations to consider it. It founded, however, a Permanent Court of Arbitration for which Andrew Carnegie, the American millionaire, built the Temple of Peace at the Hague now used as the meeting-place for the new Court of International Justice founded by the Treaty of Versailles.

The Tsar's sketch of the League of Nations in this Hague Conference had wider indirect results. It was an encourage-

ment to make more treaties of arbitration, and it kept before men's minds the possibility of solving their differences in other ways than by war.

In 1904 Theodore Roosevelt, who was then President of the United States, proposed a second conference, but the issue of the invitations was left to the Tsar Nicholas who had convened the first. The second Peace Conference met, like the first, at the Hague, and was attended by the representatives of forty-seven states, invited to consider the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the regulation of warfare on land and sea. It opened on the 15th of June, 1907, and sat till the eighteenth of October. Again the question of disarmament was raised and again it was dismissed in a resolution referring it to the consideration of the governments concerned. The only matters on which this Conference came to a definite conclusion were rules affecting the conduct of war—the laying of submarine mines, the bombardment of towns and the treatment of neutrals in war—all of which were thrown to the winds as soon as the Great War broke out.

But it should not be concluded from these failures that a permanent and well-thought-out organisation is likely to suffer the same fate. There was very little in common between these special conferences and the League of Nations except the underlying idea of superseding war, and in the meantime of regulating it. The Hague Conferences were called at the special instance of one or two men who happened to be at the head of the governments of their countries at the moment. There was no international instrument directing the summons, no permanent staff or secretariat to carry on the work. They were both fine gestures and little more. But the second conference brought a distinction to Roosevelt and an utterance from him which deserve recording before we pass to the fruitful efforts

on the same lines which followed the War. Roosevelt had taken an active and successful part in settling the Russo-Japanese war, and the Treaty of Portsmouth which ended that war in 1905 was signed under his chairmanship at Portsmouth in New Hampshire, not in England. Then came the Second Conference at The Hague. In 1910 he received the Nobel Prize for work done in promoting peace, and made a speech in acknowledging it at Christiania (now Oslo), the capital of the land from which the prize was given. "Granted sincerity of purpose," said he, "the Great Powers of the world should find no insurmountable difficulty in reaching an agreement which would put an end to the present costly and growing extravagance on naval armaments. . . . Finally, it would be a master stroke if those Great Powers bent on peace would form a league of peace, not only to keep peace among themselves, but to prevent by force, if necessary, its being broken by others. The ruler or statesman who should bring about such a combination would have earned his place in history for all time and his title to the gratitude of mankind."

It was Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt's successor in the presidency, who was to win that place in history, but he won it on a field strewn with the ruins of the old world of sectional alliances and nationalistic greed. It was indeed the prospect of that ruin which braced up the nations to take the momentous step and gave Woodrow Wilson the popular force to place the Covenant of the League of Nations first in all the Treaties of peace drawn up between the victorious allies and their defeated opponents in Europe. The success of 1919 was, in fact, strictly according to precedent. After the wars of religion in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Grotius had been inspired to write the first treatise on international law and Henri IV, or his minister Sully, to conceive of the Grand Design for a Concert of Europe.

The wars of Louis XIV led Saint Pierre to write his *Projet de Paix perpétuelle* in 1713. The Napoleonic wars founded the Holy Alliance. The greater disaster of 1914 and the greater unity of the world into which it broke made a substantial structure of what on previous occasions had been but a sketch or a scaffolding.

The League of Nations was adopted by the Peace Conference at Versailles on the 28th of April, 1919. Its Covenant was signed by thirty-two nations two months later. Its first meeting was held in Geneva on the 10th of January, 1920. The genesis of the Covenant is well known. President Wilson had included his Fourteen Points in his Address to Congress on the 8th of January, 1918. The last of the fourteen was, "That a general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants, etc." As great stress was laid on these Fourteen Points, especially by the Germans, in the peace negotiations, the President had a preliminary argument for forcing the Covenant into the Peace Treaty. The actual covenant which was accepted, is derived from two main sources, British and American. General Smuts and Lord Phillimore had been working on the British side; Lansing and Wilson on the American. In the final Committee at Versailles, which brought both schemes together and produced the Covenant as we know it, the leading minds, with Wilson's, were those of General Smuts and Lord Cecil.

The eight years since 1920 which have tested the work of the founders have not yet revealed any serious fault in the structure. The only considerable change which has been made was to enlarge the Council to fourteen or, with the United States, fifteen members. This was done in 1926. This Council, which is the Cabinet of the League, now consists of five permanent members (with a vacant place for the United States). The permanent five are Great Britain,

France, Germany, Italy and Japan. The other nine, temporary, members are chosen by the whole League at its Assembly. The Council meets four times a year and sees that the League's work is done. Without such meetings of the representatives of the nations themselves, the growing mass of the League's work would tend more and more to be done by the secretariat which is always in session and might furnish the world with an international bureaucracy. Besides the quarterly meeting of the Council the Assembly of the whole League meets once a year and sits for about a month. This always takes place at the beginning of September, and as there are now fifty-five member states, and each state may send three delegates, the crowded room gives some impression of a Parliament of Mankind. At this parliament the larger questions of policy are discussed and reports from the many commissions and committees are submitted for approval.

The League now represents four-fifths of the population of the world, though in some cases, notably that of China, the representation is hardly more than nominal. The accession of Germany in 1926 was the greatest step towards comprehensiveness which had been taken since the foundation. It still remains one of the glaring paradoxes of history that the United States, whose President had the chief share in its foundation, has never become a member. But the crowd of American visitors in the galleries bear testimony to the popular interest of their country. Mexico, Turkey and Soviet Russia are the other large absentees.

But all the absentee states are present from time to time on special occasions. Thus the Russians attended the League's Health Conference at Warsaw in 1921 and the Economic and Disarmament Conferences of 1927 and 1928. Only one serious withdrawal of a member state has taken place, that of Brazil in 1927, and the withdrawal was

accompanied by the expression of so much good will and readiness to help unofficially that one was left wondering why she withdrew at all.

But these points are taking us beyond the limits of this book, which does not profess to deal with events after 1920, and we must be content with a few illustrations of the League's activities, sufficient to enable the reader to judge of its general drift and frame some answer for himself to the questions which are sure to arise. Is it a success so far? Is it likely to last?

Our view in this book must be historical, and therefore the first question is to see how it fits in with previous events which have been described. A final judgment is as little possible as it was about the origin of the war. But a few points are clear enough. The League has come into the world primarily to take the place of the sectional alliances and the balance of power which had been current in the world from the sixteenth century onward. There have been plenty of separate treaties since the War, but in all cases, except when Russia has been concerned, the treaties have been concluded subject to the conditions of the Covenant of the League, have been registered with the League, and sometimes put under the care of the League for their execution. This was the case with the Treaties of Locarno which, next to the League itself, are the most important political event since the Peace of Versailles. The Treaties of Locarno brought together for the first time France and Germany in a solemn pact, guaranteed by Great Britain and referred to the League of Nations. One could not have a stronger contrast than between such an arrangement and the struggle before the War of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, with no one to hold the balance and the devil waiting for the hindmost. Again, this year (1928) the United States, feeling unable formally to take her seat

at Geneva, has propounded another pact to the nations, within the limits of the Covenant of the League, and aiming at the same great object of avoiding war as a means of national policy. In both—the Covenant and the American pact—any breach of the public peace as between nations would be treated, as we treat a breach of the peace in the streets of a town, as a question for the police, not as a question of policy.

Another clear point is that the smaller nations accept gladly the guidance and authority of the League. It takes the place for them of the larger aggregate to which before they had been compelled to belong. Galicia or Bosnia or Posen had rendered reluctant homage to Austria or Prussia, and their union with the larger country was not a permanent or healthy one. Yet it was not wholly bad. Smaller units need the discipline and the sense of solidarity which a well-ordered whole, larger than themselves, will give. To those smaller states, like the constituent parts of the old Turkish empire, which never had this experience in a helpful sense, the League came with still greater possibilities of good. And to those member states, of a great commonwealth, happily united like the British, the annual meeting at Geneva is a welcome opportunity of talking over their own affairs as well as those of the League as a whole. The numerous cases of averted war which have already occurred, have all been between smaller states, except when Signor Mussolini bombarded Corfu in September, 1923. In each case appeal was made to the League, and in each case—including Corfu—the appeal, directly or indirectly, led to cessation of hostilities. The Greco-Bulgarian case of October, 1925, is the most instructive because it recalls so closely some of the incidents which preceded the Second Balkan War. One Monday in October, 1925, a Greek sentry was shot on the Bulgarian frontier, and three days later Greek troops invaded Bulgaria. The Bulgarian General Staff telegraphed

to the officer commanding their forces, " Make only slight resistance ; protect the fugitive and stricken population ; prevent the spread of panic in the Struma Valley ; do not expose the troops to unnecessary losses in view of the fact that the incident has been laid before the Council of the League of Nations, which is expected to stop the invasion." The expectation was justified. A meeting of the Council was convened by telegraph and met on the following Monday. Meanwhile other telegrams had been sent both to Greece and Bulgaria, reminding them that they were Members of the League and calling upon them to stop their armies until the Council should have met. The Council at its meeting ordered the Greek armies to be withdrawn within three days, and by Friday the last Greek soldier had left Bulgarian soil. Nor was this all. A neutral Commission was appointed to examine the incident on the spot and apportion the blame. The report of this Commission was accepted by the Council at its December meeting and Greece was condemned to pay £45,000 as damages. Looking back on what happened just before the Second Balkan War, one notes with thankfulness the new force and the new spirit that had come into Europe.

It is no discredit to the League that its greatest successes have so far been gained in dealing with the smaller nations, because it is the smaller nations which most need its help. If, in dealing with them, the greater Powers preserve their unity and use their strength for the general good, this is precisely what the idealist would wish the League to do. It has done so in other matters besides the prevention of war. Both Austria and Hungary, broken in the War and impoverished by the curtailment of their territory, have been set up again financially by commissions appointed by the League and borrowing money on a League guarantee. It is a method which might well be extended to other cases. The Austrian

scheme was started in the autumn of 1922, and control of Austrian finances was maintained until the summer of 1926. There was no intention of any permanent supervision. Even in the case of "Mandates" the Covenant looks forward to a time when the "mandated" countries will be able to walk alone, or at least as much alone as any other independent member-state of the League of Nations. The Mandates Commission of the League, which stands second only to that on the Reduction of Armaments, was largely the device of General Smuts for providing international supervision for the colonies which were taken over from Germany at the end of the War and entrusted to Great Britain, France, Belgium and Japan. It was stipulated that these territories should not be merged in the general colonial possessions of the Powers to whom they were assigned. An annual report has to be furnished by the Mandatory Power, and this report is examined by the Commission in a perfectly friendly way, questions being asked of the representatve of the Mandatory Power who attends the Commission for the purpose. An able Swiss professor who was chairman of this Commission for some years, made a great mark by the skill and general acceptance with which his work was conducted. All who know the facts agree that it is a brilliantly successful part of the League's work. Many would like to see the same system extended to other colonies acquired before the mandatory idea became part of the law of Europe. We saw in earlier chapters how the notion was brought home to the public conscience at the end of the eighteenth century by various means and agents. The Society of Friends in England was one. The humanitarians of the French Revolution were another. Edmund Burke in his attack on Warren Hastings made it public and official, and the Covenant of the League gave it at last the sanction of international law.

Many chapters might be written on the sister-organisations of the League—the Permanent Court of International Justice sitting at The Hague, and the International Labour Office, which has acquired its permanent home on the Lake of Geneva before suitable quarters have been provided for the League itself. But space forbids. Nothing but illustrations were intended here, and we should pass at once to the intellectual foundations which underlie the whole, were it not that a word seems called for on the one great exception which stands out in the world to the operations of the League and its spirit. Of course Russia is the case, and about Russia it is the more necessary to say something because she figures largely in earlier chapters and, though shorn of her western provinces, she is still, for a large part of her surface, geographically European and claims through her present governors to be intellectually the most advanced country in Europe. Very briefly, what happened after the collapse of the Tsarist system during the War was this. A band of clever and determined theorists, disciples of Karl Marx, managed, in the dissolution of public confidence and the defeat of the imperial armies, to seize the machinery of government. They used it more vigorously than it had ever been used before, but entirely without the consent of the governed, as it would be ascertained in any constitutional country by a representative assembly freely elected. This idea—the Duma of the liberals—was scouted, and power was transmitted downwards from a governing committee to subordinate committees, or soviets, chosen from the labouring classes only. The possession of property was in itself an offence and excluded its possessor from any share in governing. It was, in fact, another despotism, obtained by completely inverting the old one. How this has worked in the ten years of its existence is the subject of a torrent of books and incessant controversy in all parts of the world.

The first dictator, Lenin, whose personal power was the greatest factor in the Revolution, died two years ago, and the name of Peter the Great's city was altered by his followers to Leningrad in order to keep his memory alive for ever. Minor changes have frequently been made in the ten years of Sovietism, and as difficulties occur—disease, famine, want of money, ill success of public enterprises—concessions are made to the property-owning instincts, still strong in the mass of the peasantry, and then again the concessions will be withdrawn. Little in general can be said about Russia in such a summary as this, except that she is clearly suffering and may be expected to come back gradually to the European comity. So far, however, she has made no sign of wishing to join the League, and on the occasions when her representatives have attended conferences, or been called upon to express an opinion about it, they have always spoken as if it were a "capitalistic" device, invented to bolster up the evil system in the world which it is their business to upset. There, in fact, we must leave them. The Communists, who are the force behind the throne in Russia, have their sympathizers in other countries of the West, but least of all in England or the United States. A small proportion of Communists are elected to the Chambers in both France and Germany, but the most fruitful field for the subversive propaganda to which the Russian Communists are addicted, is to be found among the unorganised masses of the East, and especially of China, where it seems likely that the great fight—let us hope a bloodless one—for the civilisation of the world will be fought out during the rest of the present century.

CHAPTER XXVII

EXPANSION OF SCIENCE IN THE NEW AGE — ITS UNION WITH PRACTICE AND THE WELFARE OF MANKIND

The last chapter, after sketching the progress already achieved by the League of Nations, ended on a note of discord and of expectation. Russia was still unreconciled, and tasks even greater than those of the past were seen awaiting the collective force and wisdom of mankind, in settling the problems of the vast populations of the East and of the countries not yet sufficiently strong or well organised to be free from the tutelage implied in any mandated or colonial system. It will be well before we close our study of the modern world to review—even more briefly—the other series of events and achievements that bring us to the threshold of the times in which we live. For side by side with the changes in politics and war with which we have been dealing in the last few chapters, great things were going on in that world of thought and discovery which lies, often concealed and unthought of, beneath the public appearances of statesmen in congress, soldiers on the field, traders and manufacturers pursuing their work in ships and factories and railways. We are more bound to do so in a book on this period than in any other part of history, for the century between the battle of Waterloo and the battle

of the Marne contains a record of the conquest of nature by thought which far surpasses that of any similar period in the past. So great has been the recent advance in science and invention that writers have compared it to the sudden bursting of a plant into flower, and one may well think that the chief work of the coming century will lie in assimilating and making useful for mankind the new stores of knowledge and power which have lately come into our hands. Something of this has been said in earlier chapters, but much more remains to be said, for the war, as a side issue, stimulated scientific discovery, and though much of the new knowledge had its immediate use in concluding the war, it all has far wider and more permanent application in the peaceful development of life. Indeed, in this sphere of the common utilisation of the resources of science lies the natural and permanent solution of the discords and evils that still afflict so large a part of mankind.

An illustration of this at once occurs to the mind in connection with public health. After the War, as always happens, there were widespread epidemics. In the west of Europe some hundreds of thousands died of influenza, while in the east, and especially in Russia, the more deadly plague of typhus broke out, which killed multitudes and threatened to invade the western lands which had for many years been nearly immune. The League of Nations, to prevent the further spread of the disease, drew a medical cordon between Russia and the West by centring a staff of doctors in Warsaw and other towns in about that longitude, while in the east of Russia bands of English and American nurses and others went out to work in saving the lives of the sufferers and feeding the hungry. In connection with this a Health Conference was organised by the League, which met at Warsaw in 1921, and was attended by Russians as well as the emissaries of the League. In the same spirit the

hospitals of Vienna were kept full throughout the War, detaining and relieving Eastern patients and thus preventing the spread of serious epidemics among friendly neutral and enemy countries alike.

These cases are an illustration of the way in which, when beneficial knowledge is once acquired, it finds its way, by diffusion and by the essential kindliness of mankind, all over the world, overriding the barriers of nation or even of war. But the period we are dealing with—the end, that is, of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries—is even more distinguished for its brilliant new discoveries than for the humane diffusion of the old. The latter process is going on all the time, but it has still a good many leagues to catch up. Three lines of advance may be distinguished in the new work, each of which contains several discoveries which appear to those who know them best to deserve the title of "epoch-making." We can here do little more than enumerate a few and refer the reader to places where he may find a more adequate account.* The first is physics and engineering; the second is biology, especially mutations and heredity; the third is cosmogony and the doctrine of relativity.

Physics stands first in revolutionary importance because it contains a new philosophy of the nature of matter in which men of science are still only groping, surmising the full significance. It descends from the discoveries in electricity to which we alluded in Chapter XVII. From the early discoveries of Faraday in the 'thirties, through Clerk-Maxwell, Hertz, Crookes and a host of others later in the century, men came by the end of the century to a new

* See "A Century of Invention," a lecture by Sir James Ewing, *Nature*, June 16, 1928. *Modern Biology*, Cunningham, Kegan Paul, 1928. *Astronomy and Cosmogony*, Sir James Jeans, Cambridge Press, 1928, and *Eos*, Kegan Paul.

conception of matter which identified it with electricity. It was in the last decade of last century that a universe of new " rays "—manifestations of what had before been known generally as electricity—burst upon men's astonished eyes. The so-called " X-rays " were the first to strike the popular imagination, rays by means of which " photographs " could be taken of the interor of the body or of objects concealed from sight by walls or metal cases. This was the sensational side of the discovery, the true bearing being a step in the revelation of the nature of matter. In 1895 Sir J. J. Thomson, examining the discharge from the negative pole of a Crookes' vacuum-tube, discovered that the rays consisted of a stream of separate particles—corpuscles as he called them—of negative electricity, all alike and all independent. These particles are what are now called " electrons," and together with a smaller number of " protons " or particles of positive electricity, they form the atoms of which the material universe is built. Measurement of their movement, inquiries into their behaviour, have ever since been the absorbing interest of physics. The supreme practical problem of disengaging the forces thus known to reside in every atom and using them at our will, remains and may long remain unsolved. But special manifestations of free electrons were known to be given out by highly heated substances—the glowing filament, for instance, in the vacuum bulb of an electric lamp. Such free electrons, transmitted by suitable valves, have since become the main factor in the wireless transmission of sound which is the great popular marvel of our age. Hertz and Marconi gave us the wireless transmission of electric waves at the end of the last century ; Fleming's valves, utilising the new discoveries, made wireless as we know it in the twentieth.

This is one—the most sensational and widely appreciated—of the new applications of science, but only one.

It is well to record a few of the others which soon became so familiar that we cease to wonder and only ask, "How could men ever have lived without them?"

The internal combustion engine is the other great invention of the end of the last century which has made a revolution in our lives. Not only has it made motoring, motor-traction and the motor-bicycle the business or the recreation of more than half the population, but by providing an engine light enough for flying it has made aviation practicable in peace and the most deadly weapon in war. All this has come, easily within the last half-century, but by the co-operation of a greater volume of the mechanical ingenuity of all nations than has ever been concentrated on one problem before in the history of the world. The results strike our eye in the crowded highways, and the bird-like flights of the aeroplane. Far greater and more profound, no doubt, is the effect on the mind of the new generation. It has created "the age of the chauffeur" and turned the man in the street into an engineer.

These two inventions—the motor and wireless—fill our minds so much at the moment that other things, which by themselves would be sufficient to mark an epoch, have tended to be obscured. One or two examples are worth giving, both to show the connection in the modern world of theory and practice and also the continuity of past and present in science and invention as well as in everything else. Take, as one, the science of thermo-dynamics with its great law of Carnot as to the equivalence of heat and work in machines. This discovery was made by a Captain in the French Engineers in 1824, but its full significance was left for Lord Kelvin to re-discover in 1848. The re-discovery of Carnot's cycle set the engineers' wits to work to bring their engines nearer and nearer to the perfect standard which Carnot had laid down on theoretical grounds. Hence a host of improve-

ments in every part of the steam-engine. But another simple application of the principle was enough to create a special new branch of engineering with wide and growing economic results. If by an ordinary engine you convert so much heat into work, by reversing the process and applying power from without, you can draw off heat from bodies and make them colder than their surroundings. This is the principle of the refrigerating engine by means of which foodstuffs are stored and transported without damage or danger all over the world. The whole world, indeed, by means of this and its attendant inventions, has become one orchard and one farm.

The one example must stand for a hundred others. What has happened is that, by the conscious, close and immediate co-operation of scientific research with practical application, our field of work and change in the realm of nature seems to have been indefinitely expanded. Nothing that we can imagine seems beyond the possibilities of accomplishment. And electricity—now seen to be a general term covering all the manifestations of the material universe—is our most potent instrument.

The other main branch of science is that which deals with the manifestations of life. We saw in an earlier chapter that with the discoveries of Darwin biology seemed to have leapt ahead. It had, as many thought, now found its Newton, and its future would consist in ordering all the facts of life under the master-idea of evolution. The sequel has not quite answered to this expectation. Darwin's work was great, "epoch-making" in the fullest sense of the term; yet it would be truer to think of him rather as the Copernicus than as the Newton of a new biology. Much has been done since his time in working on the lines of descent in tracing out ancestral descent from existing forms to their earlier progenitors and presenting animate nature as one connected whole—a tree of life with its roots in the simple germ of the

immeasurable past and its flower and fruit in eternity. Yet such work has not been the main preoccupation of biologists in these later years. They have rather turned to a closer examination of the facts both of life and of inheritance, how the creature functions, how its form is determined by its function—or vice versa—and, above all, how it transmits its qualities—and with what changes—to the next generation. The re-discovery of the Abbé Mendel's work at the close of the nineteenth century was a potent factor in turning the attention of biologists to the method and machinery of inheritance. If we have to select one aspect of biological work as pre-eminent in the last two decades, it will undoubtedly be this. Amazing work in detail has been done upon it—both here and in America—so that, to judge by one of the latest investigators,* we may actually be able to map out among the infinitesimal cells from which the new creature springs, the regions connoting the qualities of its parents. "Embryology," as this branch of the science is termed, claims now to be in the experimental stage. Experimenters, dealing of course with simple organisms, seem at least to have got in closer touch with the facts of the transmission of life than any earlier generation of biologists had dreamt of. Yet here, after all—as indeed in the discoveries of the new physics—we seem to be rather digging round the foundations than extending the mighty structures of the masters of the nineteenth century. All things are now under examination and the world is on tip-toe, awaiting to see the results. We shall not attempt to predict them, but only point out two or three somewhat comforting reflections. In the first place, the whole world is concerned and united in these inquiries ; in this region no nationalistic passions arise to deflect the conclusion. In the second place, theory and practice are at last working hand in hand. Every civilised

* Mr. J. H. Morgan, of Columbia University.

government, with sufficient men and money at command, has departments of scientific research charged with the duty of inquiring into the best means of improving the national methods in agriculture, in manufacture, in national health. In England the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, established in 1916 to assist us in the War, has been maintained and extended since, and is one of the beneficent legacies of a time which was mostly one of colossal material loss. And in the third place, while pure science flourishes and no one wishes to hamper the free spirit of the investigator, it is now admitted by all, and a cardinal principle of policy, that construction and not destruction must be the goal. Our knowledge, and collective power due to knowledge, have far outstripped our will and knowledge to use them for the good of all. It is as if, says one of the leaders of applied science in a recent speech, "we had given a child a sharp-edged tool before he has sense to handle it wisely. We have given him the power to do irreparable mischief when he scarcely knows the difference between good and evil. Does it not follow that the duty of leadership is to educate his judgment and his conscience?" In this matter the League of Nations, which has among its Committees one on Intellectual Co-operation, will find unending work before it, when the fear of another devastating war has been put aside, so far as the machinery of conciliation can do it.

We mentioned at the beginning of this chapter three main branches of scientific work on which the last few years of European history have contributed results which will stand out when much of the political details, on which we have perforce dealt at some length, has been forgotten. Two have now been sketched, but the third remains, and in the minds of most thoughtful people it takes precedence of all the rest. It is connected, too, with the new physics which has made it possible and assisted it at every step. This is

the new doctrine of Relativity which remodels our notions of infinite space and brings the light of the most distant stars back to us, a part of ourselves. The name of Einstein is the greatest here, but he is surrounded by a host of fellow workers of whom some of the most eminent are in English Universities. It would be idle in a few sentences to attempt to sketch this tremendous subject, but wrong to omit it altogether. There are many short popular accounts, and it is a bracing thing to apply one's mind steadily—any one can do it—to understand what is, in the first place, a piece of common sense and straightforward mathematics. But in mentioning it here, it may be worth while to add two or three considerations which link up the new doctrine of relativity and the new cosmogony with the general tenor of this book. It marches, firstly, with all the discoveries in physics, to which we have alluded in this and previous chapters. The observations on light with which Einstein worked would have been impossible without the spectral analysis of the later nineteenth century. The physics and chemistry of the stars and nebulæ are a development of that based on terrestrial problems. In this sense the new view of the universe which Sir James Jeans has just given us, includes not only Einstein's special intuitions, but the sound work of all his predecessors. Newton, as Einstein has often said, is not superseded, but only corrected in detail and vastly supplemented. The picture thus unfolded by modern physics and chemistry, combined and held together by the mathematics of relativity, is the most striking intellectual effort of the new century. For plain people, such as the writer and perhaps the majority of the readers of this book, it is the concrete aspects of the problem which will attract the most attention. Through spaces so vast that they can only be reckoned in millions of millions of light-years, the mind wanders to nebulæ being born from chaos under our actual

vision, where steps may be traced which are preparing for later æons fresh systems of stars like the Sun, throwing off, as tidal masses, fresh planets like our own, with life perhaps arising again, either to continue what we know or on lines of new and higher growth. Light has revealed it to us, and light has been resolved into forms of atomic motion which we may trace in similar and predictable movements in these unimaginable depths of space. There, too, the electrons revolve in their own planetary system round their central nucleus and form the superficial atmosphere of bodies, emitting activity from within of a still higher order, but subject, as we are confident, to laws of which the foundations have been laid by experiments on our own globe. But the most staggering point, the coping-stone provided by the new relativity of Einstein, remains. This revealing light is not now to be regarded as wandering off in straight lines into an infinite space, but returns to complete its circuit. The universe is no longer an infinite, or, if an infinite, is centred and contained in the eye and the mind of the observing man.

EPILOGUE

We have stopped in our survey of the Modern World at 1920, because the first meeting of the League of Nations gives a well-marked turning-point, the end of one era, the beginning of another. It marked the close of the great hostile combinations which had shaken the world for many years and led to the World War. It marked, on the other hand, the beginning of a new system, the deliberate and organised effort to settle the affairs of the world on the basis of co-operation. We anticipated enough of the sequel to see that a start has been made with growing goodwill and more success than even the founders of the League had dared to hope for. The world is now settling down to this new state of things, and it is so complicated that very few of us, even of those most in sympathy with new ideas and developments, can be in touch with more than a small part of what is going on. Meanwhile the notion is widely diffused that the new century, at least since the Great War, really contains a brand new world, and that its problems must all be solved on brand new principles, that it will be well to let the bad old past bury its dead and begin with a clean sheet all round. A few words on this, recalling us to the other side of the complex picture, may serve as an epilogue.

The notion of a fresh start is a wholesome and stimulating thing, and it often happens in our own lives, as well as in the lives of states and civilisations, that changes are so marked that the chapter which follows may be truly called new. So it is

conspicuously with the League, though when we trace the earlier history it is clear enough that such a thing was coming, and was indeed tried imperfectly and partially many times before. The truth is that the nearer we come to an art, to the doing of something to satisfy an idea, the newer that thing will be. Hence, in the age we live in, there is much new art, and our League of Nations is a great new art, answering to, and embodying, an idea. But when we come to the way men think and feel, the passions and necessities of their lives, the novelty, when we examine it, is not found to be so great. In the last chapter we saw how men of science in recent years were digging round the foundations of the great conclusions of the past. There was a new physics, a new cosmogony, and new lines of research in biology. Yet if we take each line of thought in detail, and trace it back, it is soon found that each is the direct result of some one else's work in the past. Darwin has not been overthrown, or Newton. And the new workers who know most of the subjects, are always found to be most ready to acknowledge their debt to those who went before. Science is the most perfect example of this continuity, which is one reason why it is so good for us to study its history.

We have said less in this book about the literature of the period, because it has been so abundant, and because there are so many histories, treating of it by itself. In the new century there has been a great outburst of poetry, and of course a flood of novels such as the world never saw before. The poetry is certainly new, with a rush of happiness in life and interest in nature and animals and little things. It does not aim at sustained efforts or long arguments, but makes its effects quickly by sharp and well-chosen strokes. So it is with the modern novels, as compared with the slowly unfolded pictures of life which we have in the standard writers of the last century. Some people are now inclined

to leave these books undisturbed, though in high honour, on their shelves ; but if you take down one of the great books of the early nineteenth century on which our fathers doted—say one of Dickens' novels or Victor Hugo's—and lay yourself out to enjoy it with an open mind, you will make some interesting discoveries. One is precisely the point on which this epilogue is being written. Take *Dombey and Son*, though almost any other of Dickens would answer the same purpose, and, as you read, you will be feeling all the time that we are now living out, and trying to make actual and general, the kindliness, the care for simple people, the love of children, the hatred of pomp and selfishness that breathe through all his writings. We believe that Mr. Squeers and Dr. Blimber and Miss Pipchin are now extinct, and enjoy them rather as curiosities than as living monsters, because Dickens, speaking for the rising tide of humanity and of common sense a hundred years ago, has swept them into the museum. So with Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables*, which was a gospel to generous young men in the 'sixties and 'seventies. If these books have lost anything of their savour, it is only because the ideas of humanity and compassion which inspire them, have passed into the blood and breath of the new generation.

Another class of book less read at the present day than a hundred years ago, is the historical novel of which Scott is the great exemplar. The war and the keener struggle for existence which has followed it, have for the time destroyed the leisurely feeling and the desire deliberately to exalt and beautify the things of the past which are necessary ingredients in the enjoyment of Scott. The new generation is too conscious of the crimes and errors of the past to be ready yet to take up again the attitude of hero-worship. Nor will it ever again be an undiluted worship of the past.

As the stress of war-time is passing away, and men are

coming to treat the new age, with all its obligations and its fresh opportunities, as a settled thing, so the great writers and thinkers of the last century are living again. Dickens, George Eliot, Trollope, Tennyson among ourselves ; Victor Hugo, Dumas, George Sand, among the French. They did not foresee the fiery furnace through which Europe had to pass, but they had the joy in life, the hope for the future, the love of mankind of which the new world must be made. Goethe, the greatest of the modern Germans, stands above them, living rather in the sphere of eternal thoughts than in the busy, throbbing, popular life of the present. Scott, who, for idealisation of the past, surpasses all, does not speak as a voice of the nineteenth century, because that age looked forward while he looked back. To him the chivalry of war and the pomp of kingship were sacred and immutable things, and this new age has somehow to learn that while these things were glorious and useful, even necessary in their time, the times have changed and we must change with them.

Much of this book has been devoted to an account of wars and, if history is to be truthful, it cannot do otherwise, but it was often stated as we passed, that this or that war might have been avoided. This should never be taken as a condemnation of those who conducted, still less of those who took part in, any war. Sometimes one may trace a personal responsibility which seems to involve a moral crime. Never can one feel anything but admiration for those who gave—what most men cling to longest—their lives, for a cause which went far beyond them, always in the nineteenth century embraced their country, often, as in the World War, seemed to involve the safety and future happiness of all mankind. Here, then, is the paradox : we praise and honour those who did a thing which we believe it vital to the world to prevent in future.

Only the historic sense can save us here. We have to

learn to see the good in things that time may render needless, or even evil. We stand on their shoulders—the great ones of the past—but not for that reason do we look down upon them. They lived and sometimes died before their time, that we might live still better. We have to add to a present love and service of mankind an even deeper feeling for those who have gone before us and made us what we are.

Our story has traced the growth of co-operation in the world. The nineteenth century is the chief time in history when this has been made manifest in a hundred ways—of science and trading and common action for common ends. But there remains the deeper thing on which the nobility of every man and every nation and of all mankind will stand in the future, if it stands at all. That is co-operation with the past, the recognition that man lives and grows by the development of an inheritance. The present is strong not so much by the multitudes of those now living, who breathe the same air and hear the same wireless messages, but by the grateful memory of those who trod the same earth before us. And they are glorious and deserve our thought because through their labours paths have been opened, on which we may walk, and others after us, to a still brighter future.

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